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Resumo 
  
 O objectivo central desta tese é contribuir para a demonstração de que os indivíduos 
podem, quer adoptar uma focalização prescritiva tendente a depreciar fortemente os membros 
desviantes do endogrupo, quer adoptar uma estratégia de descomprometimento moral em 
relação às normas violadas por esses desviantes, no sentido de os desculpabilizarem, e que a 
adopção de ambas as estratégias visa manter e reforçar uma identidade social positiva. Neste 
sentido, reportamos quatro estudos baseados na teoria da dinâmica de grupos subjectiva (J. M. 
Marques, D. Páez, & D. Abrams, 1998) e no modelo de Bandura e colegas (A. Bandura, 1996) 
sobre o descomprometimento moral. No Estudo 1, medimos o grau de descomprometimento 
moral dos participantes, a intensidade das emoções negativas provocadas por desviantes do 
endogrupo, e as avaliações desses desviantes. Nos estudos 2 e 3, manipulámos o grupo dos 
alvos desviantes (endogrupo vs. exogrupo), e o seu contributo positivo ou negativo em 
benefício do endogrupo (Estudo 2), ou o seu estatuto de veterano ou de noviço no grupo 
(Estudo 3). No Estudo 4, manipulámos a crença dos participantes acerca de serem ou não 
capazes de valorizar (ou desvalorizar) normas morais e pedimos-lhe que julgassem membros 
normativos e membros desviantes do endogrupo ou do exogrupo. Medimos a intensidade das 
emoções negativas geradas pelo alvo desviante, e as avaliações de ambos os alvos. 
Genericamente, os resultados indicam que o descomprometimento moral, as emoções 
negativas e a avaliação de membros desviantes do endogrupo estão relacionados. Quando a 
situação de julgamento legitima a adopção de um descomprometimento moral, os participantes 
reportaram menos emoções negativas, o que explicava avaliações menos negativas dos alvos 
desviantes do endogrupo, mas não do exogrupo. Estes resultados sugerem que os indivíduos 
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podem optar por diminuir a importância das normas morais, quando confrontados com desvio 
endogrupal, desde que o contexto social legitime o descomprometimento moral. Discutimos 
estes resultados à luz da teoria da dinâmica de grupos subjectiva e propomos que esta teoria 
pode alargar-se no sentido de abarcar não só os processos que levam ao surgimento de atitudes 
punitivas em relação aos desviantes endogrupais, mas também os processos que, pelo 
contrário, criam uma tolerância em relação a esses desviantes, e como ambos os processos 
contribuem para manter e reforçar uma identidade social positiva. 
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Abstract 
  
 The main goal of this thesis is to advance towards the demonstration that individuals 
may adopt either a prescriptive focus leading them to strongly depreciate ingroup deviants, or, 
a strategy of moral disengagement regarding the norms that those deviants violated, as a means 
to explain away their behavior, and that both strategies function to maintain and to reinforce a 
positive social identity. We report four studies based n subjective group dynamics theory (J. 
M. Marques, D. Páez, & D. Abrams, 1998) and in Bandura and colleagues’ (A. Bandura, 1996) 
model of moral disengagement. In Study 1, we measured the intensity of negative emotions 
generated by ingroup deviants and the evaluations of these deviants. In studies 2 and 3, we 
manipulated deviant targets’ ingroup versus outgroup membership and their positive or 
negative contribution in benefit of the ingroup (Study 2), or their status as veteran or newbie 
members of their groups (Study 3). In Study 4, we manipulated participants’ belief that they 
were either able or unable to disengage from moral norms and asked them to judge normative 
and deviant ingroup or outgroup members. We measured participants’ moral disengagement 
from the norms in terms of which the targets behaved, the intensity of negative emotions 
triggered by these targets, and their evaluations. In general, the results indicate that there is an 
association between moral disengagement, negative emotions regarding the targets, and 
targets’ evaluations. When the judgmental situation legitimates the adoption of a morally 
disengaged stance by participants, participants reported less negative emotions, which, in turn, 
lead them to make less unfavorable evaluations of deviant ingroup targets, but not of outgroup 
targets. These results suggest that individuals may diminish the importance of moral norms 
when they face ingroup deviance, provided that they find themselves in a context that grants 
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them the legitimacy to do so. We discuss these results in light of subjective group dynamics 
theory and we contend that this theory can be extended to encompass not only an account of 
the processes involved individuals’ adoption of strongly derogatory attitudes towards ingroup 
deviant members, but also an account of the way in which these processes lead individuals to 
increase their tolerance towards these members, and how both kinds of processes may 
contribute to the protection and enhancement of a positive social identity. 
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Résumé 
 
L’objectif central de cette thèse est d’avancer dans le sens de la démonstration de l’idée 
selon laquelle les individus peuvent adopter, soit une focalisation prescriptive qui les amène à 
déprécier fortement les membres déviants de l’endogroupe, soit un désengagement moral à 
l’égard des normes violées par ces déviants, de façon à les déculpabiliser de leur 
comportement, et que ces deux stratégies remplissent une fonction de maintien et de 
renforcement d’une identité social positive. Nous rapportons quatre études basées sur la théorie 
de la dynamique subjective des groupes (J. M. Marques, D. Páez, & D. Abrams, 1998) et sur 
le modèle du désengagement moral de Bandura et ses collègues (A. Bandura, 1996). Dans 
l’Étude 1, nous avons mesuré l’intensité des émotions négatives créées par les déviants 
endogroupaux et les évaluations de ces déviants. Dans les études 2 et 3, nous avons manipulé 
l’appartenance des membres-cible soit à l’endogroupe soit à l’exogroupe ainsi que leur 
contribution positive ou négative pour le bien de l’endogroupe (Étude 2), ou leurs statuts en 
tant que membres vétéran ou novice de leurs groupes (Étude 3). Dans l’Étude 4, nous avons 
manipulé la croyance des participants de qu’ils étaient soit capables soit incapables de se 
désengager moralement de normes violées par les déviants et nous leur avons demandé de juger 
un membre normatif et un membre déviant de l’endogroupe ou de l’exogroupe. Nous avons 
mesuré le degré de désengagement moral des participants, les émotions négatives générées par 
le membre-cible déviant et les évaluations des deux cibles. En général, les résultats montrent 
qu’il existe une association entre le désengagement moral, les émotions négatives ressenties 
par rapport aux membres déviants de l’endogroupe et les évaluations de ces membres. Lorsque 
la situation de jugement légitime un désengagement moral, les participants ont rapporté moins 
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d’émotions négatives, ce qui explique leurs évaluations moins défavorables des membres 
déviants de l‘endogroupe, mais non pas de ceux de l’exogroupe. Ces résultats suggèrent que 
les individus sont capables de réduire l’importance qu’ils attribuent à une norme morale, 
pourvu que le contexte légitime leur désengagement moral. Nous discutons ces résultats en 
termes de la théorie de la dynamique de groupes subjective et nous proposons que cette théorie 
peut être élargie pour rendre compte non seulement des processus qui mènent à des attitudes 
punitives à l’égard des déviants endogroupaux, mais aussi aux processus qui, au contraire de 
ceux-là, engendrent de la tolérance à l’égard de ces membres, et comment ces deux processus 
contribuent au maintien et au renforcement d’une identité sociale positive. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this work, we explore the causes and functions of individuals’ tolerance or 
derogation of deviant ingroup members. We propose that disengagement from moral norms 
and associated emotional reactions are at the heart of these processes. We argue that in some 
intergroup contexts, individuals prefer to ascribe less importance to moral norms, than to 
downgrade the deviants. In so doing, individuals avoid the negative emotions that are usually 
generated by the negative contribution of ingroup deviants to their social identity. 
 We report research that we conducted in order to examine the above summarized idea. 
This research stems, in part, from what is already a vast empirical and theoretical work 
developed on subjective group dynamics theory (SGDT; e.g., Abrams, Marques, Bown, & 
Henson, 2000; Marques, Abrams, Páez, et al., 2001; Marques & Páez, 2008; Pinto, Marques, 
Levine, & Abrams, 2010). Proponents of SGDT view deviance as a functional intragroup 
process (see Cooley, 1956; Durkheim, 1893). However, deviants are a threat to the group as 
they potentially harm group cohesion, the group’s ability to accomplish group members’ goals 
including that of holding valid opinions about relevant aspects of the world, and, not less 
importantly, a positive social identity (e.g., Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Deutsch & Gerard, 
1955; Festinger, 1954; Levine, 1980; Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Therefore it is not 
surprising that normative group members strongly downgrade ingroup deviants (e.g., Marques, 
Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). Notwithstanding, deviant group members may be still viewed 
favorably by the group. This occurs in daily life, in the contexts of sports teams, political 
parties, or whole nations. Group members deviate constantly, yet sometimes their groups do 
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not seem to care much about it. By the end of this thesis we hope to have shed some light on 
the psychological processes that account for why in some situations groups disregard their 
deviants, whilst harshly dealing with them in other situations. 
Structure of the Thesis 
 This thesis is divided in five chapters. In chapter I-III, we outline the theoretical 
framework and the rationale underlying our empirical studies, that we report in Chapter IV. 
Finally, in Chapter V we discuss the major bulk of our findings, which we follow by our 
concluding comments including limitations of our research and possible future directions. 
 We devote Chapter I to describe the social identity framework, including social identity 
theory and self-categorization theory (e.g., Tajfel, 1978; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & 
Wetherell, 1987) and the small-group approach, that developed mostly from laboratory work 
on group processes that emerged mainly in the 1950s and 1960s  (e.g., Cartwright & Zander, 
1968). We point out the basic assumptions of the two paradigms and the differences between 
them. The small-group approach was especially directed at processes occurring in small, face 
to face, groups. We describe several studies showing that individuals join social groups in order 
to validate their beliefs about reality, and to achieve goals that they could not achieve in 
isolation (Festinger, 1950). According to this view, individuals are motivated to affiliate with 
similar others, who are in a position to validate their beliefs, and to help them to achieve such 
goals. In turn, the social identity framework deals mostly with the emotional-cognitive 
concomitants of membership to large social categories which require a sense of belongingness 
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to these categories and a sense of distinctiveness from other relevant social categories which 
are salient in any given situation (e.g., Tajfel, 1978, 1982). Whereas the small group approach 
emphasizes the intragroup processes based on individuals’ reciprocal affective bonds and 
shared goals, the social identity framework emphasizes the intergroup contexts in terms of 
which individuals develop a depersonalized attraction towards the ingroup, and fulfill (or not) 
their motivation to achieve and sustain a positive social identity. 
 In Chapter II, we outline subjective group dynamics theory (e.g. Marques & Páez, 
2008; Marques, Paez & Abrams, 1998). This theory borrows from both the social identity 
framework and the small-group approach. It sustains that individuals react very negatively 
against ingroup deviants, because these deviants are viewed as threatening to the positivity of 
the ingroup. Concomitantly, they praise normative ingroup members, because these members 
have a positive impact on the group’s social identity. Concomitantly, outgroup members are 
seen in a more moderate fashion because they have little impact on the value of the ingroup. 
This describes the black sheep effect (Marques et al., 1988), that accounts for the more extreme 
evaluations of ingroup members as compared to similar outgroupers. This phenomenon was 
robustly demonstrated by different studies, that we describe throughout the chapter (e.g., 
Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 2001; Pinto et al., 2010). 
 In Chapter III, we present theory and research about the biological origins and social 
shaping of emotions (e.g., Izard, 2013). We argue that, because the value of group membership 
tat stems from social comparison situations, has emotional significance to the individual. We 
discuss the implications of  group-based emotions (e.g., Mackie & Smith, 2015) and we review 
investigation suggesting that ingroup deviants generate negative emotions on other ingroup 
members (e.g., Johns, Schmader, & Lickel, 2005). We also review recent literature 
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demonstrating that sometimes individuals are lenient towards socially undesirable others by 
decreasing the importance that they attribute to the norms that those individuals’ transgressed 
(e.g., Traclet, Moret, Ohl, & Clémence, 2015). In these circumstances, people become more 
lenient because moral disengagement acts as a buffer against the negative emotions derived 
from the presence of deviant individuals (e.g., Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 
1996; Boardley & Kavussanu, 2008; Traclet et al., 2015). Based on these ideas, we move 
forward to discussing instances in which ingroup deviants are the object of such tolerance on 
the part of other ingroup members, the central aspect of this thesis, and we suggest that moral 
disengagement mechanisms may explain such tolerance by way of its mitigating effect on the 
negative emotions that are associated with ingroup deviants. 
 In Chapter IV, we report four studies. In Study 1, we asked a sample of Porto residents 
about their opinions and feelings regarding a gang composed by other residents whom, at the 
time, committed burglaries across the city. As predicted, the more participants disengaged from 
the moral norms, the less they reported negative emotions, and the more positively they 
evaluated the deviants. In studies 2 and 3, we manipulated deviant targets’ group membership 
(ingroup vs outgroup). In Study 2, we also manipulated the consequences of the deviant’s 
behavior to their group. In Study 3, we manipulated the deviant’s status in the group (newbie 
vs. veteran). As predicted, participants felt more morally disengaged, reported less negative 
emotions, and evaluated the ingroup veteran target more favorably, as compared to the newbie 
ingroup target, or to both outgroup targets. Importantly, moral disengagement was negatively 
associated with negative emotions which, in turn, predicted negative evaluations of the deviant 
newbie ingroup target. Finally, in Study 4, we directly manipulated participants’ moral 
engagement supposedly as feedback of a bogus test. We then presented participants with a 
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normative and a deviant ingroup or outgroup targets. As predicted, we found a black sheep 
effect in evaluations (and the corresponding negative emotional reaction) of participants who 
believed to be morally engaged. In turn, participants who believed to be morally disengaged 
were more tolerant towards the ingroup deviant, and the aforementioned effect was not 
observed. 
 We end this thesis with Chapter V. In that chapter, we discuss the implications of our 
studies as an extension of subjective group dynamics theory. We contend that that tolerance of 
ingroup deviants is also a component of subjective group dynamics, as individuals will prefer 
to be lenient to ingroup deviants rather than holding a punitive attitude towards these deviants, 
as long as this is legitimized by the context in which judgments emerge. We also discuss the 
practical implications of our results, and we point out a number of limitations, and suggest 
possible directions for future investigation. 
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THE SMALL GROUP APPROACH AND THE SOCIAL IDENTITY FRAMEWORK: 
TWO CLASSICAL PERSPECTIVES ABOUT GROUP PROCESSES 
Traditionally, social psychology has studied group processes along two main avenues 
usually referred to as the small group approach (e.g., Cartwright, 1954; Shaw, 1976; Thibaut 
& Kelley, 1959) and the social identity framework (e.g., Tajfel, 1978, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 
1986). Whereas the small group approach dealt mostly with the interaction between members 
of face-to-face groups and focused itself on intragroup processes such as group cohesiveness, 
member socialization, member roles and statuses, or leadership (e.g., Brown, 1988; Cartwright 
& Zander, 1968), the social identity framework dealt mostly with the cognitive-emotional and 
self-definition processes associated with individuals’ membership to large social categories 
(e.g. race, gender, nationality, etc.) and focused itself mainly on intergroup processes, such as 
intergroup competition and cooperation, intergroup differentiation, or social discrimination 
(e.g., Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1975). These traditions evolved separately especially until the late 
1980s (see Hogg & Abrams, 1988). However, they became more and more theoretically and 
empirically interconnected especially with the outset of self-categorization theory (Turner et 
al., 1987), an offshoot of social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978). This integrative trend emerged 
as an attempt by many researchers to reinterpret phenomena that, until then, had been studied 
in the realm of small groups under the theoretical scope of these two theories specifically, by 
embedding intragroup processes into the larger context of intergroup relations and by 
establishing the social identity antecedents and consequences of such processes (e.g., Hogg, 
1992; Marques, Páez, & Abrams, 1998). As a result, the two initially separated orientations 
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became an articulated approach to the processes involved in the construction, maintenance and 
change of individuals’ social identifications (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). In this chapter, we 
describe the main aspects of these two earlier, small group and social identification, approaches 
(and how they became part of a single integrated approach to group processes). 
The Small Group Approach 
 According to proponents of the small group approach, groups can be conceived of as 
collections of individuals who are connected to one another by interpersonal attraction and 
who share common goals. Interpersonal attraction and shared goals may either ensue from, or 
engender interpersonal similarity and common fate among group members (e.g., (Cartwright 
& Zander, 1968; Shaw, 1976). This occurs because the group provides a context for individuals 
to interact among themselves, and, consequently, to influence and to be influenced by others 
regarding their worldviews and the ways to attain group goals (e.g., Jones & Gerard, 1967; 
Shaw, 1976). The basic assumption of the small group approach is thus that interpersonal 
influence is one crucial of group life (see Brown, 1988). Interpersonal influence would create 
the cement required for group members to develop mutual attraction and to establish consensus 
about relevant social beliefs, about group goals and how to accomplish them (Cartwright & 
Zander, 1968),. 
As Marques, Páez, et al. (1998) pointed out the above general idea reflects, at least in 
part, the influence of the work by earlier sociologists like Cooley, Durkheim, Mead or Simmel, 
on the ideas of classical social psychologists such as Festinger (1950) or Sherif (e.g., 1936), 
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namely that the existence of a group largely depends on its members’ ability to create and to 
ensure consensus about relevant aspects of the group’s life. Specifically, with his seminal 
theory of informal social communication, Festinger (1950) proposed that group affiliation 
largely depends on factors associated with pre-existing similar opinions, as well as other 
factors, such as “propinquity”, or spatial proximity that facilitates social interaction and mutual 
influence between individuals (Festinger, Schachter, & Back, 1950). As a result, membership 
to a group should fulfil a social reality function, corresponding to the internalization or, at 
least, overt acceptance, of normative beliefs created through social interaction (see also Asch, 
1965; Sherif, 1936), and a locomotion function, corresponding to the unanimity about group 
goals and the ways to achieve these goals. 
Social Reality and Group Locomotion 
 According to Festinger (1950), the social dynamics which occurs within a group is 
based on two notions. First, people rely on social consensus to reduce uncertainty about 
relevant aspects of their lives and to achieve a sense that their beliefs about these aspects of 
life are valid and accurate. They do so by affiliating themselves with others who share similar 
attitudes and opinions, and/or by generating (or reinforcing) consensus in the course of social 
interaction within the group. This corresponds to the social reality function of the group. 
Second, people associate themselves with others with whom they share not only similar 
opinions, but also similar goals, so that the achievement of such goals is made possible or 
facilitated. This corresponds to the locomotion function of the group. 
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 Reciprocal influence among group members should generate uniformity and 
consensus. That is, people should be attracted to those who share views similar to theirs hence 
contributing to the subjective validity of their beliefs, as well to those who hold goals similar 
to theirs, hence contributing to the achievement of such goals. Concomitantly, people’s 
attraction towards others should be a direct function to the extent to which the latter contribute 
to such subjective validity and to the attainment of their goals. The negative side of this process 
is that belief validation and goal attainment should be undermined by dissent among group 
members.  
 
Social reality, group consensus and deviance. Individuals rely on social consensus in 
order to validate their views of reality. Social reality emerges from group life in the form of 
consensus among group members about such views. Festinger (1950), the author who first 
proposed this idea in the social psychological literature, argued that people’s opinions, attitudes 
and beliefs range along a continuum, or “a scale of degree of physical reality” (Festinger, 1950, 
p. 272). At one end of the continuum we have constructs that depend entirely upon objective 
tests of physical reality. For example, a one may believe that, when dropped from some height, 
a glass cup will break as it hits the floor. Such belief might be easily tested simply by dropping 
that object. Beliefs that can be put to test in this way, will depend from a much less extent 
about what other people think than other beliefs that have zero dependence upon physical 
reality. For example, one may believe that to never accept bribes is a moral obligation of every 
citizen. However, there is no way to physically test whether this belief is “right”. Its validity 
strongly depends on what other people think about it. That is, such belief cannot be validated 
by psycho-physical means as the drop of a glass cup, but it can be socially validated by 
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consensus among relevant other. Therefore, Festinger (1950) argues that in a group, when most 
people believe the same thing, this belief is viewed by group members as accurate or valid. At 
the opposite, when most people disagree, the belief tends to be seen as inaccurate. Group 
consensus thus becomes a major criterion against which people decide whether their views of 
important aspects of the world that surrounds them are accurate or not. From what is stated 
above, it becomes clear that deviance in small-groups refers to behavior by group members 
that decreases the group’s uniformity. It follows that deviants are those group members whose 
conduct threatens such uniformity (see Levine, 1980; Levine & Kerr, 2007, for a review). 
Dissent thus generates uncertainty, or lack of subjective validity (Turner, 1991). 
Motivation to avoid uncertainty would lead group members to devote significant efforts to 
prevent the emergence of deviant opinions and behavior both by other members and 
themselves. Subjective valid social reality should thus be a direct function of members’ 
conformity to the group’s mainstream views, or modal opinions (Schachter, 1951) and 
behavior. In this vein, members would be willing not only to exert their influence upon others 
but also to accept other members’ influence upon themselves. 
In an illustration of the above process Festinger and Thibaut (1951) had Psychology 
undergraduates form groups of six to 14. The group’s task was to arrive at a solution for a 
problem given them by the experimenter. Participants were assigned to one of six conditions, 
according to the groups’ homogeneity (High, Low), and the situational pressure1. Among other 
                                                          
1 To manipulate group homogeneity, participants learned either that they had been grouped based on 
their similarity and that there was no basis for group subdivision (homogeneity condition), or that they 
were selected to be as different as possible among themselves and that it was possible subdivide the 
group (heterogeneity condition). In order to manipulate pressure towards uniformity (low, medium or 
high) participants learned that the experimenters were either interested in observing how a group 
proceeds to achieve a unanimous (high pressure towards uniformity), a proportional majority (medium 
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things, the authors found that: 1) communication tended to be directed towards the members 
who expressed more extreme opinions; 2) the stronger the pressure towards uniformity and the 
greater the perception of homogeneity of the group, the greater is the communication towards 
the extreme members; 3) the greater was the pressure towards uniformity and the more 
homogeneous the group was perceived to be, the more efficient was the communication 
directed at extreme members, as shown by the fact that these members moved towards the 
modal opinion. 
Accepted influence would emerge either, privately, as the acceptance of other 
members’ opinions as true accounts of reality, or only publicly as an open effort to match other 
members’ positive expectations about the self (see Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; see also Asch, 
1951; Festinger, 1950; Schachter, 1951; Sherif, 1936). In turn, pressures towards conformity 
exerted upon members whose opinions and behavior diverges from the group’s mainstream 
should emerge both either in the form of persuasive communication, or in as hostile attitudes 
and behavior directed at these members (e.g., Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Levine, 1980; 
Marques & Páez, 1994). In brief, social regulation, cohesiveness, and the positive 
interdependence among group members should be strongly interrelated processes, and these 
processes should rest upon the social construction and maintenance of group norms (e.g., 
Forsyth, 2010). 
                                                          
pressure towards uniformity), or simply how they interacted while discussing about a (low pressure 
towards uniformity) decision regarding discussion topic. 
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Social Reality, Group Locomotion and Group Norms 
 Norms have been defined as informal rules that implicitly or explicitly set the 
appropriate attitudes, beliefs and perceptions to guide social behavior (Sherif, 1936). Put 
simply, they are behavioral rules (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) that moderate intragroup and 
interpersonal interaction by creating expectations about other people’s behavior as well as 
about one’s own adequate behavior in specific situation, thus boosting uniformity and hence 
reducing uncertainty (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). In the same vein Festinger et al. 
(1950) defined a norm as  “a uniform set of directions which the group induces on the forces 
which act on the members of the group” (p. 166).. Thus the degree of cohesiveness of any 
given group is relationship direct function of the degree to which group members conform to 
the norms of that group, such that, for instance a group in which there would be total uniformity 
should also be a group whose members fully accepted the whole set of norms which are 
relevant to that group (Festinger et al., 1950). 
According to Thibaut and Kelley (1959) norms are functional2 because, on the one 
hand, they help the group to exert control over members’ behavior and, on the other hand, 
because they function as social coordination principles which guide members’ reciprocal 
expectations about each other’s conduct. Norms thus decrease individuals’ efforts directed at 
predicting other people’ behavior, and at deciding about their own appropriate behavior, while 
                                                          
2 Nevertheless, some norms that were once functional still persist even if context changes have reduced, 
or even completely depleted them from, their functional value (e.g., Sherif, 1936; Thibaut & Kelley, 
1959). For example, a secret hand-shake that once served as a means for members of an outcast group 
to quickly recognize each other may remain in use even after the group lost its the former outcast 
position (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). Thus, although it remains normative, a behavior which, previously, 
had a functional value, may become simply expressive and hold a purely symbolic value which, 
nevertheless, helps maintaining group loyalty and solidarity. 
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decreasing the need to systematically exert reciprocal influence upon each other. As a result, 
norms help preventing intragroup conflict, while having the advantage of reducing the costs of 
interaction (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959), in that they replace an individually located interpersonal 
power by a more diffuse, but no less effective, collective power over the actual behavior of 
group members (see Sherif, 1936). 
In brief, we may view norms as the building blocks of social reality and group 
locomotion, which may either be internalized or, if not internalized at least overtly accepted 
by group members. In this vein, the acceptance of other members’ influence and the resulting 
enactment of normative conduct entails the operation of two kinds of influence: informational 
influence and normative influence (Deutsch & Gerard 1955; Jones & Gerard, 1967). 
Informational influence refers to standards that group members assimilate and internalize in 
the course of social exchanges with other members. In turn, normative influence is an 
externally located form of influence that corresponds members’ overt conformity to the 
expectations of the sources of that influence. Whereas acceptance of informational influence 
functions as a means to promote subjective validity, normative influence is a means to avoid 
the negative psychological (e.g. shame, guilt), and/or material (e.g., deprecation, punition, 
ostracism, and, ultimately, expulsion) consequences of deviance3 (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; 
see also Forsyth, 2010). In the words of Deutsch and Gerard (1955), informational influence 
                                                          
3 Thus, individuals conform with normative influence either because they anticipate the negative 
consequences of not complying or because others directly enforce their compliance (see Forsyth, 2010). 
For example, people will feel anxious and embarrassed when violating social norms such as asking 
someone to give them their seat in a public transportation for no apparent reason (Milgram, 1977). 
Similarly, people in a queue will react negatively towards someone who breaks the waiting line, 
sometimes even if that behavior involves no cost to those who comply – that is, they will react 
negatively solely because they notice a violation of the social order (Milgram, Liberty, Toledo, & 
Wackenhut, 1986). 
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can be defined “as an influence to accept information obtained from another as evidence about 
reality”, whereas normative influence can be defined “as an influence to conform with the 
positive expectations of another45” (p. 629; see also Gladwell, 2006). Informational and 
normative influences will lead people to, respectively, adhere to, and to comply with, group 
norms. Thus, as Forsyth (2010) puts it, “people obey norms not only because they fear the 
negative interpersonal consequences that their nonconformity may produce – such as 
ostracism, ridicule, punishment –, but also because they feel personally compelled to live up 
to their own expectations” (p. 199). 
The Social Identification Framework 
Contrary to the small-group approach – which considers interpersonal processes to be 
the backbone of group structure and process –, the social identification framework considers 
that groups’ existence depends on the individuals’ cognitive representations of the group, as 
well as their own self-representations as members of such groups. The present section deals 
with this framework. 
                                                          
4 ‘Positive expectations’ refers to those expectations whose fulfillment by another will generate positive 
outcomes to the individual, as opposed to the negative outcomes (such as ostracism) generated by 
failing to fulfill such expectations (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). 
 
5 The authors stress that the term ‘another’ may refer to ‘another’ person, group or one’s self. Thus, one 
can be under normative influence by the expectations of oneself, a group or another person (Deutsch & 
Gerard, 1955). 
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Social Identity and the Self-Concept 
According to Tajfel (1982) a ‘group’ is defined by external and internal criteria. The 
former refers to the acknowledgement and designations coming from outside the group, that 
is, the fact that others label and behave toward a collection of individuals in a similar way. In 
turn, the latter refers to the psychological awareness that group members have of the existence 
of their group, that is the fact that the individual accepts label as a designation of themselves 
and that they adopt behavior similar to others who are labeled similarly. Together, external and 
internal definitions turn the sense of membership to a group into one component of individuals’ 
self-concept – the other component being personal identity – their “social identity” (Turner, 
1984b). Social identity stands for the set of attributes that people perceive that they share with 
other people who belong to their ingroup category, and that distinguish these persons from 
members of outgroup categories in relevant social settings. In turn, personal identity can be 
described as the set of unique attributes, such as personality traits, body features, tastes, 
interests, etc. that uniquely distinguish the individual (Turner, 1984b). Nevertheless, these two 
components of the self-concept are not discrete, “since there are doubtless subtle and complex 
interconnections between the two” (Turner, 1984b, p. 527). This idea allows one to understand 
why people may view themselves and others as group members rather than as unique 
individuals, in such a way that they discard the unique features of the self in favor of the 
features shared with the ingroup as a whole. In this kind of situation, the self becomes 
exclusively represented in terms of their social identity, and as a result individuals’ self-worth 
is exclusively derived from the worth of their social identity. 
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Self-Categorization Theory 
The social identification framework proposes self-categorization theory as the theory 
that best describes the cognitive processes that explain the emergence of a social identity. Self-
categorization plays a decisive role in individuals’ motivation to uphold a positive social 
identity, because it provides individuals with a sense of group membership that distinguishes 
them from members of other groups in any specific social situation, while simultaneously 
approximating them to the members of their group (Tajfel, 1969, 1981, 1982). In Turner et al. 
(1987) words, self-categorization refers to “cognitive groupings of oneself and some class of 
stimuli as the same (identical, similar, equivalent, interchangeable, and so on) in contrast to 
some other class of stimuli” (p. 44). 
 
The perceptual accentuation process. Social categorization seems to stem from a 
perceptual accentuation process (Bruner, 1957; see also Tajfel, 1969; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963). 
This term is used to refer to a tendency to exaggerate differences between categories and 
similarities within categories to the detriment of intercategory similarities and intracategory 
differences. In a classical experiment by Tajfel and Wilkes (1963) participants were divided 
into three conditions and asked to estimate the length of eight vertical lines. The lines had 
different lengths that differed by a constant 5% ratio, from 16.2 cm to 22.9 cm. In one 
condition, the four lines smaller lines were presented with the label “A”, and the four longer 
lines were presented with the label “B” (the super imposed condition). In another condition, 
the lines were categorized randomly, so that the category label had no relation with the length 
(the randomly classified condition). In the third condition, the lines were not categorized (the 
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unclassified condition). The authors found that participants in the super imposed condition 
overestimated the differences between lines categorized with different labels, and, although to 
a lesser extent, minimized the differences among the lines categorized with the same label. 
These results were not found in the other conditions. The authors propose that the mere 
classification of stimuli into two categories determines an exaggeration of the apparent 
differences between categories, and the minimization of the apparent differences within 
categories (see also Tajfel, 1969).  
The perceptual accentuation process occurs when individuals judge physical stimuli 
(e.g., Campbell, 1956; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963), but also when they judge social stimuli (e.g., 
Eiser, 1971; Lambert, Hodgson, Gardner, & Fillenbaum, 1960; Tajfel, Sheikh, & Gardner, 
1964). In an illustrative study, Secord, Bevan, and Katz (1956) showed fifteen portraits of 
people to their participants. The portraits, ranged from very light to very dark skin color. The 
participants were asked to rate each face in terms of physiognomic and personality traits. They 
found that participants considered that the personalities of targets with a darker skin were 
similar to the stereotype of “Black people” while disregarding their physiognomic traits. That 
is, even the most Caucasian-like Black targets were viewed as sharing all the stereotypical 
traits of Black people. Doise, Deschamps, and Meyer (1978) found similar results. The authors 
had boys and girls characterizing pictures of other boys and girls on a set of 24 attributes. In 
one condition, participants were to characterize the targets of one sex first, and only then would 
they categorize the targets of the other sex, so that when they characterized the former they 
were not aware that they should also characterize the latter. In the other condition, participants 
were presented with both the female and the male targets and were asked to characterize them. 
So, whereas the former condition corresponded to a one group setting, the latter corresponding 
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to an intergroup setting in which two categories were blatantly contrasted with each other. The 
authors found that target descriptions provided by the participants in the latter condition 
revealed stronger similarity between the boys on the one hand and between the girls on the 
other hand, and, simultaneously, stronger differences between the boys and girls than 
descriptions provided in the former condition. Thus a clear-cut contrast between category 
labels induces not only perceptions of stronger similarities among the members of each 
category, but also the perception of stronger differences between the members of the two 
categories. 
Tajfel (1969) argues that as is the case of the general process of categorization, so does 
social categorization fulfil a “cognitive economy” function. As had been earlier suggested by 
Bruner (1957), categorization simplifies and orders a complex world, and is functional in 
adding meaning and predictability to the world, both physical and social, that surrounds the 
individual. The crucial difference between the categorization of non-person and of person 
objects is that the latter is often reflexive, in that it involves the self as an object of 
categorization, i.e. it entails a self-categorization process (Turner, 1982, 1984a). 
Concomitantly, Tajfel (1959) claims that this cognitive process leads to biases in one’s 
perception in a way that we tend to see members of a given category as more similar than what 
they really are, whilst we tend to see members of two different categories as more different 
than what they really are. 
Thus perceptual accentuation will contribute for the cognitive representation of 
stimulus arrays which have continuous real-world properties (e.g. skin color, height and 
weight, political position, etc.) in terms of dichotomy categories (e.g. Black versus White 
people, tall versus small people, fat versus thin people, left-wing versus right-wing people, 
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etc.) As Tajfel (1969) put it, perceptual accentuation breaks “continuous dimensions into 
discrete pigeon-holes” (p. 82). 
   
 The accessibility x fit hypothesis. Self-categorization theory borrowed from Bruner’s 
(1957) work on “perceptual readiness” to propose that the accessibility x fit process should be 
at the basis of the categorization of self and others as members of social groups and to predict 
which particular intergroup dimension groups would become a meaningful criterion to account 
for any specific social situation (Turner et al., 1987). It states that the salience of a contrast 
between social categories “depends upon an interaction between the ‘relative accessibility’ of 
the category within the perceiver’s repertoire and the ‘fit’ between stimulus input and stored 
category specifications” (Oakes, Turner, & Haslam, 1991, p. 126). Hence, categories must be 
simultaneously accessible to the perceiver’s memory and fit to the stimulus configurations that 
are present in the perceptual field, in order to become salient and thus be used as interpretive 
devices of the situation (Oakes, 1987; Oakes et al., 1991). 
According to Bruner (1957), category accessibility can be defined as the extent to 
which an individual may readily evoke that category to assign meaning to a given stimulus 
array. Such perceptual readiness should be a direct function of the frequency with which the 
individual evoked that category in the past. The more often a category is accessed in memory, 
the more likely it will be accessed in the future. It follows that some categories will be activated 
more often than others, depending on perceivers’ personal experiences, attitudes, beliefs, and 
the culture into which they are embedded together with the existing fit between those categories 
and the stimulus arrays that are present in each particular situation. As Oakes et al. (1991, p. 
126) pointed out, the outcome of this process is that “as the differences perceived between 
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individuals belonging to different (implicit) groups increase, compared to the differences 
perceived between individuals belonging to the same (implicit) groups, then the more salient 
will the social categorization become in the perception of those individuals” (e.g., Oakes, 
Haslam, & Turner, 1998; Oakes et al., 1991; Secord et al., 1956). To put it more simply, the 
more perceptually salient is a stimulus dimension (e.g. distinctive shirt colors) the more likely 
it will be used as a cue for category distinctiveness. However, such dimension will be used as 
a criterion for categorization only when it fits the most readily evoked category from 
perceivers’ memory (e.g. an ingroup-outgroup sports teams’ distinction), provided that this 
category is meaningful for the specific situation (e.g. a sports match).  
 
Functional antagonism principle. According to self-categorization theory, individuals 
construe the self-concept at different categorization levels. At the superordinate level, they see 
themselves as human beings – the human identity is salient. At an intermediate level, they see 
themselves as members of a given social group as opposed to other social groups – social 
identity is salient6. At the subordinate level, individuals see themselves as individuals proper, 
who distinguish themselves from other individuals at the personal level – personal identity is 
salient (Turner et al., 1987)7. According to Turner et al. 1987, intermediate (or group) level is 
the basic level at which social categorization takes place, since this level is the most 
                                                          
6 Other authors have claimed and explored the idea that the intermediate level of abstraction may be 
composed by finer gradations, namely through the existence of subgroup identities (see Hornsey & 
Hogg, 2000). 
 
7 The idea that self-categorization occurs along different “levels of abstraction” (Rosch, 1978, p. 189) 
is based on Rosch’s work on the vertical dimensions of categories. 
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informative in social situations8. The distinctive levels of self-categories harmonize themselves 
with one another in a way that if a given level is salient, the others become non salient (e.g., 
Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Turner et al., 1987). According to the functional antagonism 
principle, only one level of abstraction for self-definition will be made salient in a given 
situation – for example, one will not perceive him/herself simultaneously as a unique individual 
and as member of a group. Thus, at the intermediate level, social identity engulfs the perceptual 
field, so that the human identity and the personal identity levels become psychologically 
irrelevant for self-definition. 
 
The metacontrast principle, normative fit, and group prototypes. Once the accessibility 
x fit process turns an inter-category dimension into a meaningful device to make sense of a 
social situation, individuals will operate a metacontrast that will increase the distinctiveness of 
the categories involved. The metacontrast principle can be defined as the perceived ratio of 
differences between the members of one category by the differences between the members of 
two contrasting categories (Oakes et al., 1991; Turner et al., 1987). According to self-
categorization theory, individuals would intuitively and automatically apply the metacontrast 
principle by appraising this ratio between intercategorial and intracategorial similarities and 
differences. This would allow them to construe category prototypes as the optimal, or ideal, 
representations of the contrasting categories evoked in a situation (Hogg & Vaughan, 2008), 
i.e., sets of categorical attributes which best summarize the similarities among the members of 
the same category and the differences between the members of the two categories. Group 
                                                          
8 This corresponds to Rosch’s notion of basic level categories, i.e., a level at which the ratio between 
information received about the categories the cognitive resources to processed such information is 
optimal (see Rosch, 1978). 
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prototypes would therefore dramatically increase perceived inter-category differences and 
perceived intra-category similarities, hence the term metacontrast (Turner et al., 1987). Thus, 
one can see the metacontrast principle as the process that creates prototypes within groups, 
allowing a potentially infinite array of interindividual differences to be grouped together into 
a more straightforward distinction between group-prototypes (Turner & Oakes, 1989).  
The metacontrast principle is not only a device for construing clear-cut intercategory 
representations. Importantly, it also generates expectations about the relevant features that 
category members’ should display, that is, the extent to which category members’ behavior 
and characteristics match the specifications of the categories’ prototypes, or, in other terms, 
the members’ fit to the prototypical features of their group. Self-categorization theorists refer 
to this particular aspect of the metacontrast principle as normative fit (Turner et al., 1987; cf 
also (Oakes et al., 1998; Oakes et al., 1991). In brief, a given categorization will fit the social 
setting in which it emerges, to the extent that it also matches the normative expectancies that 
perceivers have about the relevant social categories.  
 
Social attraction as a function of similarity to group prototypes. As we referred above, 
prototypical group members are those who best correspond to the most distinctive attributes of 
their group. They embody the ideal characteristics that define the group and that distinguish it 
from other groups (e.g., Hogg & Vaughan, 2008). The prototype of each group serves as the 
term of comparison against which individuals compare other group members, and themselves. 
For example, Hogg and Turner (1987) assigned college students to one of two conditions 
depending on whether gender membership was either salient or not. Following this 
manipulation, participants were asked to complete a self-description questionnaire. The authors 
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found that participants in the salience condition described themselves more in terms of gender 
stereotypes than participants in the no salience condition. When individuals categorize 
themselves as ingroup members, they assimilate the group prototype and see themselves in 
terms of the attributes of the group, hence they become depersonalized (Hogg, Abrams, Otten, 
& Hinkle, 2004; Oakes et al., 1994). Social attraction is a consequence of the assimilation of 
the self to the ingroup prototype (Hogg et al., 2004). Thus, ingroup members “are liked, not as 
individuals, but as embodiments of the group – that is, to the extent that they are perceived to 
be prototypical group members” (Hogg & Hardie, 1991, p. 176). 
Social attraction differs from interpersonal attraction because whereas the former is a 
consequence of interpersonal similarities, the latter is influenced by the perceived ingroup 
prototypicality of the individuals. For example, Hogg, Cooper-Shaw, and Holzworth (1993) 
have demonstrated that group-based liking is strongly associated with perceived prototypicality 
of ingroup members (see also Hogg & Hardie, 1991). The authors asked employees of an 
Australian organization to participate in an investigation about the perceptions and feelings 
they had about each other, themselves, and the team as a whole. Participants were asked to 
complete a three-part questionnaire, and they should not discuss the study with each other until 
it was finished. This questionnaire assessed the perceptions of cohesiveness of the team, group 
prototype, and commitment to the team, as well as the perceived prototypicality of the self and 
fellow team members; it also included friend and group-based sociometric choices. The authors 
found that group liking and interpersonal liking were independent. More so, group liking was 
positively correlated with the perceived prototypicality of the self and others, whilst 
interpersonal liking was unrelated to prototypicality. Similar results were found by Hogg, 
Cooper-Shaw, et al. (1993, Experiment 2) and by Hogg and Turner (1985).  
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The above results support the idea that group cohesiveness is a function of the closeness 
of group members to group prototype, rather than the closeness of group members individually 
itself. Thus, when they categorize themselves as ingroup members, individuals will evaluate 
others based on their ingroup or outgroup membership. Because they are motivated to hold a 
clear-cut social identity, individuals will prefer group members who contribute to the cognitive 
clarity of intergroup boundaries. As a result, they will prefer members who are closer to their 
group prototype to less prototypical members. In addition, they will like ingroup members not 
because of their personal characteristics but rather because they are ingroup members. That is, 
attraction between the members of a group should be mediated by their common attraction to 
the ingroup prototype and this attraction should reflect upon each member of the group (Hogg 
& Hardie, 1991). 
Social Identity Theory 
Social identity theory (e.g., Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) proposes that 
individuals’ membership to a social category does not ensues only from individuals’ 
knowledge that they belong to a social group, but it has value and emotional consequences to 
them. According to Tajfel (1974, p. 69) social identity refers to “that part of an individual’s 
self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or 
groups), together with the emotional significance attached to that membership”. Thus, 
associated with this cognitive component, i.e., the awareness that one belongs to the group, 
there is an evaluative component corresponding to the value of such group membership as 
compared to alternative memberships to relevant outgroups, and an emotional component, 
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which corresponds to the positive or negative impact of the ingroup’s comparative value on 
the individuals’ motivation to hold a positive self-concept (Tajfel, 1978, 1982). Social identity 
can only be defined and evaluated through intergroup differentiation and intergroup 
comparison. It therefore follows that, in any specific intergroup setting, the basic way for 
individuals to fulfil their motivation to uphold a positive self-concept is by achieving positive 
distinctiveness for the ingroup (Tajfel, 1978; see also Abrams & Hogg, 1990). 
The Minimal Group Paradigm and Ingroup Bias 
 The work of Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament (1971) using the ‘minimal group 
paradigm’ later influenced the outlining of the so-called social identity theory, and 
demonstrates that in the absence of personal identity concerns, individuals are motivated to 
achieve positive differentiation for their group (Turner, 1992). To illustrate, in one of their 
studies, Tajfel et al. (1971) had school boys express their preferences for each of a set of 
abstract paintings. The authors then randomly divided the participants into two categories 
(‘Klee’ or ‘Kandinsky’), purportedly based on their preferences for the works of one of the two 
painters. Each participant was then asked to fill several matrices supposedly in order to award 
money to two target participants in the study. In one set of matrices, one of the targets belonged 
to the participants’ group while the other belonged to the outgroup. In two other sets of matrices 
both targets belonged either to the ingroup or to the outgroup. Together, these matrices allowed 
the authors to detect which one of several mutually exclusive possible money awarding 
strategies participants would choose. For example, participants could award the maximum 
possible amount of money to both targets irrespective of their group membership and how 
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much each one would receive (Maximum Joint Profit). Alternatively, they might award the 
maximum possible amount to ingroup targets irrespective of the amounts received by outgroup 
targets (Maximum Ingroup Profit). Still another strategy might be to award the most similar 
amounts of money as possible to ingroup and outgroup targets, even though this implied that a 
lesser amount would be awarded to both targets, or to each target individually (Fairness). More 
interestingly, participants might attempt to generate the largest possible difference between the 
amount awarded to ingroup targets and that awarded to outgroup targets even though, in so 
doing, they would award the former targets a lesser amount than if they chose another option 
(Maximum Differentiation). 
Tajfel and colleagues observed that, when possible, participants systematically 
allocated higher amounts of money to ingroup than to outgroup members, and, more 
importantly, that they did so while attempting to generate the largest possible difference in 
favor of the ingroup (Maximum Differentiation), even though, in so doing, they were led to 
allocate the ingroup targets less money than they would, had they follow alternative options. 
Similar effects were obtained in further studies which employed other methods of 
categorization, such as labeling participants as ‘overestimators’ or ‘underestimators’ on the 
basis of their alleged pattern of estimation of a number of dots projected on a screen (Tajfel et 
al., 1971, Experiment 1), or assigning participants to the “Heads” or “Tails” categories based 
on a coin toss (Billig & Tajfel, 1973). Together, these results account for individuals’ robust 
tendency to generate a positive differentiation between ingroup and outgroup by means of 
biased resource distributions between ingroup and outgroup members, and/or biased 
evaluations of these members’ characteristics and behavior – the ingroup bias effect (e.g., 
Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1978, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). According to Tajfel and colleagues, 
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underlying ingroup bias would be a general attitude of ingroup favoritism, defined as “any 
tendency to favor ingroup over outgroup, in behavior, attitudes, preference or perception” 
(Turner, Brown, & Tajfel, 1979, p. 187). In brief, the random categorization of individuals in 
contrasting social categories is enough to evoke a positive bias towards the members of the 
ingroup category and discriminatory behavior towards the members of an outgroup category9. 
This bias is motivated by the need to achieve, preserve and enhance a positive social identity 
(Tajfel, 1978, 1982). 
 It is important to note that although discrimination in favor of the ingroup can be 
triggered by intergroup competition for scarce resources (see Sherif, 1966), the minimal nature 
of the groups in the experiments conducted by Tajfel and colleagues make it impossible to 
explain this process in terms of simple competition between groups. Instead, as it was later 
concluded by Turner et al. (1979) the process seems to be explained by a “striving for positively 
valued distinctiveness for one’s own group” (Turner et al., 1979, p. 190). Hence, ingroup bias 
occurs because individuals are motivated to achieve and maintain a distinctively positive social 
identity as compared to a relevant outgroup, which leads them to favor the ingroup over the 
outgroup in evaluations and behavior (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
                                                          
9 Initially Tajfel et al. (1971) accounted for the behavior that they observed in the participants of their 
studies as an outcome of a norm of competition that would be triggered by social categorization. Only 
later, namely with the contribution of Turner (1975), were these results explained as a social 
identification phenomenon. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter we outlined a series of aspects which form the basis of the remainder of 
this work. Six important aspects came out of that outline. First, the small-group approach 
conceives of interpersonal similarity both as an antecedent and an outcome of interpersonal 
attraction and group formation (Cartwright & Zander, 1968). Individuals are motivated to 
affiliate with similar others with whom they share common beliefs, in order to validate their 
social reality and to achieve goals that would be unachievable separately. Therefore, the social 
reality of groups and the groups’ locomotion towards the attainment of collective and 
individual goals of their members should depend on groups’ uniformity and cohesion. In short, 
consensus as such is not the critical determinant of individuals’ sense that they hold accurate 
beliefs. Rather, it is intragroup consensus that plays the decisive role in subjectively validating 
individuals’ view of reality (see Turner, 1991). It follows that, in the same way as consensus 
among ingroup members is crucial to generate such sense of accuracy, so is dissent from other 
ingroup members that generates the most uncertainty (e.g., Cartwright, 1954; Festinger, 1950; 
Forsyth, 2010). As a result, group members will be motivated to actively ensure group 
uniformity and cohesiveness by exerting informational and normative pressure towards each 
other as a means to warrant group uniformity and cohesiveness (Deutsch & Gerard 1955; Jones 
& Gerard, 1967). This should explain why groups strongly react to deviant members, by 
exerting several types of pressure upon these deviants as a means to reestablish intragroup 
consensus (e.g., Asch, 1951; Festinger, 1950; Sherif, 1936). 
Second, as suggested by the social identification framework, individuals maximize 
differences between members of different groups and minimize differences between members 
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of the same group in social situations in which groups are salient, namely through processes of 
perceptual accentuation. In these situations, individuals are motivated not only to generate 
clear-cut intergroup differences and intragroup similarities. They are also motivated to achieve 
and to maintain a positive social identity. 
Third, social categorization and ingroup identification are context-dependent 
processes. Specifically, self-categorization theory assumes that the same two individuals may 
be categorized as similar in one context, and be recategorized as different in another context, 
even if there is no change in their own positions (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989; 
Oakes et al., 1991; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). Therefore, also prototypicality 
is context-dependent. Because the definition of group prototypes depends on inter and 
intragroup comparisons, a group’s prototype should vary “along with variation in the 
intergroup context in which judgments are made” (Oakes et al., 1998, p. 80).  
Fourth, group prototypes forms the basis for group cohesiveness and intragroup 
attraction (Oakes et al., 1998). Traditionally, group cohesiveness and intragroup attraction have 
been conceived of as a function of interpersonal, idiosyncratic attraction between individuals 
who, thereat, compose a group (e.g., Back, 1951; Newcomb, 1953; Schachter, Ellertson, 
McBride, & Gregory, 1951), as it has been suggested by various authors (e.g., Hogg & Abrams, 
1988; Hogg & Hardie, 1991). However, if one follows the tenets of self-categorization theory, 
one is lead to the conclusion that intragroup attraction is depersonalized, such that ingroup 
members are liked to the extent that they are perceived to embody the group prototype (Hogg 
& Hardie, 1991). Thus, instead of interpersonal-based, self-categorization produces group-
based, intragroup attraction (Hogg, Cooper-Shaw, et al., 1993). Therefore, the process of 
categorization creates a sense of interdependency between the self and the group (Turner, 
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1991) in a way that group-prototype becomes the compass through which group members are 
expected to guide their behavior, in order to assure and maintain ingroup’s positive 
distinctiveness (Hogg, Cooper-Shaw, et al., 1993; Hogg & Hardie, 1991). Depersonalized 
attraction is distinct from interpersonal attraction; while the former stems from category-based, 
intragroup prototype-closeness, the latter comes from interpersonal similarity (see Hogg, 
CooperShaw, & Holzworth, 1993; Hogg & McGarty, 1990; Oakes et al., 1998; Turner et al., 
1987). 
 Fifth, according to self-categorization theory, deviation is to be defined by the distance 
between one individual and the prototypical specifications of one’s group (see Hogg, 1992). 
By being too far apart from the group’s prototype, deviant group members should be seen as 
such because they jeopardize intergroup distinctiveness. Given so, when people face an 
individual that was categorized as a member of a given group but it is too far away from the 
prototype of that same group they might: 1) disregard the deviant, if the categorization fits 
perfectly that particular social context; 2) recategorize the deviant (change the group 
belongingness of that individual); 3) reset the whole social categorization setting, and engage 
in different dimensions for categorization (see Abrams, Randsley de Moura, Hutchison, & 
Viki, 2005; Turner & Oakes, 1997). These strategies would certainly improve the fit between 
social perceptions and the categorization of the individuals, however there are contexts in 
which strategies such as those stated above cannot be used: a deviant may not always be 
disregarded or recategorized. In such an instance, the deviant’s presence would definitely have 
a negative impact in the “clarity of distinctions between the groups” (Abrams, Randsley de 
Moura, et al., 2005, p. 164), thus this individual may be negatively evaluated and that will 
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encourage the reestablishment of the subjective validity of group norms by his fellow group 
members (e.g., Marques & Páez, 1994). 
 In Chapter II, we attempt to clarify the functional or dysfunctional role of deviance in 
the life of groups. As a member that poses a clear threat to people’s distinct (and positive) 
social identity, groups will be motivated to deal with deviants in a way that can reassure the 
positiveness of their social identity. However, unlike what is generally assumed in the realm 
of social identity theory and by self-categorization theory, ingroup bias may not be an effective 
strategy restore such identity. A more recent theory has attempted to solve this apparent 
contradiction. We deal with this theory – subjective group dynamics theory (e.g., Marques, 
Abrams, Páez, et al., 2001; Marques, Abrams, Páez, & Martinez-Taboada, 1998; Marques & 
Páez, 1994) – in the next chapter, in which we discuss how this theory attempts to articulate 
between the social identity framework and the study of deviance in groups. 
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SUBJECTIVE GROUP DYNAMICS THEORY 
 We devote this chapter to subjective group dynamics theory (SGDT; Marques, Abrams, 
Páez, et al., 2001; Marques, Abrams, et al., 1998; Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques, Páez, et 
al., 1998). SGDT followed from the basic assumptions of the social identity framework. From 
these assumptions, perhaps the most important ones are that individuals are motivated to ensure 
a positive and distinctive social identity, and that they fulfil this motivation by categorizing the 
self and others in ways that generate meaning and reduce uncertainty in complex social 
contexts while ensuring as much as possible a positive value to the self as a member of the 
ingroup category (Abrams, Randsley de Moura, et al., 2005).  
Based on these assumptions, SGDT evolved to solve an apparent inconsistency 
between evidence showing that individuals can engage in simultaneous intergroup and 
intragroup differentiations while showing an ingroup favoritism attitude, and the traditional 
claims that social categorization involves the simultaneous exaggeration of intergroup 
differences and intragroup similarities (the perceptual accentuation process; see Chapter I; see 
Tajfel, 1969; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963), and that individuals cognitively function exclusively 
within one level of abstraction (the functional antagonism principle proposed by self-
categorization theory; idem; Oakes et al., 1994). Indeed, according to SGDT, people strive to 
simultaneously attain and maintain intergroup distinctiveness, and the validity of ingroup 
shared reality, and they achieve this by engaging in both intergroup and intragroup 
differentiation (Marques, Abrams, Páez, et al., 2001; Marques, Abrams, et al., 1998). 
54 
 
As we have discussed in Chapter I, deviant group members may be viewed by the other 
members of their group as an obstacle both to achieve the group’s goals and to attain a sense 
of accuracy regarding the group’s shared view of reality. In fact, assuming that a positive social 
identity is an important part of such shared reality, deviant (i.e. socially undesirable) ingroup 
members will endanger such reality by putting at stake the perceived positivity of the ingroup, 
and, as a result, will probably be strongly derogated as compared, for instance, with similar 
outgroup members, whom, by definition, are largely irrelevant to the ingroup. This has been 
dubbed the black sheep effect (Marques, Abrams, Páez, et al., 2001; Marques, Abrams, & 
Serôdio, 2001; Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques et al., 1988). SGDT emerged first as an 
attempt to account for this phenomenon within the realm of the social identification framework 
(Marques, Páez, et al., 1998). 
Deviance in Groups 
Empirical evidence on small groups has consistently shown that deviant group 
members are usually derogated, or even excluded from the group, by the other group members. 
To illustrate, in a classical study, Schachter (1951) demonstrated that groups punish and exert 
pressure upon deviants in order to reestablish group uniformity. The author had groups of eight 
to ten members – including three confederates – discussing a case of juvenile delinquency. 
Participants would hear about the case and should state their position about “What should be 
done with this kid?” on a scale from 1 (“all-love”), to 7 (“all-punishment”). The three 
confederate participants were instructed to play a role: the “deviate” confederate would 
consistently adopt a position of extreme disagreement with the participants’ opinion 
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throughout the discussion; the “modal” confederate would adopt and maintain the majority 
position of the group; the “slider” would start from a position of extreme disagreement with 
the participants’ opinion, but would gradually join this opinion in such a way that at the end of 
the discussion he should be at the modal position. At the end of the discussions the participants 
evaluated each other mutually, and they assigned other participants to different committees of 
varying prestige within the group. Among other things, Schachter found that participants 
stopped communicating with the deviant confederate from the moment they realized he would 
not change his position, and with the slider as it became clear that he had joined the modal 
position. In addition, participants evaluated the deviant confederate negatively, whereas the 
slider and the modal confederates were equally positively evaluated. Thus, the interruption of 
communication with the deviant was due to the fact that communicating with him was no 
longer viewed as an effective means to make him change his mind. This was not the case with 
the slider. Participants stopped communicating with this confederate because communication 
had proved effective and was no longer necessary. In addition, the deviant confederate was 
systematically designated to lower prestige committees, than were the slider and the modal 
confederate. 
 In a similar vein, Jones and DeCharms (1957) had groups of five or six participants 
perform a problem-solving task. Depending on conditions, participants were told either that 
they would be rewarded on the basis of their individual performances, or that a reward would 
be awarded on the basis of the collective performance of the group as a whole. Unknowingly 
to the participants, a confederate was instructed to systematically fail to perform the task. In 
addition to the former manipulation, the confederate ostensibly failed either in spite of his 
attempts, or because he simply did not effort himself, to succeed in the task. At the end of the 
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experiment, participants were asked to rate each other, including the confederate. The authors 
found that, when the confederate’s failure was attributed to lack of effort, he was judged more 
negatively in the collective, than in the individual reward condition.  
 More recently, Earle (1986) had groups of 4 undergraduates (among which, one was a 
confederate), participate in a study purportedly about how people formulate and evaluate their 
opinions on the participation of undergraduates as subjects in research. Participants were asked 
to think about the issue and to give their opinions, depending on condition, either as individuals 
or as a group (e.g. “how can I?” vs. “how can the group?”). In both cases, the confederate 
systematically diverged from the opinion of the majority. At the end of the discussion, 
participants were asked to rank each other according to how much they would like each target 
to participate in an upcoming discussion. As predicted, participants rejected the confederate 
more strongly in the group condition than in the individual condition. 
Together, the above results indicate that deviants provoke negative reactions from 
fellow group members, especially when they are perceived to voluntarily endanger the 
achievement of goals for which group members are interdependent, that is group locomotion 
(see Chapter I).As Festinger (1950) pointed out, groups will react inclusively or exclusively to 
deviant members: the group may either exert pressure towards uniformity or exclude the 
deviant from the group (cf. also (Levine, 1980; Levine & Kerr, 2007)10. Whereas an inclusive 
                                                          
10 It is important to stress out that “pressure towards uniformity” does not refer solely to pressures upon 
the deviant member of the group. In fact, as Festinger (1950) puts it “ uniformity may be achieved by 
changing opinions of other and/or by changing one’s own opinions” (p. 276). In other words, 
“differences of opinion (…) produce pressure towards uniformity, which in turn produce 
communication (…) [which] can resolve opinion differences in two ways – either the group convinces 
the deviate to move towards its position or the deviate convinces the group to move toward his or her 
position” (Levine & Kerr, 2007, p. 772).  Thus, a group who faces deviancy will either: (1) change the 
deviate, (2) expel him/her, or (3) change itself (Festinger, 1950). 
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reaction refers to an attempt to change the deviant’s behavior or opinion so that it matches the 
group’s modal behavior or opinion, an exclusive reaction refers to the redefinition of group’s 
boundaries – i.e., expelling the deviant. Regardless of whether the group inclusively or 
exclusively reacts to its deviant members, research has shown that deviant members will trigger 
a reaction from the group aimed to restore internal consensus, and that people derogate fellow 
ingroup members who fail to comply with the normative rules of the group either by 
jeopardizing the group’s social reality, or by posing an obstacle to group goals (e.g., Berkowitz 
& Howard, 1959).  
Results like those summarized above suggest that people derogate ingroup members 
who fail to comply with the normative rules of the group either by jeopardizing the group’s 
social reality, or by posing an obstacle to group goals. These studies arise from the small (or 
face-to-face) groups perspective (e.g., Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Levine & Thompson, 1996) 
that we presented in Chapter I. Based on a similar idea, SGDT proposes that in groups which 
are exclusively defined by a shared membership, such pressures emerge in the form of 
intragroup differentiation (e.g., Marques, Abrams, Páez, et al., 2001; Marques & Páez, 1994; 
Marques, Páez, et al., 1998). 
Intragroup Differentiation and the Validation of Positive Social Identity 
 According to Durkheim (1994), deviance plays a crucial role in groups, mostly because 
it turns social control possible and thus provides group members with a sense of group 
membership and a basic motivation to participate in group life. In an apparently paradoxical, 
but, in fact, quite straightforward way, groups are led to create their own deviance, as a means 
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to legitimize social control and to allow group members to share relevant norms prescribing 
their conduct. More than acting as a deterrent of future deviance, punishment would thus 
function as a means to gather group members around norms and values whose thresholds are 
delimited by the action of the group itself. In other words, Durkheim suggested, by construing 
deviance, the group increases the likelihood that its members engage in punishing the deviants, 
which, in turn, will promote their adherence to the newly infringed norms (e.g., Durkheim, 
1895, 1994; Durkheim, 1953). 
 Interestingly, proponents of SGDT argue that the derogation of ingroup deviant 
members plays an analog role for individuals in that it helps them sustain a positive social 
identity (Marques & Páez, 1994). This is the reasoning behind research on the black sheep 
effect. 
  
The black sheep effect. The black sheep effect inspired (Marques & Páez, 1994) and 
provided initial evidence for, SGDT. As pointed out earlier in this work, the term describes a 
simultaneously occurring intergroup and intragroup differentiation process, in terms of which 
people upgrade likable ingroup members and downgrade unlikable ingroup members, 
compared with similar outgroup members (e.g., Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 2001; Marques 
& Páez, 1994; Marques et al., 1988). On one hand, the upgrading of likable ingroup members 
reflects an attitude of ingroup favoritism (see Chapter I). Likable ingroup members contribute 
positively to the positive image of the ingroup, so, they will be preferred to similar outgroup 
members. On the other hand, by definition, unlikable ingroup members have a more deleterious 
effect on the perceiver’s social identity than have unlikable outgroup members. Therefore, the 
former members should be derogated as compared to the latter, and this would be due to the 
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same ingroup favoritism attitude that leads likable ingroup members to be upgraded as 
compared to similarly likable outgroup members. In short, individuals praise those ingroup 
members who help to preserve the ingroup’s positive image, and deprecate other members 
whose behavior harms that image and thus contribute a negative value to their social identity 
(Marques & Páez, 1994). In the whole, “the black sheep effect should be considered a 
sophisticated form of ingroup favoritism” (Marques et al., 1988, p. 5). 
 In their first study, Marques et al. (1988, Experiment 1) asked Belgian students to 
evaluate one of six targets: ‘Belgian students’, North African students’, ‘Unlikeable Belgian 
students’, ‘Unlikeable North African students’, ‘Likeable Belgian students’, or ‘Likeable North 
African students’. As predicted, participants evaluated the ‘Likeable Belgian students’ more 
positively than the ‘Likeable North African students’; and ‘Unlikeable Belgian students’ more 
negatively than ‘Unlikeable North African students’. 
 In two other experiments, Marques and Yzerbyt (1988) had law students listening to 
good and poor speeches, supposedly issued by either a student of their course (ingroup 
condition) or from the philosophy course (outgroup condition), and judge the speakers. In one 
experiment, participants listened to two good or two poor speeches, one made by an ingroup 
member (law student) and the other made by an outgroup member (philosophy student), in an 
intergroup comparison context.  In the other experiment, participants listened to two good or 
two poor speeches, both made by two ingroup members or by two outgroup members, in an 
intragroup comparison context. The results showed that regardless of the context, participants 
evaluated the good ingroup speaker more positively than the good outgroup speaker, whereas 
they evaluated the poor ingroup speaker more negatively than the poor outgroup speaker. 
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 In another study, Marques (1990) asked freshmen of military school to rank a list of 13 
norms issued from the school’s manual from most to least important. Participants then 
evaluated two fellow freshmen, issued wither from their school (ingroup condition) or from a 
rival school (outgroup condition), from which one consistently complied with four norms 
(normative target); and one consistently opposed those norms (deviant target). Whereas for 
half the participants the norms were the four ranked as the most important (relevant norms 
condition), for the other half the norms were the four ranked as the least important (irrelevant 
norms condition). Results showed that in the relevant norms condition, participants evaluated 
the normative and the deviant ingroup targets respectively more favorably and more 
unfavorably than the equivalent outgroup targets. There was no such difference when the 
norms had been considered as irrelevant. 
 These and other studies (see Marques, 1990; Marques & Páez, 1994, for a review) 
support the idea that people evaluate likeable ingroup members more positively, while 
simultaneously evaluating unlikeable ingroup members more negatively, than equivalent 
outgroup members. 
Subjective Group Dynamics 
 SGDT emerged as an attempt to articulate between the core idea of the social 
identification framework that is subsumed by the metacontrast process and the results found 
on the black sheep effect. Indeed, whereas the social identification framework generally builds 
upon the principle that individuals accentuate intergroup differences and minimize intragroup 
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differences, the main assumption underlying SGDT is that intergroup and intragroup 
differentiation may be concomitant processes which function in support of a positive social 
identity (Abrams, Randsley de Moura, et al., 2005).  
 Figure 1 summarizes the subjective group dynamics process. According to this process, 
at the intergroup level, individuals should engage in the basic processes put forth by the 
Metacontrast 
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Figure 1 – The Subjective Group Dynamics Process. Adapted from Marques, Abrams, Páez, 
and Hogg (2001). 
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traditional social identification framework and, specifically, self-categorization theory. They 
should seek to generate clear-cut intergroup differentiation by establishing a metacontrast 
between the categories that are available in the context of judgment. Where no salient deviance 
emerges within the ingroup, positive ingroup distinctiveness should be satisfactorily achieved. 
However, when, following a successful intercategory differentiation, perceivers detect ingroup 
deviants, intergroup differentiation should no longer be sufficient to achieve positive ingroup 
distinctiveness. In this context, individuals should attempt to restore the subjective validity of 
the positive social identity that is being threatened by deviant ingroup members. Namely, they 
should attempt to establish the perceived legitimacy of their belief that the ingroup is not only 
distinct from, but that it is also better than, the outgroup, by derogating the deviants (Marques, 
Páez, et al., 1998). Thus, subjective group dynamics theory assumes that in intergroup contexts 
will lead individuals to attempt to maximize intergroup differences through the operation of a 
metacontrast, and will categorize themselves as ingroup members (Serôdio, 2006). Whereas 
sometimes11 intergroup differentiation alone should suffice to achieve a legitimated positive 
social identity; other times, salient ingroup deviance jeopardizes ingroup’s positive 
distinctiveness (Marques, Páez, et al., 1998). Those circumstances will lead individuals to 
simultaneously engage in an intragroup differentiation process, which is motivated by the 
intergroup context in which they are (Marques, Páez, et al., 1998). 
 The above idea received empirical support in a study conducted by Marques, Abrams, 
et al. (1998, Experiment 1). Participants were categorized in two groups, purportedly according 
to their reasoning style about an ambiguous murder case. Participants also had to rank the 
                                                          
11 Such as when there is no perceived violation of norms. In this case, simple social categorization may 
be sufficient to legitimate positive ingroup distinctiveness (Marques, Abrams, Páez, et al., 2001). 
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characters involved in that case according to their responsibility for the murder. In a second 
session, after receiving information that purportedly categorized them in one reasoning style, 
participants were informed that people who belonged to the ingroup reasoning style ought to 
rank the characters in a given order (which, “coincidentally”, was the same exact ranking as 
the one made by each participant), whereas people who belong to the other category ought to 
rank the characters in the opposite order (prescriptive norm condition). Other participants 
received no such information and just noticed the rankings made by themselves and by the 
targets (descriptive norm condition). In both conditions, ranking information defined the 
ingroup and outgroup normative rankings, while establishing that each participant was a 
normative member of their group. Participants were then asked to evaluate a deviant and a 
normative ingroup target (i.e., an ingroup member who deviated from the ingroup ranking 
norm, and an ingroup member who followed the ingroup ranking norm, respectively); or a 
deviant and a normative outgroup target (i.e., an outgroup member who deviated from the 
outgroup ranking norm, and an outgroup member who followed the outgroup ranking norm, 
respectively). As predicted, the ingroup deviant was evaluated more negatively than the 
ingroup normative member, whereas the outgroup deviant was evaluated more positively than 
the outgroup normative member, but only when participants believed that the normative 
ranking was corresponded to a prescriptive norm. In the descriptive norm condition both 
ingroup targets were judged more favorably than the corresponding outgroup targets and 
intragroup differentiation was similar for ingroup and outgroup targets. 
In another study, Marques and colleagues (1998, Experiment 4) focused themselves on 
the functions fulfilled by the ingroup differentiation process, and predicted that derogation of 
ingroup members who deviate from a prescriptive norm should lead individuals to increase 
64 
 
their identification with the ingroup. The procedure was similar to that of the preceding 
experiment, with two exceptions. First, all participants were in a prescriptive norm condition. 
Second, all participants completed a base-line measure of identification, both with the ingroup 
and with the outgroup prior to evaluating the normative and deviant targets (pre-identification 
measure). Finally, purportedly as part of another study, participants filled a second measure of 
identification with the ingroup and the outgroup (post-identification measure). As predicted, 
participants revealed higher ingroup than outgroup both pre and post-identification. More 
importantly, the more participants pre-identified with the ingroup, the more they derogated the 
deviant ingroup target; and the more they derogated this target, the more they post-identified 
with the ingroup. In other terms, ingroup identification generated and was reinforced by, the 
derogation of ingroup deviants. This result supports the idea that deviant’s derogation enhances 
the perceived legitimacy of a positive social identity, making it possible for individuals to 
engage in ingroup favoritism, “while also preferring particular outgroup members over 
particular ingroup members” (Abrams, Randsley de Moura, et al., 2005, p. 165).  
 
 Descriptive and prescriptive focus. According to the SGDT, both descriptive and 
prescriptive norms12 operate when judging ingroup deviants (Pinto et al 2010). According to 
Marques, Páez, et al. (1998), individuals will focus on descriptive norms to establish an 
intercategorial setting (thus categorizing themselves and others as group members), while 
prescriptive focus will be triggered by the presence of ingroup deviants, and serves the function 
of evaluating such members (see also Marques & Páez, 2008). 
                                                          
12 The two concepts are very similar to the idea of informational and normative influences occurring 
within face-to-face groups, which we have discussed in the Chapter I. 
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On the one hand, the concept of descriptive norms is very close to the operation of the 
metacontrast process (e.g., Hogg & McGarty, 1990; Turner et al., 1987; see Chapter I), as these 
norms convey the differentiation between, and the definition of prototypes within, categories 
(Marques & Páez, 2008). According to Abrams, Hogg, and Marques (2005, p. 166), descriptive 
norms “are perceived as essential for, inherent in, or entirely indicative of category 
membership”, thus providing with the criteria by which individuals should be categorized 
(Marques, Páez, et al., 1998). On the other hand, prescriptive norms refer to the moral 
expectations created within each category – “the requirements that ingroup members must meet 
in order to promote a positive social identity” (Pinto et al., 2010, p. 108). Therefore, these 
correspond to universal norms, in that such norms can be applied to every member of any group 
indiscriminately (Marques, Abrams, Páez, et al., 2001; Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 2001; 
Marques & Páez, 2008; Marques, Páez, et al., 1998). Hence, individuals shift from descriptive 
focus – in order to determine the intergroup setting of social contexts –, to prescriptive focus 
– in order to sustain the subjective validity of individual’s social identity that is jeopardized by 
ingroup deviants. This focus-shifting operates according to the social stimuli one faces at any 
given moment: descriptive focus will be evoked in function of the accessibility x fit process 
(see Chapter I); in turn, prescriptive focus is evoked mainly when group members deviate 
prescriptively (Marques & Páez, 2008). 
Descriptive and prescriptive norms also differ in their function. The former define the 
intergroup context and allow for the categorization of individuals as members of a specific 
group (ingroup or outgroup; see the upper part of Figure 1). Descriptive norms thus provide 
the cues which function as criteria for category differentiation and category inclusion, such as 
skin color, gender, nationality, and clothing or hair style, for example. Thus, descriptive norms 
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are statistical/differential cognitive tools that allow individuals to employ the context-specific 
criteria according to which they engage in intergroup differentiation and intragroup 
assimilation or, in other words, which allow them to function according to the metacontrast 
principle (Marques & Páez, 2008). In turn, prescriptive norms are not group-specific. Rather, 
they stand for conventional, generic criteria, such as generic moral principles, that equally 
apply to all groups while being useful to assign value to those who commit or deviate from the 
values that they represent. Prescriptive norms may thus be viewed as the tools used by group 
members to “ascertain, not ingroup distinctiveness, but rather the legitimacy of the ingroup’s 
superiority” (Marques, Páez, et al., 1998, p. 129; see also Marques & Páez, 2008; Pinto et al., 
2010; see the lower part of Figure 1). Honesty would be a good example of such a prescriptive 
norm. How honest people are, is not informative about their membership to a particular group. 
However, it may be a good indicator of the image these people’s group, because learning about 
the existence of a dishonest group member may be generalized to the whole group, thus 
jeopardizing its image as a whole (Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 2001; Pinto et al., 2010). 
Therefore, the explanation for the negative evaluation of ingroup deviants (such as 
dishonest ingroup members) lies on the “articulation between self-categorization and the 
focalization of individuals on the norms which support the positiveness of such self-
categorization” (Marques & Páez, 2008, p. 89). Hence, descriptive and prescriptive focus are 
concomitant processes: In fact, individuals’ descriptive focus dictates the social context in 
which deviant behavior occurs, while such behavior will, in turn, evoke individuals’ 
prescriptive focalization (Marques & Páez, 2008). Despite being complementary, these two 
processes are also independent, in that they fulfill different functions. From what we stated 
above in this chapter, one can presume these functions. On one hand, descriptive focus meets 
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intergroup functions (Marques & Páez, 2008). First, it defines prototypes within each category, 
thus defining opposing groups. Second, by creating group-prototypes, descriptive focalization 
logically implies the self-categorization process, in that we will “adopt one of these prototypes 
as defining elements of our own self-definition” (Marques & Páez, 2008, p. 89). Third, 
consequently, descriptive focalization also provides us with the “rules” to estimate how much 
individuals can differentiate within their categories without the need to be recategorized. On 
the other hand, prescriptive focus meets the intragroup functions of validating and sustaining 
the positive and distinct image of the ingroup when compared to a relevant outgroup (Marques 
& Páez, 2008). 
In brief, the main difference between descriptive and prescriptive focus “corresponds 
to the difference between a judgment that aims to a clear (and positive) distinction between the 
ingroup and the outgroup, and a moral judgment that aims to validate the normative opinion” 
(Marques & Páez, 2008, p. 92). 
Other authors have also distinguished between descriptive and prescriptive norms (e.g., 
Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991; Cialdini et al., 1990; Cialdini & Trost, 1998). The authors 
had participants walk by a parking garage that was either littered or clean. At that parking 
garage, half of the participants would see a confederate litter a paper bill, or just walk by 
without littering. The results showed that participants have littered less in a clean environment, 
than in a littered one; besides, participants littering increased when the confederate’s littering 
behavior drawn the participants’ attention to a pro-littering norm (i.e., in the littered parking 
garage). This pattern was reversed when the confederate’s littering behavior drawn the 
participants’ attention to an anti-littering norm (i.e., in the clean parking garage) (Cialdini et 
al., 1990, Experiment 1 and 4), experiment 1 and 4). Put simply, Cialdini et al. (1991) use 
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descriptive norms to refer to what most people do, whereas prescriptive norms refers to what 
most people approve or disapprove – respectively, these are the norms of ‘is’ and the norms of 
‘ought’. Descriptive norms are used by individuals as informational shortcuts to choose how 
to behave: people see what most others do in a given situation, and they imitate their actions, 
which usually turns out in an efficient and adaptive behavior for that situation (Cialdini et al., 
1991; Cialdini et al., 1990). For example, Milgram, Bickman, and Berkowitz (1969) have 
showed that people often guide their behavior by the way others behave: The authors got 
passersby looking up at a building simply by having a group of confederates stopping on the 
sidewalk and looking up at that building. 
Prescriptive norms are otherwise imbued with moral value and therefore they do not 
simply inform us in what we should do; “these norms enjoin it through the promise of social 
sanctions” (Cialdini et al., 1990, p. 1015), they “motivate action by promising social rewards 
and punishments for it” (Cialdini et al., 1991, p. 203). For example, Gouldner (1960) suggests 
that a norm of reciprocity impels people to help, and not injure, those who have helped them, 
thus collecting social rewards and avoiding social punishments. Notwithstanding the fact that 
these two norms overlap very often (i.e., what one ought to do, is what one typically does), 
Cialdini and colleagues also argue that these two types of norms as distinct, both conceptually 
and motivationally (Cialdini et al., 1990). 
 To summarize, according to Marques, Abrams, Páez, et al. (2001), descriptive and 
prescriptive foci differ in important ways. Whereas descriptive focus draws upon the 
comparative fit of targets’ behaviors to their respective categories, and/or upon the normative 
fit of those behaviors to their respective group prototypes, prescriptive focus draws upon the 
moral value of the behavior under scrutiny and thus the contribution of target members to the 
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value of their respective groups. Furthermore, whereas descriptive focus automatically 
establishes intergroup differences and group memberships, prescriptive focus entails some 
volitional properties of behavior in that it assumes that ingroup and outgroup members can 
choose whether to adopt behaviors that conform to, or dissents from, a prescribed standard. In 
brief, because descriptive focus ensures clear-cut intergroup distinctions, it is less likely that 
conformity to such norms will require high self-awareness, particularly when the social context 
is straightforward (such as when no deviance is salient, particularly within the ingroup). 
However, in social contexts in which an ingroup member endangers the subjective validity of 
the ingroup, individuals should be lead to more explicitly appraise the consequences of this 
fact to their group and to their social identity (Marques, Abrams, Páez, et al., 2001). 
Conclusion 
 SGDT follows social identity theory and self-categorization theory in proposing that 
individuals draw much of their notion of self-value from the value of their ingroups, and that 
therefore they are motivated to ensure that their groups are positively distinct from the 
outgroups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Additionally, SGDT borrows the small-groups approach 
notions that group consensus is essential for the subjective validation of group’s social reality, 
and thus that ingroup deviance triggers strong pressures towards the reestablishment of group’s 
uniformity (Cartwright & Zander, 1968). Based on this assumption, SGDT posits that the 
combination inter and intragroup differentiation are essential for the attainment of a positive 
social identity (Pinto et al., 2010). According to this theory, individuals construe intergroup 
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settings via the operation of a descriptive focus. In such context, the presence of deviant 
ingroup members undermines the positive value of individual’s social identity, and jeopardizes 
the distinct and positive position of the ingroup in social comparison to the outgroup. This in 
turn triggers a strong prescriptive focus by group members, which leads them to judge other 
members in accordance to whether they are beneficial, or detrimental, to the legitimization of 
the group’s superior identity. In short, ingroup members are judged by the conjoint operation 
of descriptive and prescriptive focus, that explain inter and intragroup differentiation, 
respectively. 
 The black sheep effect can be viewed as the corollary of these processes. Individuals 
derogate ingroup deviants, as compared to their outgroup equivalents, because the former are 
much more threatening to social identity than the latter. Simultaneously, normative ingroup 
members are evaluated more positively than similar outgroup members (e.g., Marques, 
Abrams, & Serôdio, 2001). In this vein, the black sheep effect is a sophisticated form of 
ingroup favoritism as it fulfils the same function of protecting one’s social identity. 
 In Chapter III we elaborate further on the ideas leading to our predictions in this thesis. 
Namely, we address the role of group-based emotions and how they may affect intergroup and 
intragroup relations. Moreover, we will discuss the relation between emotional processes and 
the way individuals sometimes diminish the importance of moral norms in order to tolerate 
ingroup deviants, instead of derogating them. 
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MORAL DISENGAGEMENT AND THE EMOTIONAL CONCOMITANTS OF 
SUBJECTIVE GROUP DYNAMICS 
 As we have seen in the previous chapters, an important process associated with 
individuals’ social identity is the more positive or more negative value derived from their group 
membership and the more positive or more negative emotional consequences of that values 
(Tajfel, 1974). This idea is in line with a broad existing consensus among psychologists about 
the role of emotional processes on human behavior (see Damásio, 2008; Darwin, 1872; Izard, 
2007). As a case in point, some of these authors have explored the possibility that deviant 
ingroup members generate a negative emotional reaction in their fellow ingroup members (e.g., 
Biernat, Vescio, & Billings, 1999). However, in spite of the fact that, as Lickel and colleagues 
have claimed “research on the role of emotion in social identity (…) is burgeoning” (Lickel, 
Steele, & Schmader, 2011, p. 153), to the best of our knowledge research on SGDT has seldom 
focused on the role of emotions in the achievement and maintenance of a positive social 
identity, both in terms of the derogation of ingroup deviants, and in terms of their tolerance. 
 In this chapter, we examine research on the emotional reactions towards ingroup 
deviants. We propose that ingroup deviants have an emotional impact on group members which 
plays an important role for the protection of ingroup’s positive distinctiveness. In short, how 
we feel has a decisive influence in how we deal with ingroup deviants. We also introduce the 
concept of moral disengagement (Bandura, 1999), as a useful conceptual tool for analyzing the 
set of mechanisms that are believed to reduce the negative emotional impact of misconducts, 
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and which may explain why, in certain circumstances, individuals tolerate deviant ingroup 
members. 
Emotions Past and Present 
 Emotions have drawn interest from psychological research over more than a century 
(see, for example, James, 1884), and were often viewed as a threat to the pursuit of Reason, 
and that rationality should control the deceitful, untrustworthy emotions (Keltner & Gross, 
1999; Solomon, 2008). This may have been the reason why the study of emotions was 
somewhat relegated out of the limelight by psychological research and researchers gave so 
much attention to cognitive processes (see Marques, 1986). For example, Skinner (1974) stated 
that “emotions are useless and bad for our peace of mind” (p. 92). Such dualism remained for 
centuries and is well illustrated by the Cartesian  mind-body duality and was present even in 
the views of authors like Tajfel (1969), who disputed the primacy of “emotion” as an 
explanation for social conflict, and only very recently this view was notably challenged by 
authors like Damásio (2008; see also Solomon, 2008, for a review)13. 
                                                          
13 Damásio was greatly inspired by the case of Phineas Gage, and more importantly, by the case of 
Elliot, a patient who was subjected to brain surgery due to a tumor, and in the process some tissue from 
his frontal lobe was also removed. From that moment on, Elliot was a radically different person: 
although his intelligence, locomotion or talking skills remained unaffected, he became utterly unable 
to make the right decisions, which came with a great cost for his personal and professional life. Latter, 
he admitted that since the operation he had never felt emotions again. 
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 Currently, there is some consensus around the notion that Human emotions are 
determined biologically and sociologically (Darwin, 1872; Ekman, 1984, 1992; Ekman, 
Friesen, & Simons, 1985; Izard, 2007, 2009, 2013; Keltner & Gross, 1999; Keltner & Haidt, 
1999; Panksepp, 2005). According to Izard (e.g., 2013), while basic emotions are discrete and 
fundamentally an evolutionary product (see Darwin, 1859), they often interact with cognitive 
structures (and other discrete emotions) to create emotion schemata, that are socially derived, 
and are what we refer to when we commonly talk about emotions. Emotions are also deeply 
imbued with social functions, and have a decisive influence in our social interactions (e.g., 
Izard, 2007). In fact, literature on group-based emotions (e.g., Mackie & Smith, 2015) has 
shown that group membership is an important source of emotional reactions, and that people 
often feel vicarious emotions.  
Emotional Reactions in Humans: Differential Emotions Theory 
As we have seen above, the feeling and the expression of emotions is likely 
“biologically based”. As such it is not exclusive to humans (Darwin, 1872; Ekman, 1984, 1992; 
Ekman et al., 1985; Keltner & Gross, 1999; Keltner & Haidt, 1999). In fact, despite some 
dispute between evolutionary theorists and social constructionists (see Keltner & Gross, 1999), 
it seems that human emotions are determined both phylogenetically and sociologically (e.g., 
Darwin, 1872; Edelman, 2006; Ekman, 1992; Izard, 2007, 2009, 2013; Panksepp, 2005). 
Izard’s differential emotions theory (DET) (e.g., Dougherty, Abe, & Izard, 1996; Izard, 
2013) shares this idea, stating that the emotion system is the primary motivational system for 
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human thought and action (see Dougherty et al., 1996; Sander & Scherer, 2009). DET follows 
a discrete approach14 to emotions, in that emotions are primarily carved by nature, each is 
functionally distinct, has different predictors, and triggers different behavioral outputs (e.g., 
specific facial expressions; Darwin, 1872; Ekman, 1984). Although there is debate about which 
concepts best describe the human emotional processes, we believe that the discrete approach 
to emotions has the advantage of being functional (Izard, 2007), since it categorizes emotions 
into discrete emotion categories, that are more easily assessed. 
 
The differential emotions scale. Since DET categorizes emotions into discrete emotion 
categories, they become more easy to grasp. In that sense, proponents of DET developed the 
differential emotions scale (DES; e.g., Izard, 2013) to assess emotions. DES is a “standardized 
instrument that reliably divides the individual's description of emotion experience into 
validated, discrete categories of emotion" (Izard, 2013, p. 124), that measures the experience 
of ten discrete emotions15, using 3 individual emotional descriptors for each basic emotion. 
Although these items are regarded as discrete, some emerge as combined factors (e.g., Boyle, 
1986). Hence, DET distinguishes between “the evolutionary derived basic emotions, and the 
                                                          
14 As opposed to the dimensional approach (e.g., Barrett, 2006; Russell, 2003), which defines the feeling 
of emotions as perceptions, according to which feeling a specific emotion is to categorize a broad core 
affect state through introspection (see Barrett, 2005; Scherer, 2005). For example, the experience of the 
emotion sadness stems from a core affect state – felt in a dimension of valence (i.e., feeling good or 
bad) and another dimension of arousal (felling activated or deactivated) –, that is later evaluatively 
categorized by the individual as sadness (Barrett, 2005, 2006; Russell, 2003), thus viewing emotions 
more as responses than having explanatory power as part of a motivational system (Izard, 2007). With 
regard to the present work, the obvious downside of this approach is the methodology used, which 
restricts emotional assessment to a point in a valence-arousal space (see Scherer, 2005, pp., for a review) 
 
15 These emotions are interest, enjoyment, surprise, distress, anger, disgust, contempt, fear, shame, and 
guilt. 
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developmentally influenced emotion schemata” (Sander & Scherer, 2009, p. 119), which will 
be addressed next. 
  
Basic emotions and emotion schemata. According to Izard (2007, 2009), the term 
emotion refers both to basic emotions and to emotion schemata. In spite of the fact that basic 
emotions and emotion schemata both have regulatory, motivational, and functional, roles, they 
differ importantly from each other. On the one hand, a basic emotion may be conceived of “as 
a set of neural, bodily/expressive, and feeling/motivational components generated rapidly, 
automatically, and non-consciously when ongoing affective-cognitive processes interact with 
the sensing or perception of an ecologically valid stimulus to activate evolutionarily adapted 
neurobiological and mental processes” (Izard, 2007, pp. 261-262). On the other hand, emotion 
schemata are what most people are referring to when they use the term emotion. Emotion 
schemata involve higher order cognition, in that they derive from the interaction between 
emotion and cognition. Such interaction is guided by factors ranging from the individual to the 
cultural level, thus developing continuously in the course of the individual’s lifetime, occurring 
with relative frequency, and lasting longer than basic emotions (Izard, 2007). Despite being 
composed by basic emotions, emotion schemata cannot be traced back in ontogeny; their 
activation depends less on perception than on evaluative appraisals. They are associated with 
individual differences, by learning experiences, and by social and cultural factors (Izard, 2007, 
2009). Therefore, emotion schemata are not innate, although they develop in humans since 
early childhood as a “natural outcome of emotion and social-cognitive development” (Izard, 
2007, p. 266), and from then on are the most common emotion experience and the main source 
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of motivation for behavior (Izard, 2007)16. In short, “an emotion schema consists of an evolved 
feeling plus learned labels and concepts” (Izard, 2007, p. 265). 
 As an example, Izard (2007) suggests that the development of basic emotions and 
emotion schemata is analogous to the development of the sense of taste and flavor. Basic 
emotions is comparable to the four basic tastes, in that they have emerged from natural 
selection, are universal, develop prenatally or shortly after birth, are innately distinguishable 
from one another, and derive from sensory processes (see Ekman, 1992; Ekman & Davidson, 
1994). Conversely, emotion schemata are analogous to the development of flavor in that they 
represent more than the sum of basic tastes, and ensues from the interplay of taste, smell, touch 
and sight, as well as of many idiosyncratic, social and cultural gastronomical factors. As it is 
probably clear for the reader at this point, emotion schemata (similarly to flavor preferences), 
are far more complex than its constituents, basic emotions (similarly to basic tastes). This 
difference has led researchers to focus more of their research in the stricter category of basic 
emotions, than on the broader category of emotion schemata (e.g., Ekman, 1992; Izard, 1992; 
Izard, 2007; Lewis, 2005; Wilson-Mendenhall, Barrett, & Barsalou, 2013). Importantly, such 
research strategy will also be the baseline of the thesis we present here. 
Similar to basic emotions, emotion schemata also seem to fulfill important functions. 
According to Izard (2007) “affect or emotion is continual in the human mind and always 
interacting with perceptual-cognitive processes” (p. 274). Thus it comes as no surprise that 
emotions play a decisive role in social interaction. We address this idea further in the next 
                                                          
16 While other authors use different terminology, the notion of emotion schemata is similar to that of 
emotional interpretations (see Lewis, 2005) or that of ideo-affective organizations (see Tomkins, 1962; 
see also Magai & McFadden, 1995) to describe the emotions-appraisals interaction that determine most 
emotional experiences in humans. 
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section of this Chapter, dedicated to group emotions, and how individuals emotionally react to 
inter and intragroup events, namely when ingroup members deviate from moral norms in 
intergroup contexts. 
Group-based Emotions 
 In chapters I and II we established that group membership may be a crucial self-
definition cue, and that the behavior of ingroup members may yield powerful intergroup and 
intragroup dynamics among fellow ingroup members (e.g., Marques, Abrams, et al., 1998). It 
is thus reasonable to suppose that ingroup members’ actions have an emotional impact on other 
members. For example, if a Portuguese person reflects upon the colonial past of its fellow-
nationals, it may well be that such thoughts evoke strong emotions, even though those acts 
were not committed by them personally (see Marques, Páez, & Serra, 1997). This was well 
documented by Feagin, Vera, and Batur (2001), who show that American white men reported 
feelings of guilt about the racist past of their fellow White people. Also, Doosje, Branscombe, 
Spears, and Manstead (1998) showed that participants in a minimal-group setting can feel 
group-based (or collective) guilt simply by acknowledging their group’s history of being unfair 
towards the outgroup (see also Marques, Vincze, Valencia, & Páez, 2006; Páez, Vincze, 
Valencia, & Marques, 2006). 
 
Group-based emotions versus individual-level emotions. In spite of the fact that most 
emotions arise in social contexts, frequently stemming from interpersonal interactions (e.g., 
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feeling happy or sad at another person), social emotions should be fundamentally different 
from group-based, group-level or intergroup emotions, because the latter are “experienced by 
an individual when identifying with an ingroup” (Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007, p. 432)17. 
Smith et al. (2007) (see also Mackie, Silver, & Smith, 2004; Smith & Mackie, 2008) have 
proposed four criteria to help identify and distinguish group-based emotions from individual-
level emotions. 
First, group-based emotions should differ “systematically and reliably from the same 
person’s individual-level emotions” (Smith et al., 2007, p. 432). Individuals who see 
themselves as group members should feel emotions that they do not feel when they see 
themselves as individuals (see Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). This idea is 
supported by several studies showing that people emotionally react to events that have affected 
their ingroup (or fellow ingroup members), even if they are not involved (Doosje et al., 1998; 
Gordijn, Wigboldus, & Yzerbyt, 2001; Gordijn, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Dumont, 2006; 
Yzerbyt, Dumont, Gordijn, & Wigboldus, 2002). 
Second, group-based emotions should depend on group identification. As we pointed 
out previously (see Chapter I), individuals’ social identity is imbued with emotional 
significance (Tajfel, 1974), and the more individuals identify with a group, the more they 
should adopt the prototypical behavior of that group (Turner et al., 1987). Therefore, group 
members should feel group-based emotions to the extent that they identify with the ingroup. 
                                                          
17 Nevertheless, it is important to note that group-based emotions should overlap individual emotions 
to some extent. That is, individuals can feel happy or sad, per example, independent of where they 
position themselves in the personal identity-social identity continuum. Alongside, there are group-
related events that may lead oneself into feeling emotions that are simultaneously group and 
individually-based (Smith et al., 2007). 
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According to Smith et al. (2007) this should be particularly true for positive emotions such as 
happiness and pride. Research on negative group-based emotions, however, has returned more 
ambiguous results. For example, Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, and Gordijn (2003) presented 
participants with victims of unfair treatment by their university board. The authors led 
participants to believe that they shared, or did not share, group membership with the victims, 
and measured participants’ identification with the group as well as their emotional reactions. 
Results showed that participants who shared group membership with the victims and reported 
being more identified with the group were also the ones who reported greater feelings of anger, 
which suggests that the feeling of group-emotions may depend on group identification. 
Differently, Doosje et al. (1998, experiment 2) have also showed that highly identified Dutch 
individuals that were presented with ambiguous (i.e., positive and negative) information about 
their country’s colonial past showed less feelings of guilt than did low identified participants. 
There seems to be some ingroup-threatening contexts (see Branscombe et al., 1999) in which 
high identifiers will become more defensive, thus more likely to reject the negative aspects of 
the ambiguous information about their ingroup, and hence the reduced feelings of guilt (Doosje 
et al., 1998; Gordijn et al., 2006). 
Third, group-based emotions should be similarly shared among the members of the 
group. The same way groups have prototypical members (Turner et al., 1987; see Chapter I), 
groups should have prototypical emotional profiles: if one thinks of themself as Portuguese, 
one’s emotions should converge to the prototypical emotional profile of the Portuguese people; 
likewise, a change in self-categorization (for example, from “I am Portuguese” to “I am a 
university student”) should re-adjust the pattern of emotions felt, converging to the emotional 
profile of the new category, be it a large social category, or a small, face to face, group (Smith 
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et al., 2007). Although past research on social-categorization theory (see Chapter I) is not 
focused on emotions, results have showed that the salience of group membership promotes 
behavioral and attitudinal self-stereotyping (e.g., Hogg & Turner, 1987), thus suggesting that 
the same convergence may occur emotionally (Smith et al., 2007; see also Yzerbyt et al., 2002). 
Per example, people share feelings of happiness for the successes of their groups – as well as 
sadness for its failures –, even though they did not contribute personally to the group’s result 
(e.g., Cialdini et al., 1976), which suggests that there is a “self–group overlap on emotional 
experiences” (Yzerbyt et al., 2002, p. 72). 
Fourth, group-based emotions should play decisive roles in social interactions, thus 
“motivate and regulate intragroup and intergroup attitudes and behavior” (Smith et al., 2007, 
p. 433). The influence of emotions on social interactions is acknowledged by numerous authors 
(e.g., Gordijn et al., 2006; Mackie et al., 2004; Mackie & Smith, 1998; Smith & Mackie, 2008; 
Van Kleef, 2009) and in our opinion at this point it should be no surprise that group emotions 
– alike “individual” emotions – act as the main motivator for human social interactions (see 
Izard, 2007; see also the previous sections of this Chapter; 2009, 2013). Moreover, Mackie et 
al. (2004) have proposed that group-based emotions have regulatory functions, molding inter 
and intragroup behaviors and attitudes. Per example, Schmader and Lickel (2006a) have 
showed that vicarious shame predicts avoidance tendencies (such as distancing oneself from 
the shameful event), whereas vicarious guilt predicts approach tendencies (such as repairing 
the harmful event). Likewise, Lickel, Miller, Stenstrom, Denson, and Schmader (2006) have 
suggested that one may feel anger and engage in vicarious retribution, e.g., to commit an act 
of aggression towards outgroupers for an assault that had no direct consequences for oneself, 
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but only for fellow ingroup members18. Moreover, besides promoting specific and immediate 
action tendencies (e.g., Yzerbyt et al., 2003), group-level emotions also have long-term effects 
on attitudes, having decisive influence on intergroup prejudice, (Miller et al., 2004; see also 
Smith & Mackie, 2008). 
So far, we have discussed what emotions are, and more importantly what are its 
functions on human cognition and actions. We have also seen that emotions play a decisive 
role at both the individual and – notably for the present work – the social level. Previous work 
on group-based emotions (see Mackie & Smith, 2015; Smith & Mackie, 2008; Smith et al., 
2007) has showed that group identification and depersonalization is a major drive and the basis 
for intergroup emotions, namely ingroup and outgroup-directed emotions (such as ingroup 
collective guilt, or outgroup-directed anger). Just like individual-level emotions, group-level 
emotions can be very specific and targeted (e.g., feeling joy for the achievements of an ingroup 
member), or reflect broader and more stable emotional feelings (e.g., feeling generally anxious 
when facing ingroup-threatening contexts). However, intergroup emotions differ from 
individual emotions because individuals can experience emotions on behalf of others with 
whom they only share group membership, despite not being directly affected by the event that 
triggered the emotional experience. Likewise, one of the main propositions of the current work 
is that individuals will often vicariously react emotionally to ingroup deviants – even if the 
deviants’ action does not affect them directly – because these members threaten the positivity 
of their social identity. This idea will be explored in the following section of this Chapter. 
                                                          
18 Moreover, besides promoting specific and immediate action tendencies (e.g., Yzerbyt et al., 2003), 
group-level emotions also have long-term effects on attitudes, having decisive influence on intergroup 
prejudice, (Miller, Smith, & Mackie, 2004; see also Smith & Mackie, 2008). 
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Emotional Reaction to Ingroup Deviants, Subjective Group Dynamics and the Black 
Sheep Effect 
 Research on SGDT (Marques, Abrams, et al., 1998; Marques, Páez, et al., 1998; see 
Chapter II) and on the black sheep effect (Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 2001; Marques et al., 
1988; Pinto et al., 2010) has consistently showed that individuals derogate ingroup members 
who deviate from prescriptive norms, as compared to similar outgroup members, because the 
former, unlike the latter, has decisive impact on their social identity. Additionally, along the 
present Chapter we summarized the research on how emotions play decisive roles in human 
motivation, namely in our social interactions. Besides, there is compelling evidence that 
individuals often literally feel for others, that is, one can feel actual emotions (such as anger, 
happiness, shame, or guilt) if someone with whom they share some degree of subjective 
interdependence (such as ingroup member) goes through an emotion-triggering situation, even 
if such situation has no direct impact in one’s actual circumstance (e.g., Doosje et al., 1998; 
see previous sections of this Chapter). Is it that emotions are also the main motivator upholding 
the derogation – and even punishment – of ingroup deviants (i.e., the black sheep effect)? 
Anecdotally, there are numerous examples of people who demonstrate feeling vicarious guilt, 
shame, and other emotions caused by other people behavior. Citizens often publicly manifest 
against their countries’ foreign policies, sports fans regularly oppose their sports teams’ 
decisions, and family members frequently argue. Such statements of disagreement commonly 
come alongside with displays of negative emotions towards their country, team or family. 
Recent research by Lickel, Schmader, and their colleagues (e.g., Johns et al., 2005; 
Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier, & Ames, 2005; Schmader, Croft, Scarnier, Lickel, & 
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Mendes, 2012; Schmader & Lickel, 2006b) on group-based emotions such as shame and guilt 
has shown that people often feel vicarious shame and guilt when confronted by the wrongdoing 
of fellow-ingroup members, and that such emotions are distinguishable in terms of theirs inter 
and intragroupal predecessors (see Lickel et al., 2011 for a review). For example, Lickel et al. 
(2005) asked college undergraduates to write about three events in which they felt ashamed or 
guilty by the actions of a family member, a friend, and a person who they did not know well 
but shared their ethnicity. After writing on each event, participants’ emotional response was 
assessed, as well as their appraisals of the extent to which they could have prevented the event 
from happening and how much that event could threat their own image. Participants’ perceived 
interdependence and shared identity with the perpetrator was also assessed. The authors found 
that participants’ feelings of guilt and shame are predicted by their appraisals of the event and 
of their social relation to the wrongdoer. Participants felt more guilt when they perceived high 
interdependence with the perpetrator and felt that they should have impeded the event from 
happening. On the contrary, participants felt ashamed when they felt that the wrongdoer had a 
negative reflection on themselves and, more importantly, when that event was relevant to the 
social identity they shared with the wrongdoer. 
Also, Iyer, Schmader, and Lickel (2007), studied how anger, shame and guilt may 
predict the intention of participants in protesting against their own country transgressions. The 
authors asked Americans (experiment 1) and British (experiment 2) participants to read 
fictional news articles about their countries occupation of Iraq. Those news articles 
manipulated the threat to the image of the countries by attributing the negative consequences 
of the occupation either to the countries’ character (high image threat) or to the countries’ 
actions (low image threat).  Furthermore, participants were asked about the legitimacy of their 
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countries’ actions, their feelings of guilt, shame and threat, as well as their willingness to 
support the compensation of the victims, the confrontation of those responsible for the 
occupation, and the withdrawal from Iraq. The authors found that the perceived illegitimacy of 
their countries’ actions increased participants’ negative emotions (e.g., guilt, shame, and anger) 
towards the ingroup and its representatives. Moreover, a greater threat to the countries’ image 
led to greater shame and anger (but not guilt) felt by the participants. 
Derogation of family members who misbehave also seems to be associated with feeling 
of vicarious emotions (Páez, Marques, & Insua, 1996). Investigation on parents disciplining 
their children (Scarnier, Schmader, & Lickel, 2009) also revealed that threats to the parents’ 
self-image predict their feelings of shame when facing their children wrongdoing. The authors 
asked 110 parents (Experiment 1) to write a small essay describing the worst wrongdoing of 
their children, excluding those incidents in which the parent was personally victimized. Then, 
they rated their emotional reactions, self-related (including image threat, perceived ideal 
control over the child, and actual control), and event-related, appraisals (event publicity, and 
harm to others). Results showed that, whereas publicity predicted shame but not guilt, the 
reverse pattern was found regarding harm to others. Besides, the parents’ perception that their 
child behavior was threatening their image uniquely predicted shame, whereas the perception 
of lack of control over the child behavior uniquely predicted guilty. Moreover, image threat 
also mediated the relation between the child behavior publicity and parental shame, meaning 
that parents who perceive that their child behavior is known by others feel ashamed because 
the public exposure of the incident might flag them as a bad parent or person. 
Consistent with these results, (Lickel et al., 2005) have asked undergraduates to recall 
and rate three different situations in which they felt ashamed or guilty for the actions of a family 
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member, a friend, and someone not very close but with the same ethnicity. Participants also 
rated their feelings of shame and guilty, their appraisals of the event (i.e., their perceived 
control over the targets behavior, and the perceived threat the targets pose for the participants’ 
image). Finally, participants’ perceived closeness with the target was also measured, as well 
as the participants’ perceived relevance of the identity they shared with the target (e.g., “I felt 
like this person’s behavior was confirming negative conceptions that other people might have 
about the reputation of my family [or friendship group, or ethnic group]”). Besides building 
upon the evidence that people may feel vicarious negative emotions when confronted with 
others negative actions, results showed that participants felt more shame the more they 
perceived to share a relevant identity with the target and the more they perceived their image 
to be threaten. In turn, participants’ feeling of guilt was associated with greater closeness with 
the target, as well as greater perception of control over the targets’ behavior. 
Emotional Reactions to Ingroup Black Sheep 
Despite the fact that research on intergroup emotions has provided interesting hints that 
help support our claim that emotions play a decisive role on the subjective group dynamics 
theory, to the best of our knowledge little research has focused specifically on this subject. 
Nonetheless, some researchers have dedicated their work on understanding the role of 
emotions on intragroup differentiation, and more precisely the role of emotions on the black 
sheep effect. For example, Wann and Branscombe (1992) have found that fans of a sports team 
who were highly identified with the team reported negative mood states when facing disloyal 
fans of the same team (i.e., a disloyal ingrouper). Inversely, a loyal fan would elicit positive 
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mood states. Authors also found that low identified fans were not influenced by the 
membership of the target fan or their degree of loyalty towards the team. Later, Biernat et al. 
(1999) have suggested negative mood (not negative emotions) as the mechanism producing 
negative evaluation on ingroup deviants, however the authors’ explanation to the phenomenon 
is based on expectancy violation (i.e., because ingroup deviants fail to meet the expectations 
created for ingroup members), rather than on the threat deviant ingroup members pose to the 
positive image of the group. 
Based on research by Biernat et al. (1999), Johns et al. (2005) have proposed that 
emotions – specifically shame – may drive the black sheep effect, since shame is the emotion 
that most frequently dictates the desire for distance from the shameful event. In the months 
following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the authors asked Americans participants to write down a 
small essay about a situation where they observed another American do or say something they 
perceived as prejudiced against someone who was a Middle Eastern. Participants would also 
report their identification with being American, and rated several characteristics of the event 
(such as the perceived negativity of the event), their emotional reaction to it, and their 
motivation to distance from the situation, the ingroup, and the perpetrator. Johns et al. (2005) 
have found that the interaction between the participant’s perceived negativity of the event and 
ingroup identification predicted their general distancing motivation (i.e., the mean scores of 
the aforementioned three distancing motivations), but that relation was mediated by the feeling 
of shame. That is, highly identified participants who perceived the event as very negative 
reported feeling more shame, which ultimately led them to feel motivated to distance 
themselves from the situation as a whole. However, since the authors did not assess the 
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evaluation targets evaluation, it becomes hard to ascertain that these data connects “the black 
sheep effect specifically to feelings of shame” (Johns et al., 2005, p. 344). 
Given these results it seems reasonable to expect that emotions might be the main 
motivator that drives the reaction of group members towards other members that pose a threat 
to the positive distinctiveness of the group. It seems straightforward that if an ingroup deviant 
makes someone feel angry or sad, they will be downgraded as a consequence. Likewise, 
ingroup deviants that trigger less negative emotions – or even positive emotions – should be 
evaluated more positively. In the next section of this Chapter we introduce moral 
disengagement, a mechanism that might help explain why people sometimes feel bad about 
fellow ingroup members – thus derogating them –, while other times feel less badly (or even 
good) about members of their group – thus tolerating (or even upgrading) them. 
Exceptions to the Derogation of Ingroup Deviants 
 On this final section, we will try to give a critical look at some of the empirical evidence 
cited along this work. First and foremost, we must recognize that not everyone, every time, 
everywhere derogates ingroup deviants. On the contrary, in many deviants can even be exalted 
by their fellow group members. It is not difficult to find anecdotal evidence of people who 
misbehave and – despite being condemned by external observers – are subject of lenient (or 
even forgiving) treatment by fellow ingroup members, although the SGDT would predict the 
latter to judge the former more relentlessly. For example, Diego Maradona is literally regarded 
as a god at least by some Argentinians, despite the fact that he conspicuously cheated in an 
important quarter-finals match in the 1986 Soccer World Cup. Not only that, Maradona has 
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been caught punching reporters, he is a recurrent drug abuser, he has been associated with the 
Neapolitan Camorra, accused of domestic violence, refused paternity of a son, among other 
morally condemnable behaviors. Nevertheless, unlike what would be predicted by the SGDT, 
Maradona’s fellow ingroup members do not seem to feel that the positivity of their identity as 
Argentinians is threatened by their hero. There are several other examples of people who 
despite violating central group norms escape material or tacit punishment from ingroup 
members, or are even praised by these ingroup members. Isaltino Morais was the mayor of 
Oeiras – an important Portuguese county close to Lisbon – who was convicted of countless 
white-collar crimes, circumstances that were acknowledged by everyone. Nonetheless, 
Morais’ popularity among his constituents never dropped as people looked up at him, and 
reelected him landslide after landslide for several elections. These situations may seem 
unexpected when one considers that Maradona and Morais were full-members of the group 
(see Pinto et al., 2010) and one of them was even a well-established group leader (Abrams, 
Randsley de Moura, Marques, & Hutchison, 2008). 
 What are the mechanisms that enable group members to overlook the faults of a fellow 
member whose behavior might strongly harm their group’s image? Why do group members 
keep praising an ingroup deviant, disregarding their crimes, even though such behavior might 
say so much about their own social identity? We propose that people often find justifications, 
either in the social context, or in the deviant person proper, that legitimize to morally 
disengage, at least temporarily, from the group norms the deviants are infringing. This should 
allow them to discount the negative aspects of the deviants’ behavior and thus to evaluate them 
less negatively than if they did not find such legitimizing justifications. In this vein, moral 
disengagement would act as buffer against the negative emotions caused by ingroup deviants. 
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Tolerance of Ingroup Deviants 
Tolerance of ingroup deviants has been associated with characteristics of both the 
individuals (e.g., Gollwitzer & Keller, 2010; Hollander, 1958; van Prooijen, 2006) and the 
groups in which they emerge (e.g., Hutchison, Jetten, & Gutierrez, 2011; Iyer, Jetten, & 
Haslam, 2012; see also Jetten & Hornsey, 2014, for a review). Regarding the characteristics of 
the members of the group, Hollander (1958) has shown that the status of the deviant influences 
the groups’ reaction towards possible deviations, since individuals that have accrued enough 
(idiosyncratic) credit are allowed for greater deviation from group expectations. As for the 
characteristics of the group, Hutchison et al. (2011) have shown that ingroup deviants are 
tolerated more when group members perceive the group to be heterogeneous, than when they 
perceive the group to be homogeneous (Study 1); moreover, this difference is moderated by 
the individuals’ ideological beliefs of what is good for the group: if they believe the group 
should be homogeneous, deviant targets are derogated more, than if they believe the group 
should be heterogeneous, in which case deviants are tolerated (Study 2).  
There are also situations in which deviant ingroup members may contribute positively 
for the group. In this vein, Morton, Postmes, and Jetten (2007, Study 1) suggested that group 
members adopt strategic reactions towards ingroup deviants depending on the deviants’ value 
to the group. The authors found that highly identified supporters of the British conservative 
party supported an allegedly deviant party leader (in this case, David Cameron) if they 
perceived the party’s beliefs to be out of favor of the public, and that this support mediated by 
the perceived likelihood for the deviant behavior to attract the public’s support. These results 
show that sometimes individuals make strategic choices when dealing with ingroup deviance, 
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and that they will tolerate (or even upgrade) deviant members of their group if they are 
potentially useful for the achievement of ingroup’s goals. The authors propose that responses 
to ingroup deviance depends on its degree and direction, but also on its context which is in line 
with previous findings (see also Abrams et al., 2000). 
Research on SGDT has also shown that sometimes group members show leniency 
towards ingroup deviants. For example, Pinto et al. (2010) asked participants to judge a 
normative and a deviant, ingroup or outgroup, member of different status – they could either 
be new members, full members, or marginal members, of the group. Results shown that the 
participants derogated deviant ingroup full members but did not derogate ingroup deviant 
newcomers or marginal members as compared to their outgroup counterparts. Abrams, 
Randsley de Moura, and Travaglino (2013) have also examined circumstances in which group 
members are lenient towards ingroup deviants. The authors asked participants to judge a 
deviant leader and a deviant non-leader who was a member of either the ingroup or the 
outgroup. The authors found that participants tolerated deviant ingroup leaders (i.e., they were 
given transgression credit), and evaluated those leaders in a positive way (Abrams et al., 2013, 
Experiments 1 - 4) when their transgressions were viewed as altruistic actions in favor of the 
group (Abrams et al., 2013, Experiment 5). In the same vein, Abrams et al. (2008) have also 
showed that deviant future-leaders are given room to behave anti-normatively, in a ways that 
aims toward the validation the ingroup norm. 
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Social Cognitive Theory and Moral Disengagement 
We propose that in order to show lenient judgments or reaction towards some ingroup 
deviants, people need to morally disengage from the norms that were violated in the first place, 
through a process coined moral disengagement (e.g., Bandura, 1990, 1991, 1999, 2002; 
Bandura et al., 1996). The notion of moral disengagement stems from the broader social 
cognitive theory (Bandura, 1991, 2002). This theory states that, because many behaviors can 
bring personal advantages while being socially harmful (e.g. to other people), individuals must 
rely on behavioral patterns that guide social conduct. Although laws, social norms and its 
sanctions serve the function of regulating individuals’ behavior, these mechanisms are not 
foolproof, because most behaviors that harm others are undetectable, or go easily unnoticed. 
Nevertheless, individuals’ behavior is clearly morally oriented, which suggests the 
simultaneous existence of a moral agency that regulates conduct. Based on these 
considerations, Bandura (1991) suggests that in parallel with social sanctions, self-sanctions 
may also function as guidelines for keeping one’s conduct aligned with internalized social 
standards. In the course of socialization “individuals adopt standards of right and wrong that 
serve as guides and deterrents for conduct” (Bandura, 2002, p. 102), and will continuously 
evaluate their behavior against these moral standards, regulating their behavior by the sanctions 
that they apply to themselves. These sanctions stem from the notion that one has not behaved 
according to one’s moral patterns. Because we are motivated to seek satisfaction and a sense 
of self-worth, we would, in principle, behave in line with our internalized values, and  we 
would refrain from misbehaving because misbehaving would generate feelings of self-
condemnation (Bandura, 2002). Importantly, this moral agency through self-sanctions would 
94 
 
operate anticipatorily: We would constantly monitor our own conduct, and such monitoring 
would lead us to evaluate ourselves based on the perceived consistency of our conduct with 
our moral standards. Our self-appraisals would ensue from this (lack of) consistency, so that 
we should feel affectively self-compensated by desirable conduct (feelings of satisfaction and 
self-worth) and self-sanctioned by undesirable conduct (feelings of self-reprisal and self-
condemnation). The anticipation of these sanctions upon the self should motivate us to keep 
our  conduct in line with our internalized moral standards (Bandura, 2002). Of course, self-
sanctions, or negative self-appraisals, often emerge side by side with social sanctions, thus 
providing social validation for the self-regulatory system of moral agency (e.g., Festinger, 
1954; see Chapter I). 
 
Moral disengagement mechanisms. There are instances, however, in which behavior is 
clearly divorced from socially shared moral patterns. Human history is full of examples of 
inhumane behavior (e.g., the Holocaust, the Russian gulags, the Napalm bombing of 
defenseless populations by the USA in North Vietnam; the witch-hunting that took place 
during the Middle Ages, etc.). Such examples would not occur had all humans share similar 
moral standards and interpret all situations in a similar way, as if moral agency proposed by 
the social cognitive theory controlled human was an invariant and incontrovertible 
phenomenon. In fact, self-sanctions do not operate unless they are activated, and they are often 
selectively disconnected depending on the characteristics of situations and on individuals’ 
motivations (Bandura, 1990, 1999, 2002). In other words, moral disengagement corresponds 
to a kind of psychosocial agility that allows individuals to selectively activate and deactivate 
the self-sanctions associated with transgressive behavior, and as such that makes possible the 
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emergence of “different types of conduct with the same moral standards” (Bandura et al., 1996, 
p. 364). That is, moral disengagement mechanisms functions at the affective level, by 
selectively deactivating self-sanctions through reappraisals of the conduct through (1) the 
moral justification of the detrimental act; (2) the use of euphemistic language to mask the 
behavior; (3) the establishment of  advantageous comparisons between the detrimental conduct 
and more negative acts; (4) the displacement of responsibility of one’s actions onto other 
actors; (5) the diffusion of responsibility among others; (6) the distortion of the consequences 
of one’s actions; (7) the dehumanization of the victims of detrimental conduct; and finally (8) 
the attribution of blame to the victims (Bandura et al., 1996). 
In a correlational study, Bandura et al. (1996) aimed to demonstrate the relation 
between moral disengagement and the perpetration of detrimental acts by asking 799 children 
and teenagers to complete scales of moral disengagement, aggressive and prosocial behavior, 
self-sanctions for transgressive behavior, and the affective and cognitive aspects of aggression, 
among other concepts. The results showed that moral disengagement mechanisms play 
influential crucial role both in prosocial and in antisocial conduct. Indeed, highly morally 
disengaged participants behaved in a more angered fashion and were more injurious than did 
participants who were more morally engaged, thus applying self-sanctions to moral conduct. 
Importantly for the present work, moral disengagement seems to function at the individual 
affective level, because it helps to discard feelings of self-condemnation which should be 
associated withundesirable behavior. In this vein, Bandura (1991) proposes that individuals 
may feel different emotions (e.g., pride or guilt) as a consequence of self-sanctions for positive 
or negative behavior, and that moral disengagement mechanisms may operate in indirectly 
promoting detrimental conduct by lessening the feeling of negative emotions associated with 
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such conduct. In fact, Bandura et al. (1996) have also demonstrated that the feeling of guilt 
mediated the influence of moral disengagement on aggression proneness, because participants 
who scored higher on moral disengagement were also the ones who reported less anticipatory 
feelings of guilt (see Boardley & Kavussanu, 2010). 
Moral Disengagement as an Alternative to the Derogation of Ingroup Black Sheep 
In a recent work, Traclet et al. (2015) examined how moral disengagement is associated 
with tolerance towards aggressive behaviors in sports context (i.e., football and ice hockey). 
These authors asked professional sports players to evaluate videotaped aggressive behavior 
occurring in sports events, and measured the players’ perception about the coach-, and self-
attitudes, towards the rules. Traclet and colleagues found that moral disengagement mediated 
the relation between the perceptions of the coach, and of the self, attitudes toward the rules, 
and tolerance towards hostile aggression. The authors propose that “the mechanisms of moral 
disengagement might be more easily used when players are confronted by behavior that is 
largely condemned in the sport context in which they are embedded” (p. 131), and that it 
reduces the experience of negative emotions associated with the evaluation of aggressive 
behaviors (see also Boardley & Kavussanu, 2010). 
Traclet et al’s (2015) findings are especially important for the present work in two 
ways: First, they show that individuals may feel vicarious moral disengagement when 
observing the negative behavior of others; and, second, they indicate that such vicarious moral 
disengagement can lead to greater tolerance towards ingroup deviance. We propose that, when 
facing ingroup deviants, and given the salient context of a threatened social identity, people 
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will disengage from the moral norms at stake, provided that they feel legitimated to do so. For 
example, the fact that by breaking a moral standard an ingroup member greatly contributes  for 
the achievement of ingroup goals might be such a legitimizing feature (see Morton et al., 2007). 
Another such legitimizing feature might be the past history of the deviant as an ingroup 
member. For example, idiosyncrasy credit (see Hollander, 1958) earned in the past by some 
ingroup members might function as a legitimizing clue allowing other members to decrease 
their moral engagement in appraising the present deviant behavior of those members. 
Disengagement from moral norms would lessen the negative emotions associated with the 
ingroup deviants, hence increasing tolerance towards them, in a process that is the opposite  of 
the adoption of a prescriptive focus, as proposed by SGDT (see Pinto et al., 2010).  
Clearly, our above reasoning seems in contradiction with SGDT’s predictions, in that 
moral disengagement should prevent individuals from adopting a prescriptive focus towards 
ingroup deviants, and hence preventing the emergence of the black sheep effect. Notice, 
however, that SGDT attempts to describe the cognitive processes that are in operation when 
people deal with intragroup processes that emerge in intergroup situations. Punitive reactions 
to ingroup deviants are, no doubt part of such processes. However, so are more lenient reactions 
to other deviants or to similar deviants in different contexts. Whether these reactions are 
strongly negative or driven by an attempt to justify the deviants’ behavior should be consistent 
with SGDT to the extent that we can provide a solid explanation as to why one or the other 
process serves the ultimate function of maintaining a positive social identity. In the present 
work, we will examine the mechanism that explains the circumstances in which individuals 
tolerate, instead of derogating, ingroup deviants. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have reviewed relevant literature on emotions and on how emotions 
may relate to judgements of ingroup deviants. We also discussed the way in which the notion 
of moral disengagement may offer a suitable explanation for the fact that sometimes 
individuals tolerate ingroup deviants who threaten their group’s social identity and positive 
distinctiveness. 
Our aim with this chapter was to show that it is logical to suppose that emotions are 
important components in the process of judgment of ingroup deviants (e.g., Doosje et al., 1998; 
Iyer et al., 2007; Johns et al., 2005; Lickel et al., 2011). We posit that, in the same way emotions 
may explain why ingroup deviants attract negative, derogatory, judgments, so can they help to 
explain why sometimes individuals are lenient towards those deviants. We propose that such 
leniency occurs because sometimes group members downplay the importance of moral norms, 
in a process coined moral disengagement (Bandura et al., 1996). We argue that moral 
disengagement mechanisms kick in whenever individuals view the characteristics of the social 
context as legitimizing to do so. In this case, moral disengagement mitigates the negative 
emotions associated with ingroup deviance, which, we propose, should explain why the 
deviants can be tolerated (see Abrams et al., 2008; Abrams et al., 2013; Pinto et al., 2010). 
In the next chapter we will report four studies that we conducted in order to substantiate 
the above general idea. In the first study, we explore the correlational relations between the 
main variables in this thesis. The following three studies are experimental and aim to 
demonstrate that there is a causal relation between group membership and the tolerance of 
ingroup deviance, through emotional and moral disengagement mechanisms, and test three 
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different social circumstances that individuals may regard as legitimizing to discount the 
importance of moral norms. 
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EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
General Overview and Hypothesis 
 With the present research, we aim to fill two apparent gaps in SGDT research conducted 
so far. One such gap is the need of an account for why individuals sometimes seem to tolerate 
ingroup deviants whereas other times they do not. There has been research showing apparently 
similar processes. Over the recent years, research on the SGDT and, more particularly, research 
on the black sheep effect almost exclusively focused on understanding how and why 
individuals derogate ingroup deviants. This research consistently showed that the presence of 
ingroup deviants makes mere intergroup differentiation insufficient to achieve positive ingroup 
distinctiveness. In this case, intragroup processes will become particularly relevant to sustain 
a positive social identity. Hence, individuals become prescriptively focused, and derogate 
ingroup deviants (e.g., Marques, Páez, et al., 1998; Pinto et al., 2010). Nonetheless, less 
attention has been devoted to the exceptions to the black sheep effect, namely to those 
situations in which groups show leniency towards deviants. For example, Marques (1990) 
showed that participants do not derogate ingroup members who deviate from irrelevant ingroup 
norms. In that study, students in a military academy were asked to rank-order a set of norms 
according to the importance they thought these norms had for their group. Following this, they 
were asked to imagine an ingroup or an outgroup student who either conformed with or deviate 
from four of those norms. Depending on conditions, these norms were either the four most 
important or the four least important ones, as rank-ordered in the first task. The results showed 
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that participants derogated the ingroup member who deviated from the four most relevant 
norms, relative to all other deviants. However, this result begs the question of whether we may 
consider a group member who violated an irrelevant norm to be considered by participants as 
much a deviant as a group member who violated a relevant norm. Indeed, other evidence 
suggests that individuals sometimes tolerate ingroup deviants, in spite of the fact that these 
deviants pose a clear threat to the group’s identity (e.g., Abrams et al., 2008; see Jetten & 
Hornsey, 2014, for a review). Nevertheless, as far as we know, no special attention has been 
devoted to the factors at work in this process. 
The second gap is related to the above one and, specifically, to the processes that we 
mentioned. Accepting SIT´s contention that an unfavorable social identity generates a negative 
emotional state in individuals (Tajfel, 1978) one may assume that deviant ingroup members, 
whose behavior is detrimental to  social identity, should also generate a negative emotional 
reaction. Conversely, normative ingroup members, whose behavior provides a positive 
contribution to social identity, should trigger positive emotions. In spite of the fact that, a far 
as we see, this is a straightforward assumption, to our knowledge this avenue of research has 
only recently started to be pursued (see Pinto, Marques, & Páez, in press). Specifically, we are 
interested in examining the role of emotions on participants’ tolerance versus derogation of 
ingroup deviants. Based on the idea that moral disengagement mechanisms may act as a buffer 
against the negative emotions provoked by the unlikable behavior of ingroup members (see 
Bandura, 2002; see also, Traclet et al., 2015), we reasoned that moral disengagement may, 
under some circumstances, underlie tolerance towards ingroup deviants, and materialize in the 
evaluations of these members. We propose that moral disengagement operates by mitigating 
the negative emotional impact that deviant ingroup members have on fellow ingroupers, by 
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discounting the negative value assigned to deviant behavior. We also propose that individuals 
make use of moral disengagement mechanisms when facing ingroup deviants provided 
characteristics of the social context are regarded as legitimizing to do so. 
 We conducted four studies in order to examine the above general ideas. Study 1 is a 
correlational study. In that study, we asked Portuguese respondents issued from Porto to judge, 
and react to, members of a gang also issuing from Porto, who were perpetrating felonies in the 
city. We also asked them to rate the extent to which they considered that the targets posed a 
threat to the group’s image and to their personal safety, as well as their moral disengagement, 
and the emotions they felt towards those targets. One specific goal of this study was to collect 
correlational data that would be, if not demonstrative of, at least consistent with, the processes 
that we propose with the present work, in order to advance to experimental settings. The second 
goal was to test the prediction that participants’ moral disengagement is negatively associated 
with their reported negative emotional reaction, and positively correlated with their evaluation 
of deviant ingroup members. 
We also believe that evaluations of deviant ingroup members and the emotional 
reaction triggered by these members should be related with the threat that they pose to the 
group’s image. This would be in line with recent evidence collected by Campos, Aguiar, 
Marques, Pinto, and Lorenzi-Cioldi (submitted). Campos and colleagues (Experiment 3) had 
participants evaluating a deviant ingroup member whose actions were either concealed within 
the ingroup, or revealed to the outgroup. They found that deviant targets whose misbehavior 
was made public were evaluated more negatively than those whose similar behavior remained 
confined within the ingroup’s boundaries, because the former threatened the group’s image 
more than the latter. 
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 Studies 2-4 are experimental studies. In studies 2 and 3 we presented participants with 
a deviant ingroup or outgroup target and manipulated whether the target’s behavior, in spite of 
being deviant, had turned out to be profitable or detrimental for the ingroup (Study 2), or if the 
deviant target was a veteran member or a newbie member of the group (Study 3). In both 
experiments, we measured participant’s moral disengagement, emotional reaction, and 
judgements of the target. We expected the profitable feature (in Study 2), and the veteran status 
(in Study 3), of the ingroup deviant legitimate participants’ moral disengagement. Thus we 
expect participants in the ingroup condition to report greater moral disengagement, as well as 
less negative emotions towards, and more positive evaluations of, the profitable target as 
compared to the detrimental equivalent (Study 2). We expect similar results for the veteran 
target as compared to the newbie member (Study 3). Differences for the outgroup conditions 
should be less noticeable in both experiments. We also expect moral disengagement and the 
negative emotional reaction to mediate the relation between target’s profitable/detrimental 
conduct (Study 2), or veteran/newbie member status (Study 3), and participant’s evaluation of 
the target for the ingroup conditions, but not for the outgroup. 
 In Study 4, we manipulated the feedback given to participants about their moral 
disengagement (high, low) supposedly as the outcome of a bogus test. After that, participants 
were asked to rate their negative emotional reaction to, and to evaluate, a normative and a 
deviant target, from the ingroup or from the outgroup. We expected participants who believed 
to be morally disengaged to report less negative emotional reaction to the ingroup deviant 
target, as compared to participants who believed to be morally engaged. Because we believe 
that this response is not due to an experimental demand, but rather to the identity implications 
of moral disengagement, we expect no such difference to occur in the outgroup conditions. 
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Finally, we expected evaluations of the targets made by participants who believed to be morally 
engaged to reflect a black sheep effect pattern, whereas such effect should be mitigated for 
participants who believed to be morally disengaged.  
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Study 1 
An Analysis of the Relation Between Moral Disengagement, Emotional Reactions, and 
Evaluations of Deviant Ingroup Targets 
Overview and Hypothesis 
 In order to run this study, we took advantage of a real-life event which involved actual 
ingroup deviants and which was relevant for participants at the time in which it was conducted. 
Our goal was to examine the associations between the central concepts with which we work in 
this thesis, in preparation for the subsequent experiments in which we shall examine the 
hypothesized causal relations between these concepts. Specifically, we examined, firstly, 
whether moral disengagement mechanisms are associated with emotional reaction towards 
ingroup deviants, such that it is possible that moral disengagement mitigates the negative 
emotions individuals feel when faced with a deviant ingroup target. Secondly, we explored 
whether such negative emotions are associated with the evaluation of deviant ingroup targets, 
so that the more participants feel negative emotions towards ingroup deviants, the more 
negatively they will evaluate these deviants. Finally, we attempted to check for whether the 
emotional reaction to, and the evaluation of, deviant ingroup members are associated with the 
threat the deviants pose to the group’s image, rather than to the other kinds of threat (i.e., 
physical threat). 
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Method 
Participants and procedure 
Participants were 981 male and 494 female who were born, and lived and worked or 
studied in Porto, aged from 13 to 80 years old (M = 21.44, SD = 4.55). 
This study was conducted during a period through which the city of Porto witnessed a 
wave of small felonies which were allegedly committed by a juvenile delinquent gang in the 
city (thus ingroup members)19. 
We created an online survey using Qualtrics, which we uploaded to Facebook with the 
help of the administrators of the aforementioned Facebook page. By that time, the page already 
counted over 10,000 “likes”. The questionnaire was uploaded in June, 6, 2014, when the 
situation was at its peak. In that same day, the police presence was conspicuous and widely 
noticed in various faculties, and the situation had escalated to a point that some students were 
preferring to stay at home so that they would not take any risks. 
Participants filled in the survey voluntarily. Before collecting any measures, we 
presented a brief summary of recent events. After collecting the measures, participants 
                                                          
19 This group became known as “Gunas da Areosa”, and their activities usually took place near the 
city’s biggest university campus. They operated by approaching young people (mainly students) who 
walked either alone or in small groups, and then by forcing their victims to handle their cellphones, 
money or other valuable items through intimidation and threat. The gang increased its activity in the 
course of several weeks and became to be known not only in the city but even nationwide, and lead 
University authorities to issue a series of security recommendations for campus security. The police 
force in and around the campus was also reinforced. At the same time, the students created a page on 
Facebook, that helped locate and warn the Gunas da Areosa whereabouts almost in real time. The page 
also served as a way for students to mock and criticize the gang members and their activities. 
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answered demographics questions, including sex, age, city of origin, and city where they 
worked or studied. All the data were collected online. Unless stated otherwise, all items ranged 
from 1 (= “totally disagree”) to 7 (= “totally agree”). 
Measures 
Ingroup identification. Participants first answered four questions aimed to tap their 
identification with the ingroup (the people from Porto): “In general, I am identified with the 
people of Porto”; “In general, I like people of Porto”; “I feel a strong connection to the people 
of Porto”; “People of Porto have a lot to do with me”. We averaged these items to an ingroup 
identification score (Cronbach’s α = .95).1 
 
Physical and image threat. We wanted to assess whether the derogation of ingroup 
deviants who pose a physical threat to the participants (i.e., they jeopardize the physical well-
being of the participants) was also related to the image threat (reflecting threat to the 
participants’ social identity). Thus, participants answered to nine items aimed to access their 
perception of threat caused by the issue in question: 1) “These people make me feel afraid of 
walking around that area”; 2) “I avoid having valuable objects with me”; 3) “When I have to 
go somewhere, I prefer to walk a longer, but safer, path”; 4) “Because of this, I feel more 
insecure”; 5) “I always try to walk accompanied by someone or in group”; 6) “Presently, I feel 
more afraid of being robbed”; 7) “Others will probably see people from Porto more negatively 
because of what is happening”; 8) “These people contribute to the stereotype of Porto as a city 
of delinquents”; 9) “These people harm the image of the people of Porto”. The first six items 
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should represent a physical threat, while the last three should represent a threat to the ingroup’s 
image rather than a direct threat to the individual. In order to test whether our data fitted the 
two levels of threat, we conducted a principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation 
on the items, which confirmed the two factors accounting, respectively, for 50.51% and 
19.67% of the variance (all loadings > .76). We labeled these factors physical threat (items 1 
to 6; Cronbach’s α = .92) and image threat (items 7 to 9; Cronbach’s α = .77). Higher scores 
in these factors reflected higher perceived threat. 
 
Moral disengagement. Participants answered six items, aimed to tap their 
disengagement from the moral norms being transgressed. The items were: 1) “Just because a 
bunch of people is committing robberies, that’s not serious enough to justify all this fuss”; 2) 
“In a city as big as Porto, this type of robberies is not that serious”; 3) “In the end of the day, 
that’s their socioeconomic background, not the people that is to blame”; 4) “Some of these 
robberies must have come out of need”. We averaged these items to a moral disengagement 
score in which higher scores reflect higher moral disengagement (Cronbach’s α = .63). 
 
Emotional reaction towards the target. Participants indicated how much the targets 
made them feel “ashamed”; “sad”; “fearful”; and “generally bad”. We averaged these items to 
negative emotion score in which higher scores reflect more negative emotional reactions 
(Cronbach’s α = .73). 
 
Targets’ evaluation. Next, participants evaluated the targets according to six items: “In 
my opinion, the members of this gang are…” 1) “…selfish”; 2) “...bad Porto people”; 3) “…bad 
112 
 
examples”; 4) “…disrespectful”; 5) “…cowards”; 6) “…hateful”. Items were reverse scored 
so that higher scores reflect more positive evaluations of the targets. We averaged these items 
to a target evaluation score in which higher scores reflect more positive evaluations of the 
target (Cronbach’s α = .78).  
Results 
Ingroup identification. In general, participants identified with the people of Porto 
ingroup category (M = 5.45, SD = 1.29; this value was significantly higher than the midpoint 
of the scale, t(1474) = 43.27, p < .001). 
 
Physical and image threat. Participants reported feeling both physically and image 
threatened (M = 5.22, SD = 1.48; and M = 6.08, SD = 1.13, respectively). Interestingly for our 
research, participants perceived the latter as higher than the former, t(1474) = 20.87, p < .001. 
Both indexes scored significantly above the midpoint of the scale, t(1474) = 31.68, p < .001 
and t(1474) = 70.80, p < .001, respectively. 
 
Moral disengagement. Participants’ moral disengagement was low (M = 1.62, SD = 
0.71), and significantly lower than the midpoint of the scale, t(1474) = 129.17, p < .001. 
 
Emotional reaction. On average, participants reported negative emotions bad (M = 
4.89, SD = 1.46), significantly above the midpoint of the scale, t(1474) = 23.67, p < .001 
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Targets’ evaluation. As expected, participants evaluated the target gang very negatively 
(M = 1.49, SD = 0.66), significantly below the midpoint of the scale, t(1474) = 146.78, p < 
.001. 
 
Correlational analysis. The main goal of this study was to explore the relation between 
moral disengagement, emotional reactions and the evaluation of, and reactions to, ingroup 
deviants. We therefore correlated these variables. 
As can be seen in Table 1, identification was not meaningfully related with any of the 
remaining variables (largest r(1473) = .06, p = .014). The analysis of the association between 
physical threat and image threat with the other scores showed, one the one hand, that image 
threat correlated moderately with emotional reaction, r(1473) = .40, p < .001, evaluation of the 
targets, r(1473) = -.41, p < .001, and moral disengagement, r(1473) = -.29, p < .001. The more 
1 2 3 4 5
1. Identification
2. Image Threat .01
3. Physical Threat -.01 .29**
4. Moral Disengagement -.02 -.29** -.19**
5. Negative Emotion .06* .40** .55** -.26**
6. Target Evaluation -.05* -.41** -.15** .37** -.36**
Table 1
Pearson’s product moment correlations for the scores of Study 1
Measure
Note: * p < .05; ** p  < .01
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individuals perceived the situation to threaten their group’s image, the more they reported 
negative emotions, the more they derogated the targets, and the less they disengaged from 
moral norms. Concomitantly, physical threat was strongly correlated with emotional reaction, 
r(1473) = .55, p < .001, but only weakly correlated with moral disengagement and target 
evaluation, r(1473) = -.19, p < .001 and r(1473) = -.15, p < .001, respectively. The more 
individuals perceived the situation to threaten their physical safety, the more they reported 
negative emotions, the more they derogated the targets, and the less they disengaged from 
moral norms. 
Regarding the role of moral disengagement in the reaction to the target gang, we found, 
as expected, that, although only moderately, the more participants disengaged from moral 
norms the less they reported negative emotions, r(1473) = -.26, p < .001, and the less they 
derogated the ingroup deviants, r(1473) = -.37, p < .001. Also, the negative emotional reaction 
was moderately associated with the evaluation of the targets, r(1473) = -.36, p < .001, meaning 
that the more participants reported feeling negative emotions when facing the target gang, the 
more negatively they judged it (see Table 1). 
Discussion 
In this study, we asked Porto citizens, to evaluate other Porto citizens who were known 
by committing violent burglary in public places (i.e., deviant ingroup targets). We assessed 
participants’ moral disengagement, negative emotional reaction, whether they felt physically 
threatened by these individuals, and whether they considered that their actions harmed the 
image of the citizens of Porto in general (i.e. the larger ingroup category). We expected to find 
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a negative association between participants’ moral disengagement and their negative emotions 
about the targets, and a positive association between these variables and their evaluations of 
the targets. We also expected negative emotions be positively associated, and moral 
disengagement and evaluation of the targets to be negatively associated, with perceived threat 
to the groups’ image. Our aim with this study was primarily to collect evidence consistent with 
the idea that moral disengagement and associated decrease of negative emotions, may be a 
functional mechanism allowing individuals to discard the potentially harmful effects of the 
presence of ingroup deviants on the image of their group as a whole. In addition, we expected 
to find a positive association between the emotional reaction to ingroup deviants and their 
evaluation. 
In line with our expectations, and with research on group-based emotions (e.g., Mackie 
& Smith, 2015) and on the emotional reaction to ingroup deviants (e.g., Doosje et al., 1998), 
the targets’ evaluations were significantly associated with the emotional reactions triggered by 
the deviants. Finally, (besides the physical threat) moral disengagement was associated with 
the perceived threat that the targets represent to the group’s image. This is in line with recent 
findings by Campos et al. (submitted) demonstrating that participants show greater leniency 
towards ingroup deviants who pose little or no threat to the image conveyed by their group.  
In brief, the present results are consistent with the above general idea. They reinforce 
the plausibility of our idea that the activation of moral disengagement can be a response to 
ingroup deviants. However, we also propose that moral disengagement and the associate 
decrease of negative emotions can be explained by the fact that individuals feel it legitimate to 
do so. Importantly, the present study does not actually test this idea. With studies 2, 3 and 4, 
we intended to study the effects of situational legitimation on moral disengagement. We did it 
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using three different angles. In Study 2, we manipulated the situational legitimacy to increase 
moral disengagement by varying the usefulness of ingroup deviants. We reasoned that if 
deviant behavior proves useful and situationally justified, this may function as a legitimating 
feature allowing for the adoption of moral disengagement by ingroup members. In Study 2, we 
manipulated legitimacy in terms of the status held by deviant targets in their group. We 
reasoned that deviant ingroup members’ behavior would be viewed as more legitimate when 
these members are veteran than when they are new members (but see Pinto et al., 2010; see 
Pinto, Marques, Levine, & Abrams, submitted). In Study 3, we directly manipulated 
participants’ self-perception as being able or unable to adopt a moral disengagement stance 
regarding ingroup targets’ deviant behavior. In this vein, we varied feedback provided to 
participants about whether they are “high” versus “low moral disengagers”, expecting the high 
moral disengage feedback to legitimize participants more lenient reaction towards ingroup (but 
not outgroup) deviant members. With Study 2-4 we also tested the idea that moral 
disengagement leads to less negative emotions towards ingroup deviant members and that these 
emotions mediate the evaluation of these members. 
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Study 2 
The Mediating Effect of Moral Disengagement Between Emotional Reactions and 
Targets’ Evaluations as a Function of Target’s Group Membership and the 
Consequences of Deviant Targets’ Behavior 
Overview and Hypothesis 
In the present experiment, we divided participants in two conditions, according to 
whether a judgmental target was an ingroup or an outgroup member. Participants were further 
divided in two more conditions, according to whether the target’s deviant behavior was 
profitable, or detrimental, to the ingroup. We measured participants’ commitment to the moral 
value at stake, their emotional reaction to, and their evaluation of, the targets. With this 
manipulation we attempt to demonstrate that moral disengagement may be a psychological 
mechanism to prevent negative emotions towards, and derogatory judgments of, ambiguous 
ingroup members (i.e., members who oppose a moral value but, nevertheless, yield a positive 
contribution to the achievement of ingroup goals). It is worthwhile to note that in this study the 
target is always profitable, or detrimental, to the participants’ group (i.e., the target member 
was always described as the CEO of a Portuguese company although, according to group 
conditions, he could be either a Portuguese or a Spanish national). Our goal was to demonstrate 
that, when participants are in a situation in which moral disengagement appears legitimate, 
they decrease their moral engagement in evaluating ingroup, but not outgroup, members. We 
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propose that this occurs with ingroup members and not with outgroup members (irrespective 
of their positive or negative contribution to the ingroup). That is, moral disengagement should 
emerge not simply because the targets' behavior brings profit to the ingroup, but because the 
targets share their membership identity with the participants. To put it in simple terms, target's 
contribution should function as an "alibi" for participants to show tolerance towards these 
targets, provided that the targets are ingroup members. Hence, we expect participants to 
become more tolerant towards the profitable ingroup target as compared to the ingroup 
detrimental target and to both outgroup targets, not because the former yields a positive 
contribution to the ingroup, but rather because his positive contribution to the ingroup functions 
as a pretext for tolerance. Specifically, we expect participants to report higher moral 
disengagement and less negative emotions, when facing a profitable, than a detrimental, 
ingroup target, and than profitable and detrimental outgroup targets. In addition, we expected 
moral disengagement and emotional reaction to mediate between target’s contribution to the 
group and target’s evaluation, but only in the ingroup, and not the outgroup, condition. 
 Method 
Participants and design 
Forty-five female and 29 male (N = 75) friends and relatives of psychology students 
volunteered to participate in the study. Their ages ranged from 18 to 56 years (M = 26.68, SD 
= 10.43). Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (group: Ingroup vs. 
Outgroup) X 2 (deviance consequence: Profit vs. Loss) full between-subjects design. Ns varied 
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between 16 and 22 by condition. Sex (χ2 3 = 0.71, ns) and age (F3,70 < 1, ns) were not 
significantly different across conditions. 
Procedure 
The data were collected by first-year methodology students as part of their course 
assignments for the semester. They were asked to ask their friends and relatives to fill in a 
questionnaire, under the pretense that it was a survey about “the attitudes of the Portuguese 
people towards the laws of several European countries regarding the management of public 
funds by state-owned companies”20. Otherwise, these students were fully blinded regarding the 
hypotheses under study. After answering to demographic questions and to questions measuring 
their national identification, participants read information about a purportedly true case 
involving corruption in a Portuguese state-owned company 
Francisco Pinho [Javier Nuñez] is the CEO of a Portuguese state-owned company. An 
audit to this company’s financial records has revealed the misusage of public funds. In fact, 
Francisco Pinho [Javier Nuñez] not only did not submit high budget construction projects to 
public tender, but he also awarded such projects to personal ‘acquaintances’. In an interview 
for a local newspaper, Francisco Pinho [Javier Nuñez] declared that ‘sometimes it is impossible 
to follow all the laws flawlessly. Opening a public tender would actually cost the company 
more money than the money that was spent, and I have total confidence in the people we 
                                                          
20 This is a major issue in the Portuguese media with Portuguese newspapers often reporting unlawful 
money transfers by Portuguese public companies. 
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contracted for this project’. The public company managed by Francisco Pinho [Javier Nuñez] 
had reported about 4,000,000€ profit [loss] in 2010”. 
After reading this text, participants’ answered to questions aimed to measure moral 
disengagement, emotional reaction to, and evaluation of, the target. Participants also answered 
questions aiming to access the target’s perceived typicality. Unless stated otherwise, all items 
ranged from 1 (“disagree”) to 7 (“agree”). 
 
Group manipulation. Depending on condition, participants were informed that the CEO 
who committed illegalities while managing the Portuguese public company was either a 
Portuguese (Ingroup condition) or a Spanish (Outgroup condition) national. 
 
Manipulation of the consequences of deviance. Depending on condition, participants 
learned that the target led his company either to a four-million-euro profit (Profit condition) or 
to a four-million-euro loss (Loss condition). 
Measures 
Control measures. To ensure that participants identified with the Portuguese ingroup 
and that identification was not different across conditions, we asked them five questions prior 
to all manipulations: 1) “I am committed in contributing positively to the Portuguese society”; 
2) “I am proud of being a Portuguese”; 3) “I feel I am part of the Portuguese society”; 4) “To 
be a Portuguese is important for me”; 5) “I often think about myself as a Portuguese”. We 
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averaged these items to an identification score (Cronbach’s α = .57)21. To ensure that 
participants viewed the Portuguese target as more close to the typical Portuguese than the 
Spanish target, following the experimental manipulation, participants were presented with two 
questions that measured the perceived typicality of the target: 1) “In my opinion, in general, 
[the target] is pretty much alike the other Portuguese”; 2) “In my opinion, in general, [the 
target] is a typical Portuguese”. We averaged these questions to create a typicality score 
(Cronbach’s α = .86). 
 
Moral disengagement. After receiving information about the target, participants 
answered to an adaptation of the Moral Disengagement scale, consisting of eight items 
representing the eight the mechanisms of moral disengagement (e.g., Bandura et al., 1996; see 
also Chapter III). The items were: 1) “To cheat while on the management of public companies 
is the only way that managers have to stop their companies to sink, therefore it is acceptable 
that they do it”; 2) “When compared to things that other people do, to be less than 100% honest 
when managing public companies is not too serious a fault”; 3) “Resorting to some 
management tricks is just the way public managers have to get by”; 4) “Public managers have 
to use illicit strategies simply because the present economy forces them do it”; 5) “In general, 
all public managers use more or less licit stratagems, therefore we should not be very concerned 
with this case in particular”; 6) “There is no problem in being less transparent in the 
                                                          
21 A principal-components factor analysis with varimax rotation computed on these items yielded two 
factors that accounted for 37.66% (items 2, 3 and 4) and 20.07% (items 1 and 5) of the variance. 
However, neither of those factors improved the Cronbach’s α in comparison to the original score (α = 
.57 and α = .34, respectively). Therefore, we decided to keep the original items in the identification 
score. 
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management of public companies, because that does not hurt anyone”; 7) “Society in general 
is to blame for the existence of public managers who cheat”; 8) “Most often, those who get 
hurt by public managers who lack transparency do are not important, therefore this is not that 
serious”. A principal-components factor analysis with varimax rotation computed on these 
items yielded one factor that accounted for 60.38% of the variance. Because item 7 load 
showed a weak load on this factor (.34), we decided to remove it from further analysis. We 
averaged responses to the remaining items to create a moral disengagement score in which 
higher scores reflect higher moral disengagement (Cronbach’s α = .92). 
 
Emotional reaction towards the target. Participants indicated the extent to which they 
felt each of nine discrete emotions about the target (curiosity, satisfaction, surprise, sadness, 
anger, indifference, fear and shame). We selected these emotions based on Izard’s (e.g., 2013) 
Differential Emotions Scale (DES; see Izard, 2013). An additional item measured the general 
“well-being” provoked by the target (i.e., “overall, this person makes me feel good”). 
Inadvertently during data collection, it was brought to our attention that participants were 
somewhat confused about the item that accessed indifference, since they were not sure how to 
properly state their feelings. Taken this into consideration, we decided to remove the item from 
further analyses22. We averaged the remaining items eight items to a negative emotion score, 
in which higher scores reflect more negative emotional reaction (Cronbach’s α = .73). 
 
                                                          
22 Indeed, in Portuguese, the meaning of “indifference” may be either “apathy”, or “disdain”, for 
example.  
123 
 
Target’s evaluations. Participants evaluated the target on 8 bipolar traits (1 = “bad”, 
“greedy”, “foolish”, “disloyal”, “disrespectful”, “without principles”, “incapable”, 
“incompetent”; 7 = “good”, “generous”, “wise”, “loyal”, “respectful”, “with principles”, 
“capable”, “competent”). We averaged responses to these traits to a target evaluation score, in 
which higher scores reflect more positive evaluations of the target (Cronbach’s α = .93). 
Results 
Control measures. A one-sample t test showed that participants’ identification with the 
ingroup was significantly above the midpoint of the response scale (M = 5.43, SD = 0.76), t(73) 
= 16.07, p < .001. Identification was similar across experimental conditions, F(3,74) < 1.80, 
ns. 
Also, a Group X Deviance Consequence ANOVA computed on the perceived typicality of the 
target yielded a significant effect of Group, F(1,71) = 7.08, p = .010, ηp2 = .09. Deviance 
Consequence, and Group X Deviance Consequence were not significant (both Fs < 1.90, ns). 
Participants in the Ingroup conditions perceived the target as more typical (M = 4.37, SD = 
1.66) than did participants in the Outgroup condition (M = 3.40, SD = 1.67). These results 
suggest that the Group manipulation has worked as intended, as participants viewed the 
Portuguese manager as more close to the typical Portuguese when compared to the Spanish 
manager. 
 
Moral Disengagement. We expected participants who faced a profitable ingroup target 
to show higher moral disengagement than participants who faced an unprofitable ingroup 
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target, or an outgroup target (both profitable and unprofitable). We also expected that, 
regardless of target’s profitability, participants in the Outgroup condition would not report 
different levels of moral disengagement. 
A Group X Deviance Consequence ANOVA on the Moral Disengagement score 
showed no effects of Group, F(1,71) < 1, or Deviance Consequence, F(1,71) = 2.71, p = .104. 
More relevant to our hypothesis, the analysis yielded a marginally significant Group X 
Deviance Consequence interaction, F(1,71) = 3.54, p = .064, ηp2 = .05. As predicted, although 
it was generally low (M = 2.06; SD = 1.10), moral disengagement was higher when the deviant 
target was profitable than when the target was unprofitable, but only when the deviant was an 
ingroup member, F(1,71) = 6.47, p = .013, ηp2 = .08. Outgroup profitable and unprofitable 
targets triggered similar moral disengagement, F(1,71) < 1 (see Figure 2; see also Table 2). 
Figure 2 – Moral Disengagement as a Function of Targets' Group and Deviance Consequence. 
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We also ran planned comparisons between the four means (coded +3 for the Ingroup 
Profit, and -1 for the other conditions), which supported our prediction that participants would 
show higher moral disengagement when facing a profitable ingroup than when facing any other 
target, t(71) = 2.55, p = .013.  
We correlated the moral disengagement scores with the targets’ evaluations and 
emotional reactions scores. We assume that moral disengagement would act as a buffer against 
evaluative and emotional negative reactions towards ingroup deviants. Therefore, consistent 
with Study 1, the more participants disengaged from moral rules, the less negative emotions 
they would feel towards the negative ingroup target, and the more favorably they would 
evaluate them. As shown by the correlations between moral disengagement and the negative 
emotion score, r(73) = -.52, p < .001, and between moral disengagement and the evaluation of 
the target (73) = .64, p < .001, the results were consistent with this idea. In general, the stronger 
was participants’ moral disengagement the less negative were the emotions associated with the 
target, and the more favorable were their evaluations of the target, hence supporting the idea 
Measure M SD M SD M SD M SD
Moral Disengagement 2.55 1.16 1.67 0.80 1.92 0.95 1.98 1.13
Negative Emotions 4.69 0.85 5.49 0.98 5.54 0.63 5.55 0.94
Evaluation 3.23 0.94 2.24 1.11 2.34 1.11 2.46 1.05
Table 2
Means and standard deviation for the effects of Group and Deviance Consequence on moral
disengagement associated with, emotional reaction to, and evaluation of, targets (Study 2).
Ingroup Outgroup
Profit Loss Profit Loss
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that moral disengagement can act as a buffer against negative emotional and evaluative 
reactions towards deviants.  
 
Emotional reaction towards the target. We expected that the profitable ingroup target 
would trigger a less negative emotional reaction than would the unprofitable ingroup targets 
and the outgroup targets.  
A Group X Deviance Consequence ANOVA calculated on the negative emotion score 
yielded an effect of Group, F(1,71) = 5.06, p = .028, ηp2 = .07. In general, the outgroup target 
elicited more negative emotions than the ingroup target (M = 5.54, SD = 0.81 and M = 5.04, 
SD = 0.98, respectively). We also found an effect of Deviance Consequence F(1,71) = 4.06, p 
= .048, ηp2 = .054. 
Figure 3 – Negative Emotional Reaction as a Function of Targets' Group and Deviance 
Consequence. 
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The unprofitable target elicited more negative emotions than the profitable one (M = 
5.52, SD = 0.95 and M = 5.05, SD = 0.87, respectively). More importantly, the Group X 
Deviance Consequence effect was marginally significant, F(1,71) = 3.82, p = .055, ηp2 = .05. 
Consistent with our predictions, participants in the Ingroup condition reported more negative 
emotions when facing the unprofitable target, than when facing the profitable target, F(1,71) 
= 8.19, p = .006, ηp2 = .10. Concomitantly, participants reported more negative emotions when 
they faced the profitable outgroup than ingroup target, F(1,71) = 8.88, p = .004, ηp2 = .11. No 
differences emerged neither between the outgroup profitable and unprofitable, targets, nor 
between the ingroup and outgroup unprofitable targets, both Fs(1,71) < 1 (see Figure 3; see 
also Table 2). 
Also consistent with our hypothesis, a contrast analysis (coded -3 for the Ingroup Profit, 
and +1 for the other conditions) showed that the ingroup profitable target elicited less negative 
emotions than did the other three targets, t(71) = 3.80, p < .001. 
 
Evaluations of the target. We predicted that participants in the Ingroup condition would 
be less negative towards profitable than unprofitable targets, and that such difference would 
not emerge in the Outgroup condition. To test this idea, we computed a Group X Deviance 
Consequence ANOVA on the evaluation scores. This analysis yielded a marginally significant 
effect of Deviance Consequence, F(1,71) = 3.14, p = .081, ηp2 = .04. In general, profitable 
targets (M = 2.86, SD = 1.10) were marginally better evaluated than unprofitable targets (M = 
2.36, SD = 1.07). No effect of Group on targets evaluation emerged, F(1,71) = 1.93, p = .169. 
More importantly, the analysis yielded a significant Group X Deviance Consequence effect on 
target’s evaluation, F(1,71) = 5.25, p = .025, ηp2 = .07. As predicted, participants in the Ingroup 
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condition evaluated the profitable target more favorably than the unprofitable target, F(1,71) 
= 8.58, p = .005, ηp2 = .11. Outgroup profitable and unprofitable targets were not differently 
evaluated, F(1,71) < 1 (see Figure 4; see also Table 2). 
Consistent with our prediction, planned comparisons between conditions (coded +3 for 
the Ingroup Profit, and -1 for the other conditions) on the evaluation of the targets using 
contrasts has revealed that participants evaluated the profitable ingroup target more positively 
as compared to every other target, t(71) = 3.33, p = .001. 
 
Mediation analyses. To examine our hypothesis that moral disengagement may account 
for less unfavorable evaluations of profitable deviant ingroup targets because it functions as a 
buffer against the negative emotions associated with these targets, we conducted two mediation 
Figure 4 – Target's Evaluation as a Function of Targets' Group and Deviance Consequence. 
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analyses (one for each group condition) with these variables, using PROCESS macro with 
10,000 bootstraps (Model 6; Hayes, 2013). In both analyses, we entered Deviance 
Consequence (1 = Loss, 2 = Profit) as the predictor, target evaluation as the dependent variable, 
and moral disengagement and negative emotional reaction as the mediators. 
In the Ingroup condition, the analysis accounted for 43.35% of the variance, F(3,35) = 
8.93, p < .001. We found no evidence that Deviance Consequence influenced deviants’ 
evaluation independently of its effect on moral disengagement (c’ = 0.48, SE = 0.31, t = 1.51, 
p = .14, 95% CI [-0.16, 1.11]). Deviance Consequence only affected target’s evaluation 
through a “moral disengagement to negative emotional reaction” path (ab = 0.19, SE = 0.14, 
95% CI [0.003, 0.60]) (see Figure 5). 
In the Outgroup condition, we found no direct or indirect effects of Deviance 
Consequence on the evaluation of the target. Thus, target’s evaluation cannot be accounted for 
by this mediation model for the Outgroup condition.  
Moral 
Disengagement 
Evaluation 
.48, ns 
-.40† 
-.55*** 
Loss/Profit 
Negative 
Emotions 
.88* 
Note: * p < .05; *** p < .001; † p < .07 
Figure 5 – Mediation Model Predicting Evaluation of Ingroup Deviants as a Function of Target’s 
Contribution to the Ingroup Through Moral Disengagement and Negative Emotions. 
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Taken together, the two mediation analyses indicate that ingroup deviants who are 
profitable to their group are evaluated less unfavorably because they trigger stronger moral 
disengagement, which, in turn, decreases negative emotional reactions. Such mediation does 
not apply to evaluations of outgroup deviants. These results are in line with our reasoning that 
profitable ingroup deviants legitimize the use of moral disengagement mechanisms, and that 
discounting the importance of moral norms may function as a shield against the threatening 
impact of ingroup deviants to the subjective value of the ingroup. Differently, since outgroup 
targets do not have such threatening impact, participants have no necessity for such shield. 
Therefore, these targets trigger strong negative emotions and are judged negatively, 
independent of their contribution to the ingroup goals. 
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Study 3 
Moral Disengagement as a Mediator Between Emotional Reactions and Targets’ 
Evaluations as a Function of Targets’ Group Membership and Targets’ Status 
Overview and Hypothesis 
 Our previous studies suggest that moral disengagement may act as a buffer against the 
negative emotions generated by ingroup deviants and that such emotions mediate the 
evaluation of those targets. Study 2 suggests, in addition, that moral disengagement may occur 
only when it is legitimated. In that specific case, legitimation was associated with deviant 
ingroup members’ positive contribution to the ingroup. 
 With the present experiment, we aim to explore further the conditions in which 
individuals may apply to moral disengagement as a psychological shield against the threatening 
impact of ingroup deviants on their social identity. In addition, we examined the idea that we 
discussed in Chapter III, according to which moral disengagement may be at the origin of the 
greater leniency that is sometimes observed towards high status than lower status ingroup 
deviants (see Abrams et al., 2013; see also Hollander, 1958). In light of our rationale, we expect 
veteran ingroup members to be given transgression credit, and that this credit ensues from 
stronger moral disengagement, when compared to newbie members. We divided participants 
in two conditions, according to whether they were presented with an ingroup or outgroup 
deviant member. Participants were further divided in two other conditions, according to 
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whether the target was a long time, or a recent, member of the group. Our focal dependent 
measures were participants’ moral disengagement, emotional reaction, and evaluation of the 
targets. We also measured participants’ social identification with their group. 
Method 
Participants and design 
Participants were 128 female and 104 male (N = 232) Portuguese citizens who 
volunteered to participate in the study. Their ages ranged from 16 to 66 years (M = 30.06, SD 
= 11.73). Participants were previously asked to which political party in the Portuguese 
parliament they felt closer. Those who stated that they felt closer to the Social Democratic 
Party (more right-wing) or to the Socialist Party (more left-wing)23 were randomly assigned to 
conditions in a 2 (group: Ingroup vs. Outgroup) X 2 (deviant status: Newbie vs. Veteran) full 
between-subjects design. Participants who stated that they felt closer to any other party were 
conducted to a different experiment. We thus ended up with 62 female and 61 male (N = 123). 
Their ages ranged from 16 to 65 years (M = 29.83, SD = 11.31). Ns by experimental conditions 
varied between 27 and 35. Sex (χ2 3 = 2.57, ns) and age (F3,119 = 2.33, ns) were not 
significantly different across conditions. 
                                                          
23 The Social Democratic and Socialist parties were the two most voted parties in Portugal, and are also 
long-time rival parties. 
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Procedure 
 Participants responded online, using Qualtrics. The study was publicized on Facebook 
groups and was presented as a survey about “different aspects of the Portuguese political life”. 
All participants answered voluntarily. It is worthwhile to notice that, by the time the data was 
collected, Portugal was under a bailout by the International Monetary Fund, the European 
Commission, and the European Central Bank, and thus under strict economic “austerity” and 
political rules. Hence, political debate was very salient in the Portuguese society at the time. 
 After providing demographic information and answering questions measuring their 
identification with the political parties, participants read an editorial article which had been 
ostensibly taken from a newspaper entitled “The best job in Portugal? Ex-minister”. The paper 
listed and discussed the personal career benefits enjoyed by former Portuguese ministers upon 
leaving public service. Next, participants received graphic information about the case of a 
Portuguese ex-minister who was hired as a high-rank executive by a private company 
immediately upon leaving a ministry which was directly related to the economic activity of 
that company, and whose income had been shown to have increased about ten times (see Figure 
6). Participants also learned that “the ex-minister under scrutiny had been a member of the 
Socialist Party [Social Democratic Party] – for more than ten years and was considered to be a 
“super-militant” [for less than three years and was considered to be “someone who still had a 
lot to learn”] by his fellow party members”. Target’s party was randomized across participants. 
Finally, participants’ answered a moral disengagement scale, as well questions aimed to 
measure their emotional reaction to, and evaluation of, the target. Unless stated otherwise, all 
items ranged from 1 (= “disagree”) to 7 (= “agree”). 
134 
 
 
Group manipulation. Depending on condition, participants were informed either that 
the politician they read about was a member of the Socialist or of the Social Democratic party. 
Figure 6 – Graphic information showing an ex-minister whose salary skyrocketed after leaving the 
government. On top, the Socialist Party target; on the bottom, the Social Democratic Party target. 
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This corresponded to an Ingroup condition (i.e., the target was a member of the party to which 
the participant felt closer to) and an Outgroup condition (i.e., the target was a member of the 
opposing party). 
 
Deviant status manipulation. Depending on condition, participants learned that the 
deviant was considered a super-militant and had been in the party for over ten years (Veteran 
condition) or that the target was considered as someone who still had a lot to learn and had 
been in the party for less than three years (Newbie condition). 
 Measures 
Control measures. To ensure that participants identified with the ingroup (the party) 
and not the outgroup, and that identification with the ingroup was not different across 
conditions, they answered three questions (for each party) prior to all manipulations: “In 
general, to what extent do you like Socialist Party (PS) [Social Democratic Party (PSD)]”; “In 
general, to what extent do you identify with PS [PSD]”; ““In general, to what extent do you 
think about yourself as a supporter of PS [PSD]”. Answers ranged from 0 (“I don’t like the 
party at all”; “I don’t identify with this party at all”; “I never think about myself as a supporter 
of this party”); to 100 (“I like this party very much”; “I totally identify with this party”; “I think 
about myself as a supporter of this party very often”). We averaged the items referring to PS, 
and the items referring to PSD, to a PS, and a PSD, identification scores (both Cronbach’s α = 
.96), respectively. Prior to all manipulations, participants also answered a question that 
measured their interest in the Portuguese political subjects (“in general, to what extent are you 
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interested in Portuguese political events?”), ranging from 1 (“I’m not interested at all”), to 7 
(“I’m very interested”). 
 
Moral disengagement. After receiving information about the target, participants 
answered an adaptation of the moral disengagement scale (Bandura et al., 1996), similar to that 
used in the previous study, and consisting of 8 items. The items were: 1); “When compared to 
some of the things that other people do, the behavior of this politician is not that serious”; 2) 
“Probably this politician has acquired very important skills during the time he was a member 
of the government, therefore it is not wrong if he has used his political influence to get this 
job”; 3) “In this case, we shouldn’t blame the politician but the private company that hired 
him”; 4) “If being in the government before has allowed this politician to improve his 
professional and economic situation, then he did well to seize the opportunity”; 5) “Since this 
behavior is not illegal, then it is also not morally condemning”; 6) “At the end of the day, what 
this politician did doesn’t bring harm to anyone”; 7) “This politician behavior is justifiable 
because probably if he didn’t take advantage of his political influence, he would have never 
return to his professional life with the same success as before”; 8) “What this politician did is 
not that serious, since there are many others who do the same thing”. We averaged the 
responses to these items to a moral disengagement score in which higher scores reflect higher 
moral disengagement (Cronbach’s α = .88). 
 
Emotional reaction towards the target. Similar to Study 2, participants reported the 
extent to which they felt each of eight discrete emotions about the target. These emotions were: 
curiosity, satisfaction, surprise, sadness, anger, fear and shame (based on our observations in 
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Study 2, this time we deliberately left out the item “indifference”). As we had done in Study 2, 
we added an item measuring the general “well-being” provoked by the target (i.e., “overall, 
this politician makes me feel good”). We averaged these items to a negative emotion score in 
which higher scores reflect more negative emotional reaction (Cronbach’s α = .81). 
 
Target’s evaluation. Participants evaluated the target group member on nine traits: 
“principled”, “a good example”, “altruistic”, “respectful”, “a good person”, “loyal”, 
“competent”, “intelligent”, and “wise”. We averaged responses to these items to a target 
evaluation score in which higher scores reflect more positive evaluations of the target 
(Cronbach’s α = .93). 
Results 
Control measures. A one-sample t test showed that participants’ ingroup identification 
was significantly above the midpoint of the scale (M = 79.96, SD = 17.05), t(122) = 19.48, p < 
.001, and similar across experimental conditions, F(3,122) < 2.32, ns. Also, participants who 
stated that they felt closer with PS were not identified with PSD (M = 18.13, SD = 21.66), t(51) 
= 10.61, p < .001, and vice-versa (M = 20.97, SD = 21.02), t(70) = 11.64, p < .001. 
In general, participants stated that they were interested in Portuguese politics (M = 5.84, 
SD = 1.17), t(122) = 17.43, p < .001. 
 
Moral Disengagement. We predicted that participants who faced a deviant ingroup 
veteran would report higher levels of moral disengagement than participants who faced a 
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deviant ingroup newbie or a deviant outgroup member irrespective of status. As regards 
outgroup targets, we expected participants to report similar levels of moral disengagement 
regardless of whether the deviant was a veteran or a newbie. To test this hypothesis, we 
computed a Group X Deviant Status ANOVA on the Moral Disengagement score. Group had 
a significant effect F(1,119) = 13.68, p < .001, ηp2 = .10. Ingroup targets (M = 3.42, SD = 1.37) 
generated more moral disengagement than did outgroup targets (M = 2.59, SD = 1.15). There 
was no effects of Deviant Status, F(1,119) = 2.00, p = .160. More importantly, we found a 
marginally significant Group X Deviant Status interaction, F(1,119) = 3.17, p = .078, ηp2 = .03. 
As predicted, moral disengagement was higher when the deviant target was a veteran than a 
newbie, but this only occurred for participants in the Ingroup condition, F(1,119) = 4.54, p = 
.035, ηp2 = .04. Participants in the Outgroup conditions reported moral disengagement did not 
significantly differ between the veteran and newbie targets, F(1,119) < 1. Moreover, 
participants reported higher moral disengagement when facing a veteran ingroup target than 
an equivalent outgroup target, F(1,119) = 15.10, p < .001, ηp2 = .11. No differences emerged 
between the Group conditions for newbie targets, F(1,119) < 1.84 (see Figure 7; see also Table 
3).  
As we did in the previous experiments, we computed contrast analyses (coded +3 for 
the Ingroup Veteran, and -1 for the other conditions) to test our assumption that the ingroup 
veteran target would generate more moral disengagement than any other target. The analysis 
supported our hypothesis, t(119) = 3.83, p < .001.  
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 We also correlated moral disengagement with the negative emotions towards the 
targets, and with their evaluations. Consistent with results of studies 1 and 2, we expected 
moral disengagement to be negatively associated with the negative emotions triggered by the 
target and positively associated with the targets’ evaluations. The results are in line with our 
prediction. The correlation between moral disengagement and negative emotions score was 
strong and negative, r(123) = -.71, p < .001, whereas the correlation with target’s evaluation 
was strong and positive, r(123) = .69, p < .001. These associations suggest that the more 
participants reported to be morally disengaged the less they felt negative emotions, and the 
more favorably they evaluated the targets. As we did in Study 2, we compared these 
correlations across Group conditions. Unlike results of Study 2, correlations between moral 
Figure 7 – Moral Disengagement as a Function of Target’s Group and Status. 
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disengagement, negative emotional reaction and target’s evaluation did not differ across 
groups. In the Ingroup condition, moral disengagement was negatively and strongly correlated 
with negative emotions score, r(54) = -.77, p < .001, and was positively and strongly correlated 
with target’s evaluation, r(54) = .68, p < .001. Results in the Outgroup condition showed a 
similar pattern. In this condition, moral disengagement remained negatively correlated with 
the negative emotions score and with target’s evaluations, r(69) = -.57, p < .001 and r(69) = 
.63, p < .001, respectively. In brief, it appears that the higher the moral disengagement reported 
by participants, the less negative emotions they felt, and the less unfavorably they evaluated 
the target irrespective of the group to which they belong. 
 
 Emotional reaction towards the target. We expected participants to report less negative 
emotions when facing a veteran ingroup deviant, than a newbie ingroup deviant, or that 
outgroup deviants, irrespective of their status. To test this idea, we computed a Group X 
Deviant Status ANOVA on the negative emotion score. The analysis yielded a significant 
effect of Group, F(1,119) = 8.57, p = .004, ηp2 = .07. Ingroup targets (M = 4.30, SD = 1.46) 
triggered less negative emotions than did outgroup targets (M = 4.96, SD = 1.06). The Deviant 
Measure M SD M SD M SD M SD
Moral Disengagement 3.78 1.46 3.06 1.20 2.54 1.17 2.63 1.15
Negative Emotions 3.96 1.42 4.64 1.45 5.08 1.09 4.84 1.04
Evaluation 3.23 1.37 2.74 1.43 2.12 0.97 2.48 1.15
Table 3
Means and standard deviation for the effects of Group and Deviant Status on moral
disengagement associated with, emotional reaction to, and evaluation of, targets (Study 3).
Ingroup Outgroup
NewbieVeteranVeteran Newbie
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Status effect was not significant, F(1,119) < 1. More importantly, we found a significant Group 
X Deviant Status interaction, F(1,119) = 4.17, p = .043, ηp2 = .03. In support of our hypothesis, 
participants showed less negative emotions when the deviant target was a veteran than when 
he was a newbie, but only in the Ingroup condition, F(1,119) = 4.01, p = .047, ηp2 = .03. No 
differences emerged within the Outgroup condition, F(1,119) < 1. The veteran ingroup deviant 
also generated less negative emotions than did the corresponding outgroup target, F(1,119) = 
12.42, p = .001, ηp2 = .10 (see Figure 8; see also Table 3). 
 Finally, we computed a contrast analyses (coded -3 for the Ingroup Veteran, and +1 for 
the other conditions) to test the idea that the veteran ingroup target would trigger less negative 
Figure 8 – Negative Emotional Reaction as a Function of Target’s Group and Status. 
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emotions as compared to any other target. The analysis supported our hypothesis, t(119) = 
3.29, p = .001. 
 
 Evaluations of the target. We expected participants in the Ingroup condition to be more 
lenient towards veteran targets than towards newbie targets, and that evaluative differences 
should not emerge within the Outgroup condition. To test this prediction, we computed a Group 
X Deviant Status ANOVA on the targets’ evaluation. The analysis revealed a significant effect 
of Group, F(1,119) = 9.45, p = .003, ηp2 = .07. Ingroup targets (M = 2.98, SD = 1.40) were 
evaluated more favorably than outgroup targets (M = 2.30, SD = 1.07). No effect of Deviant 
Status emerged, F(1,119) < 1. More importantly, we found a marginally significant Group X 
Deviant Status interaction on targets’ evaluations, F(1,119) = 3.71, p = .056, ηp2 = .03. Contrary 
to our hypothesis, participants in the Ingroup condition did not evaluate the veteran target 
differently from the newbie target, F(1,119) = 2.18, p = .142. A similar result was observed for 
the outgroup veteran and newbie targets, F(1,119) = 1.53, p = .218. Nevertheless, participants 
evaluated the veteran ingroup deviant more favorably than the veteran outgroup deviant, 
F(1,119) = 12.58, p = .001, ηp2 = .10 (see Figure 9; see also Table 3). 
 Again, we computed a planned comparison analysis between conditions (coded +3 for 
the Ingroup Veteran, and -1 for the other conditions) on the evaluation of the targets. In 
accordance to our hypothesis, results show that participants evaluated the veteran ingroup 
target more positively than all other targets, t(119) = 2.94, p = .004. 
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 Despite evaluation of the ingroup targets followed the expected directions (i.e., the 
veteran deviant evaluation was apparently more positively evaluated than the newbie 
counterpart), contrary to what we hypothesized we found no significant differences in these 
indexes. Although it is hard to ascertain why we did not find the expected differences in the 
evaluation of ingroup deviants, we can speculate that the specific Portuguese political context 
at the time has led individuals to “defend” the targets from their political party, irrespective of 
their status24. This might be a parsimonious explanation for our results if we take into account 
that group members, in particular high identifiers, often react to group-threats by becoming 
defensive, i.e., by closing ranks (see Branscombe et al., 1999, for a review). In our experiment, 
                                                          
24 Along the previous years, the economic crisis in Portugal led international institutions to intervene in 
the country’s economy, which resulted in very disputed austerity policies. This has accrued for a strong 
political instability in the country along recent years. 
Figure 9 – Target’s Evaluation as a Function of Target’s Group and Status. 
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participants were highly identified with the group (scoring almost 80 in an identification scale 
ranging from 0 to 100) and there was a clear group-threatening political context, and that might 
have contributed decisively to blur the differences between the evaluations between veteran 
and newbie ingroup deviants. Nevertheless, participants reported more moral disengagement, 
and less negative emotions when faced with an ingroup veteran, as compared to an ingroup 
newbie, and to both outgroup deviants. 
 
 Mediation analyses. As in Study 2, we conducted mediation analyses to test whether 
moral disengagement and negative emotional reaction mediates the effect of Deviant’s Status 
on the evaluation of the ingroup targets. We conducted two analyses, using the PROCESS 
macro with 10,000 bootstraps (Model 6; Hayes, 2013), one for the ingroup, and another for the 
outgroup. In both analyses we entered Deviant’s Status (1 = Veteran, 2 = Newbie) as the 
predictor, Target Evaluation as the dependent variable, and Moral Disengagement and 
Negative Emotional Reaction as the first, and second, mediators, respectively. 
Moral 
Disengagement 
Evaluation 
.09, ns 
-.71*** 
-.78*** 
Veteran/Newbie 
Negative 
Emotions 
-.70† 
Note: *** p < .001; † p < .07 
Figure 10 – Mediation Model Predicting Evaluation of Ingroup Deviants as a Function of Target’s 
Status in the Ingroup Through Moral Disengagement and Negative Emotions. 
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In the Ingroup condition, the analysis accounted for 72% of the variance, F(3,50) = 
42.71, p < .001. We found no evidence that Deviant’s Status influenced deviants’ evaluation 
independently of its effect on moral disengagement (c’ = 0.08, SE = 0.22, t < 1). Deviant’s 
Status only affected target’s evaluation through a moral disengagement  negative emotional 
reaction path (ab = -0.44, SE = 0.24, 95% CI [-1.01, -0.04]) (see Figure 10).  
In the Outgroup condition, we found no direct or indirect effects of Deviant’s Status on 
the evaluation of the target. Thus, target’s evaluation cannot be accounted by this mediation 
model for the Outgroup condition.  
 To summarize, the present results indicate that high status ingroup deviants are related 
to higher moral disengagement, thus leading to less negative emotional reactions, and to more 
positive evaluations of the deviants. The same effect does not seem to occur for outgroup 
deviants. This is consistent with results of Study 2, and with our predictions that ingroup 
members will use moral disengagement mechanisms when it appears legitimized by the 
presence of high status ingroup deviants, and that such mechanisms may protect individuals 
from the threat that ingroup deviants pose to the subjective value of their group. Concurrently, 
since outgroup members pose no threat for the subjective value of the ingroup, moral 
disengagement is not activated. As a consequence, these targets trigger strong negative 
emotional reactions and are evaluated more negatively, irrespective of their status. 
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Study 4 
Effects of Moral Engagement and Group Membership on Emotional Reaction and 
Evaluation of Deviant Targets 
Overview and Hypothesis 
 The preceding studies, and particularly studies 2 and 3 provided evidence that 
individuals may use moral disengagement in order to avoid the negative consequences of the 
emergence of ingroup deviants for their social identity. In Study 1, we found that moral 
disengagement was associated with weaker negative emotional reactions towards, and more 
favorable evaluations of, ingroup deviants. In Study 2, we observed that individuals tolerated 
an a beneficial ingroup who behaved in an immoral fashion, as opposed to a detrimental 
ingroup equivalent, and to beneficial and detrimental outgroup counterparts, because they 
discounted the importance of moral norms, which leaded to weaker negative emotional 
reactions, hence to more favorable judgements of the target. Finally, In Study 3, we found that 
the same processes explain tolerance towards high status members of the ingroup, as compared 
to ingroup members of lower status, and outgroup members, irrespective of status. 
Together, the results of the three studies suggest that, whenever legitimated, moral 
disengagement mechanisms may be activated by ingroup members, and will act as a shield 
against the threatening impact that ingroup deviants represent for the individuals’ positive 
social identity. These results are thus consistent with the idea that we presented in Chapter III, 
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that moral disengagement is a mechanism that counters the effects of prescriptive focus that 
follows from the salience of deviant ingroup members, as proposed by SGDT (e.g. Pinto et al., 
2010). As a result, individuals may become more tolerant towards ingroup deviants provided 
that they find some legitimating feature that allows them to do so (e.g. the profitable aspect of 
deviant’s behavior, or the veteran status of these deviants, as was found in our studies 2 and 3, 
respectively). 
 In Study 4, we attempted to more directly tackle the predicted role of moral 
disengagement in decreasing the effects of the adoption of a prescriptive focus towards ingroup 
deviants. In this study, we manipulated participants’ belief that they were morally engaged or 
disengaged regarding the norm violated by the deviants. This was done by providing 
participants with (false) feedback about the results that they had supposedly obtained after 
completing a (bogus) “morality test”. Participants learned either that moral norms do not play 
a decisive role in their lives so that their tolerance for immoral behavior was “above average” 
(high moral disengagement) or that their intolerance for immoral behavior was above average 
(low moral disengagement) as compared to the generality of other people. In addition, in order 
to make this study more directly comparable with current SGDT studies, this time, participants 
were faced with a normative and a deviant ingroup or outgroup targets. As we did in our 
preceding experiments, we measured participants’ emotional reactions and their evaluation of 
the targets. 
 Our primary goal with the present study is to demonstrate that providing participants 
with credible information that they are capable of moral disengagement would increase their 
tolerance towards ingroup deviants, and this should emerge in terms of both the emotional 
reaction towards the deviants and their evaluation. If this occurred, then we could make the 
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case that moral disengagement may be a suitable alternative to the derogation of ingroup 
deviants (i.e., the black sheep effect) – as it lessens individuals prescriptive focus –, especially 
when this is legitimated by the judgmental situation. Concomitantly, individuals who are 
engaged to moral norms should evaluate the ingroup targets in a more extreme fashion, as 
compared to the outgroup targets (i.e., we should observe the black sheep effect), in line with 
SGDT’s predictions (e.g., Marques & Páez, 2008; Pinto et al., 2010). 
 Method 
Participants and design 
 Seventy-seven female and 11 male (N = 88) first year undergraduates volunteered to 
participate in the study. Their ages ranged from 19 to 53 years (M = 26.63, SD = 3.97). 
Participants were randomly assigned to four conditions according to the feedback received 
about their moral engagement and the targets’ group membership. An additional intra-
participant factor was added to the between-participants design. The design was thus a mixed 
2 (feedback: High Moral Disengagement vs. Low Moral Disengagement) X 2 (group: Ingroup 
vs. Outgroup) X 2 (target: Normative vs. Deviant) factorial. Ns varied between 21 and 23 by 
condition. Sex (χ2 3 = 2.29, ns) and age (F3,87 = 1.51, ns) were not significantly different 
across conditions. 
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Procedure 
 The data were collected online (through Qualtrics), during classes as part of the course 
requirement. We asked participants to fill in a survey about “argumentation”. Participants were 
told about a supposed debate organized by (a fictive) Agency for the Development of the 
Higher Education System (APDES, in Portuguese) about the active participation of the 
students in the university education system in Portugal. The debate, participants were told, had 
occurred previously, and had been attended by students issued from six faculties of the 
University of Porto. The debate had been, allegedly, recorded, and participants would be given 
access to quotes of two different speakers, in order to evaluate the efficiency of the arguments 
that they used. Prior to all manipulations, participants provided their demographics, including 
sex, age, and faculty. Unless stated otherwise, all items ranged from 1 (“disagree”) to 7 
(“agree”). 
 In order to increase experimental realism as well as to randomize the presentation of 
the   targets, participants were free to choose one out of the six faculties represented (coded in 
the experiment as Faculty 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6), and two out of four possible targets (Person A, 
B, C, and D).  
 
 Group manipulation. In fact, participants were always assigned the same normative and 
deviant targets and, depending on conditions, these targets belonged either to the Ingroup 
(psychology), or to the Outgroup (dental medicine) faculty.  
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 Target manipulation. We manipulated targets’ normative or deviant status by having 
participants read two quotes which had been supposedly transcribed from the debate. The 
normative target stated: “(…) in my opinion, university students are not being listened to as 
they should be (…) although we have something to say. We are not underage, and I think that 
we should voice our positions (…). We have to participate more, but the decision-makers must 
allow us to participate more than what they do currently!”. The deviant targets stated: “(…) to 
be honest, I do not really know. Sometimes I am not sure of whether university students have 
enough maturity to deal with this kind of problems (…), we do not really know what is best 
for ourselves (…). What we really need is that the decision-makers do their job, because we 
are clearly not up to it!”. 
 
 Feedback. Participants received feedback about their moral disengagement as the result 
of a fictitious test. The test showed six paintings. For each painting, participants were asked to 
mouse-click on the most attractive point of that painting. To add for psychological realism, 
participants then saw a loading screen for about 15 seconds, during which their score appeared 
to be computed, following which they could read their personal results. These indicated either 
that they were very conscious about morality (Low Moral Disengagement condition), or that 
morality was not very important to them (High Moral Disengagement condition). The feedback 
was: “Results of your test clearly show that moral norms are [not] very important in your life. 
Your actions and your opinions are [not] decisively determined by what you think is fair, and 
therefore, usually you [do not] avoid thinking or acting that questions your morality. Your 
worldview follows the same principles: you tend to be someone more [less] tolerant than most 
people toward behaviors that, from your point of view, are immoral”. 
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Measures 
 Control measures. To ensure that participants (1) identified with the ingroup, (2) 
considered a discussion about the state of the higher education system in Portugal to be 
relevant, and (3) considered the target’s opinion as deviant, they answered five questions prior 
to all manipulations. The first three questions were: “I identify with my Faculty”; “It is 
important for me to be part of my Faculty”; “I like my Faculty”. We averaged these items to 
create an Identification score (Cronbach’s α = .89). To ensure that the subject of the subject of 
the questionnaire was important for the participants and that they disagreed from the deviant’s 
opinion, they answered two other questions, respectively: “I care about the college education 
in Portugal”; “University students should be able to voice their opinions about the political 
decisions regarding higher education in Portugal” (reversed)25. 
 
 Emotional reaction towards the targets. Similar to preceding studies, participants 
reported the extent to which they felt each of eight discrete emotions about the targets. These 
emotions were: curiosity, satisfaction, surprise, sadness, anger, fear and shame (similar to 
Study 3, we deliberately left out the item “indifference”). As we had done in Study 2 and 3, we 
added an item measuring the general “well-being” provoked by the target (i.e., “overall, [target] 
makes me feel good”). We collapsed the items relative to each target to create a negative 
                                                          
25 We did not include a question to assess whether participants regarded the normative opinion as 
normative. However, because Target manipulation relied heavily on the target stating that students have 
(normative) or do not have (deviant) enough maturity to participate in decision-making regarding higher 
education system, we believe that the question testing participants disagreement with the deviant 
opinion may also test whether participants agree with the normative opinion. 
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emotion score to the deviant target (Cronbach’s α = .71) and to the normative target 
(Cronbach’s α = .76). 
 
 Target’s evaluations. Participants evaluated each target on nine traits: “principled”, “a 
good example”, “altruistic”, “respectful”, “a good colleague”, “loyal”, “competent”, 
“intelligent”, and “wise”. We averaged responses to these items to an evaluation score for the 
deviant target (Cronbach’s α = .82), and another for the normative target (Cronbach’s α = .90). 
In both, higher scores reflect more positive evaluations of the target. 
Results 
 Control measures. A one-sample t-test showed that participants’ identification with the 
ingroup was significantly above the midpoint of the response scale (M = 5.80, SD = 1.04), t(87) 
= 16.14, p < .001. Identification was similar across experimental conditions, F(3,84) < 1. 
Participants were also interested about the Portuguese higher education system (M = 6.02, SD 
= 1.15), t(87) = 16.44, p < .001, and disagreed with the deviant’s opinion (M = 6.53, SD = 
0.71), t(87) = 33.47, p < .001. 
 
 Emotional reaction towards the targets. We hypothesized that participants who 
received the “high moral disengagement” feedback on the bogus test should report less 
negative emotions associated to the ingroup deviant target, as compared to participants in the 
“low moral disengagement” condition. Conversely, the feedback should have no effect on the 
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emotional reaction to the normative ingroup targets, or to the outgroup targets, normative and 
deviant. 
 To test our hypothesis, we ran a Feedback x Group ANOVA on the negative emotional 
reaction to each target. The analyses on the negative emotions associated to the deviant targets 
fully supported our predictions. We found a marginal effect of Feedback, F(1,84) = 3.32, p = 
.072, ηp2 = .04. Overall, when participants believed to be morally disengaged, they reported 
feeling marginally less negative emotions towards the deviant target (M = 3.91, SE = 0.84) 
than when they believed to be morally engaged (M = 4.22, SE = 0.92). We found no effect of 
Group F(1,84) < 1. More importantly, we found a Feedback x Group interaction on the negative 
emotional reaction to the deviant targets, F(1,84) = 4.75, p = .032, ηp2 = .05. Participants 
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Figure 11 – Negative Emotional Reaction as a Function of Feedback, Group, and Target. 
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reported feeling less negative emotions towards the deviant when they believed to be morally 
disengaged, than when they believed to be morally engagement, but only within the ingroup, 
F(1,84) = 7.66, p = .007, ηp2 = .08. No differences between High Moral Disengagement and 
Low Moral Disengagement were found within the outgroup, F(1,84) < 1. Also consistent with 
our hypothesis, results showed that participants in the Low Moral Disengagement condition 
reported a marginally stronger negative emotional reaction to the ingroup deviant target as 
compared to the outgroup equivalent, F(1,84) = 3.78, p = .055, ηp2 = .04, whereas no such 
difference was found within the High Moral Disengagement condition, Fs(1,84) < 1.30.  
 The analyses conducted on the negative emotions associated to the normative targets 
yielded no effect of Group F(1,84) < 1. We found a marginal effect of Feedback, F(1,84) = 
5.23, p = .025, ηp2 = .06.  In general, when participants believed to be morally disengaged, they 
reported feeling more negative emotions triggered by the normative target (M = 2.60, SE = 
0.74) than when they believed to be morally engaged (M = 2.30, SE = 0.61). These results were 
qualified by a significant Feedback x Group interaction, F(1,84) = 5.49, p = .022, ηp2 = .06. As 
Measure M SE M SE M SE M SE
Negative Emotions
Deviant 3.75 0.82 4.05 0.84 4.49 0.80 3.98 0.97
Normative 2.82 0.84 2.40 0.58 2.17 0.60 2.41 0.61
Evaluation
Deviant 4.10 0.50 3.95 0.68 3.61 0.64 3.99 0.50
Normative 4.68 0.67 4.92 0.79 4.98 0.57 4.59 0.70
Table 4
Means and standard deviation for the effects of Feedback and Group on emotional reaction
to, and evaluation of, deviant and normative targets (Study 4).
High Moral Disengagement Low Moral Disengagement
Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup
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predicted, the emotions associated to the normative targets did not differ between High Moral 
Disengagement and Low Moral Disengagement, within the Outgroup condition, F(1,84) < 1 
(see Figure 11; see also Table 4)26.  
  
 Target’s evaluations. We expected participants who believed to be morally disengaged 
to adopt a lesser prescriptive focus, hence differentiating less between the ingroup targets (i.e., 
normative vs deviant) than participants who believed to be morally engaged. 
 The latter participants should derogate the ingroup deviant target as compared to the 
equivalent outgroup targets (consistent with SGDT’s predictions), whereas no such difference 
should occur in the High Moral Disengagement condition. Outgroup targets’ evaluations 
should not be affected by Feedback. 
 To test our hypothesis, we ran a Feedback x Group x Target ANOVA on the evaluation 
of the targets with repeated measures on the Target factor. We found a main effect of Target, 
F(1,84) = 98.05, p < .001, ηp2 = .54. Overall, the normative target (M = 4.79, SE = 0.70) was 
evaluated more positively than the deviant target (M = 3.91, SE = 0.60). This main effect was 
qualified by a significant three-way Feedback x Group x Target interaction, F(1,84) = 10.52, 
p = .002, ηp2 = .11. 
 Consistent with our hypothesis, the simple effects of Group within Priming and Target 
showed that participants in the Low Moral Disengagement condition evaluated the deviant 
                                                          
26 Inconsistent with our predictions, participants who believed to be disengaged with moral norms also 
reported stronger negative emotions to normative ingroup target than participants who believed to be 
morally engaged, F(1,84) = 10.24, p = .002, ηp2 = .11. It is possible that moral disengagement also has 
an impact on the emotional reaction to ingroup normative members. Obviously, this speculation should 
be subject to empirical verification. 
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ingroup target significantly more negatively than the deviant outgroup target, F(1,84) = 4.65, 
p = .034, ηp2 = .05, and the normative ingroup target marginally more positively than the similar 
outgroup target, F(1,84) = 3.41, p = .068, ηp2 = .04. No other effects of Group were significant, 
Fs < 1.39. 
 The simple effects of Feedback within Group and Target showed that participants in 
the Low Moral Disengagement condition evaluated the deviant ingroup target significantly 
more negatively than did the participants in the High Moral Disengagement condition, F(1,84) 
= 7.23, p = .009, ηp2 = .08. No other effects of Feedback were significant, Fs < 2.61. 
 Consistent to what would be expected by SGDT, we found a black sheep effect only in 
the Low Moral Disengagement condition. Participants in this condition differentiated more 
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Figure 12 – Target’s Evaluation as a Function of Feedback, Group, and Target. 
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between normative and deviant targets of the ingroup than did between the equivalent targets 
of the outgroup, F(1,84) = 9.26, p = .003, ηp2 = .10. Differentiation between Targets across 
Group was similar for participants in the High Moral Disengagement condition, F(1,84) < 2.39. 
Adding to that, the differentiation between normative and deviant targets of the ingroup 
decreased significantly for the participants in the High Moral Disengagement condition, as 
compared to the equivalent targets in the Low Moral Disengagement condition, F(1,84) = 9.37, 
p = .003, ηp2 = .10. Differentiation between Targets across Priming was similar for participants 
in the Outgroup condition, F(1,84) < 2.23 (see Figure 12; see also Table 4).  
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160 
 
  
161 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The main goal of our work was to assess the causes and the processes that allow 
individuals to tolerate deviants emerging in their groups. We believe that there are many social 
contexts in which derogation of ingroup deviants helps individuals to uphold a positive social 
identity. As a case in point, research inspired by SGDT has consistently demonstrated this 
phenomenon with studies on the black sheep effect (see Marques & Páez, 1994, for a review). 
SGDT is inspired by the social identity framework (e.g., Tajfel, 1978), and postulates that the 
combined operation of intragroup and intergroup processes is a crucial way in which 
individuals sustain their belief that the ingroup has a positive social identity (e.g., Pinto et al., 
2010). According to this theory, descriptive and prescriptive norms concur, respectively, to 
specify the categories and related group memberships which account for any given social 
context, and to specify the normative requirements for the establishment of a positive social 
identity (e.g., Marques & Páez, 2008; Marques, Páez, et al., 1998; Pinto et al., 2010). Once the 
intergroup setting is established, ingroup deviance may or may not become salient. If it 
becomes salient, individuals direct their attention to whether ingroup members’ behavior meet 
thee normative requirements that allow them to claim that the ingroup is positively distinctive 
from a relevant outgroup in that situation. As a result, they develop a punitive attitude towards 
ingroup members whose behavior does not grant validity to that claim, i.e. deviant ingroup 
members. This attitude emerges in terms of negative evaluations of these ingroup members. 
Concomitantly, individuals upgrade other members whose behavior validates a positive social 
identity. In short, according to SGDT, such strong evaluative differentiation between 
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normative and deviant ingroup members fulfils individuals’ motivation to achieve and to 
sustain a positive social identity (e.g., Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 2001; Marques, Páez, et 
al., 1998; Pinto et al., 2010). 
In spite of the above facts, recent research in the realm of SGDT has shown that 
sometimes individuals may tolerate ingroup deviants, rather than derogating them. This is 
particularly true when deviants are perceived to be useful to the group, (e.g., Morton et al., 
2007), or if they occupy an especially relevant position in the group.(e.g., Abrams et al., 2008; 
Abrams et al., 2013; Pinto et al., 2010; Randsley de Moura & Abrams, 2013; Randsley de 
Moura, Abrams, Marques, & Hutchison, 2011). 
Along this work, we argued that whether individuals derogate or tolerate ingroup 
deviants depend, at least in part, on the fact that they feel legitimated to do so. We suggested 
that the manifestation of tolerance towards ingroup deviants is underpinned by moral 
disengagement mechanisms. Through these mechanisms, individuals would, for example, be 
able to justify ingroup members’ negative actions, look for ways to diminish the negative 
implication of those action, or the personal responsibility of those members, or construe the 
consequences of such actions so that they would appear less negative than they actually are 
(see Bandura et al., 1996). Key to this process would be the activation of emotional 
mechanisms acting as a buffer between the prescriptive standards for behavior that individuals 
internalized and the attitudes triggered by the deviant ingroup members. 
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Overview of the Main Findings 
 We examined the above summarized idea in four studies. In Study 1, Porto citizens 
stated their opinion about a deviant gang that operated in the city and was clearly identified to 
be composed by other naturals of Porto. We found that moral disengagement was negatively 
associated with the negative emotional reaction towards the targets, and was positively 
associated with their evaluations. Concomitantly, such negative emotional reaction was 
negatively associated with the evaluation of the targets. Finally, these variables were more 
associated with perceived threat to the image of the ingroup. These results are in line with 
previous research showing that individuals often react emotionally to the conduct of fellow 
ingroup members (e.g., Biernat et al., 1999; Johns et al., 2005; Lickel et al., 2011). More 
importantly they suggest that emotional reactions to ingroup deviants play an important role in 
how these deviants are evaluated by other group members. Also importantly, these results 
support the long claimed (e.g., Marques & Páez, 1994) but seldom tested idea that evaluations 
of ingroup deviants are associated with the negative emotions triggered by these deviants  (see 
Biernat et al., 1999; Johns et al., 2005; Lickel et al., 2005; Lickel et al., 2011). In brief, this 
study suggested that, as we argued, moral disengagement may be at the basis of negative 
emotions triggered by ingroup members’ misconduct and that these members are evaluated in 
light of these emotions.  
In Study 2, Portuguese participants learned about a fictitious case of a Portuguese or 
Spanish CEO of a Portuguese company, who disrespected ethical rules of conduct that 
culminated either in big profits, or in big losses, to that Portuguese company. From all targets, 
participants were more tolerant towards the ingroup target whose deviant behavior had positive 
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impact in the company. The ingroup target whose behavior was harmful was as negatively 
evaluated as were the outgroup targets irrespective of their contribution to the company. We 
also found greater levels of moral disengagement, and weaker negative emotional reactions, 
when participants were faced with an ingroup profitable target, as compared to an ingroup 
unprofitable, and to both outgroup, targets. As expected, outgroup deviants triggered no 
different moral disengagement, negative emotions, and judgements, irrespective of their 
contribution for the company they managed. Finally, moral disengagement and its effect in 
mitigating negative emotions mediated the effect of deviants’ contribution to the ingroup goals, 
on the evaluation of ingroup, but not outgroup, deviants. 
These results support our thesis that individuals may resort to moral disengagement as 
an alternative to derogating ingroup deviants when the context provides some legitimacy to do 
so (in the present case, when the ingroup deviant’s behavior was beneficial to the group). Moral 
disengagement mitigates negative emotions triggered by the deviant, ultimately leading 
individuals to evaluate the deviant less unfavorably than if moral disengagement did not occur. 
Differences in moral disengagement, negative emotions and evaluations across conditions 
suggested that, when judging targets, individuals consider not only their ingroup membership, 
but also the extent to which they comply with, or oppose, relevant group norms, and the 
consequences of the targets’ actions to the ingroup. Hence, profitability of the target seems to 
serve as a legitimating cue for the activation of moral disengagement mechanisms (and 
consequently, lenient treatment), provided that the target is an ingroup member. In addition to 
providing support to our idea, these results are in line with recent literature demonstrating that 
individuals can feel morally disengaged as a consequence for others’ misbehavior (Traclet et 
al., 2015). Regarding the emotions evoked by the targets the results of Study 2 support the idea 
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that disengagement from moral norms decreases negative emotions associated with deviant 
behavior (see Bandura, 2001; Bandura et al., 1996; Boardley & Kavussanu, 2010; Traclet et 
al., 2015). Finally, also in support of the process that we postulated to account for this 
phenomenon, we found that the mediation of moral disengagement and negative emotions 
between the deviant’s contribution to the group and their evaluation only emerged when the 
deviant was an ingroup, but not an outgroup, member. This suggests that moral disengagement 
is a strategy that serves the motivation to achieve and maintain a positive social identity and is 
an alternative to the strong derogation of ingroup deviants that has been typically found in 
SGDT studies (Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 2001; Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques et al., 
1988). 
In Study 3 we Portuguese participants answered questions about a Portuguese member 
of a former cabinet whose income had grown exponentially after he left office. According to 
conditions, this target was a member either of the participants’ ingroup party or of a rival 
outgroup party and was either a veteran member or a new member of that party. We found that 
the ingroup veteran target was judged less unfavorably than all other targets, and that this was 
associated with a stronger moral disengagement and less negative emotions as compared to the 
remaining, ingroup new member or outgroup, targets. Furthermore, moral disengagement and 
the negative emotional reaction accounted for the less negative evaluations of the ingroup 
veteran target. This mediation did not occur for the outgroup targets irrespective of their status 
In Study 4, Portuguese university students answered to a fictitious test that, supposedly, 
allowed to provide them with feedback about the importance they ascribe to moral norms. 
Based on this feedback, participants were divided in two moral disengagement conditions 
(High vs. Low Moral Disengagement). Participants then learned about two ingroup or outgroup 
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targets who had expressed socially desirable and undesirable opinions regarding students’ 
participation in decision-making about Portugal’s higher education policies. We found that the 
ingroup deviant target was more negatively evaluated than the outgroup deviant target, and 
that the ingroup normative target was more positively than the outgroup normative target. 
However, this only occurred with those participants who had been led to believe that they were 
highly engaged with moral norms. Participants who had been led to believe that they were 
morally disengaged were more tolerant towards the ingroup deviant. In addition, participants 
who believed to be morally engaged differentiated more between normative and deviant targets 
when they were members of the ingroup than when they were members of the outgroup. 
Conversely, participants who believed to be morally disengaged did not differentiate between 
normative and deviant targets in general. Concomitantly, participants who were morally 
disengaged reported less negative emotions associated with the ingroup deviant target than did 
participants who were morally engaged, whereas the emotional reaction to outgroup deviants 
did not differ between participants who believed to be morally disengaged and those who 
believed to be morally engaged. 
 In the whole, the results of our four studies are in line with our predictions that moral 
disengagement may ensue from situations which legitimize its occurrence, and that, following 
such a moral disengagement, participants become more tolerant vis-a-vis deviant ingroup 
members because they feel less negative emotions about the deviants. 
As regards previous theory and research on reactions to group deviance, this suggests 
that moral engagement occurs in the classical conditions studied by research on the black sheep 
effect (see Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 2001; Marques, Robalo, & Rocha, 1992; Marques et 
al., 1988), in which individuals face with salience of ingroup deviance engage in strong 
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prescriptive focus, hence derogating the ingroup deviant and upgrading the ingroup normative 
(see Pinto et al., 2010). In turn, moral disengagement decreases individuals prescriptive focus, 
and this leads them to become more tolerant of ingroup deviance, perhaps because moral 
disengagement decreases the negative emotional impact of norm breaking by ingroup 
members. This suggests that individuals activate moral disengagement mechanisms as a means 
to protect their social identity from the threat of ingroup deviants, by decreasing that threat that 
the deviants’ behavior represents to the group instead of doing it by rejecting and punishing 
the deviants themselves. 
Emotions and Subjective Group Dynamics Theory  
One goal of our thesis was to demonstrate that emotions play an important role in the 
intragroup processes postulated by SGDT. As we stated in overview and hypotheses section 
introductory to our studies, we believe that SGDT has still a long way to go in the study of the 
impact of emotions on individuals’ reactions to ingroup deviants. There have been some 
previous explorations of  the relation between emotional reactions and motivation for 
distancing oneself from ingroup deviants (Johns et al., 2005), as well as of the relation between 
general mood and the black sheep effect (Biernat et al., 1999). However, we are not aware of 
any studies aiming specifically at understanding the role of negative emotions on the evaluation 
of ingroup deviants. With our present work, we attempted to demonstrate that evaluations of 
ingroup deviants are associated with the negative emotions they generate, and that such 
emotions play a much lesser role on evaluations of deviant outgroup members, specifically 
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because these member’s’ behavior is much less relevant to individuals’ social identity than is 
deviant behavior by ingroup members. 
In support of the above idea, we found that negative emotions were indeed associated 
with the evaluation of ingroup deviants (Study 1) and helped to explain why some ingroup 
deviants are tolerated whereas others are derogated. This was not the case for outgroup targets 
(Studies 2 and 3). Furthermore, stronger negative emotional reactions were the outcome of 
situations leading to a weaker moral disengagement, but not of situations leading to a stronger 
mora disengagement (studies 2-4). 
Moral Disengagement versus Prescriptive Focus 
 The four studies reported in this thesis demonstrate that individuals are sometimes more 
prone to diminish the importance of deviant ingroup behavior than to punish such behavior. 
This seems to occur namely when ingroup deviance appears useful to, or when deviants are 
preeminent members of, the ingroup. We reviewed previous evidence that is consistent with 
this phenomenon (e.g., Abrams et al., 2013; Morton et al., 2007).  More importantly, our own 
evidence may provide an explanation for this outcome. Our studies suggest that moral 
disengagement may be a psychological tool that could ultimately allow individuals to deny the 
existence of ingroup deviants, hence keeping their social identity out of harm’s way. According 
to SGDT the presence of ingroup deviants triggers the adoption of a prescriptive focus by other 
ingroup members, such that ingroup transgressors may endure strong derogatory reactions, 
while members who follow group norms are positively evaluated (e.g., Marques, Abrams, & 
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Serôdio, 2001; Marques & Páez, 1994). Our experiments suggest that individuals may apply 
to moral disengagement as an alternative means to fulfill the same motivation of protecting 
their positive social identity, provided that they perceive that the situation offers cues that 
legitimize such strategy. 
Moral Disengagement and the Emotional Concomitants of the Reaction to Ingroup 
Deviants 
 At this point, we may draw three major conclusions from this work. First, results from 
the four studies suggest that the emotional reaction towards ingroup deviants should be dealt 
with as a central component process in subjective group dynamics, as it helps to explain both 
derogatory and lenient reactions towards ingroup deviants. This is in accordance with previous 
research showing that ingroup deviants may trigger strong emotional reactions on other 
members of the group (e.g., Doosje et al., 1998; Johns et al., 2005; Lickel et al., 2011; 
Schmader et al., 2012). 
Second, moral disengagement seems to involve a set of mechanisms that can operate at 
the intragroup level. This is in line with previous work on moral disengagement mechanisms 
demonstrating that these can be triggered vicariously, when individuals observe other’s 
misconducts (e.g., Traclet et al., 2015). 
Third, and in complement to the above point, ingroup members may opt for moral 
disengagement instead of derogating ingroup deviants in pursuing a similar motivation to 
protect the relative superiority of the ingroup in intergroup settings. Actually, we may suggest 
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that when ingroup deviance is salient, and the social context legitimizes it, moral 
disengagement may suit that motivation better than does deviant derogation. Indeed, whereas 
the latter strategy requires that the existence of deviants in the ingroup to be recognized (and 
even made highly conspicuous following a strong negative reaction), moral disengagement 
allows to deny the existence of the deviants and to maintain the spotless normative character 
of the ingroup. In this vein, we may even go a step further by shifting the angle from which we 
look at the process, and argue that the adoption of a prescriptive focus only occurs in situations 
in which moral disengagement is not granted, instead of assuming that moral disengagement 
only occurs in situations in which it is legitimized. More than a simple word game, this idea 
would put derogation of ingroup deviants under another perspective that evades the 
mechanistic idea of a punitive reaction, to a more strategically shaped idea that subjective 
social control ensues from the appraisal of the benefits and costs of derogating ingroup 
deviants. 
Going back to the anecdotal evidence we cited in Chapter III, it seems clear to us that 
deviants such as Diego Maradona, the soccer player, or Isaltino Morais, the city mayor, are 
subject of leniency because it is easier, and less unpleasant, for their fellow ingroup members 
to devaluate the norms that they transgressed, than to depreciate the actors themselves.  
Practical Implications of this Thesis and its Shortfalls 
 Research in social psychology is often considered to be devoid of practical usefulness. 
The truth is that this thesis did not aim for an applied research. Besides, its main goal was to 
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ascertain the cognitive and emotional processes underlying relatively well-established group 
processes. Nevertheless, we believe that there are two main practical implications that are, in 
fact, different sides of the same coin. 
We argue that this thesis shows that, given the right context, ingroup members may 
prefer to tolerate deviants, and that they do so by downgrading the importance of the norms at 
stake (through mechanisms of moral disengagement), which translates in less negative feelings 
towards those deviants. Understanding this empowers one to influence others into tolerating, 
or rejecting, deviance to occur within groups. As we have showed, simply by making people 
believe they are more or less morally engaged leads them to be less or more tolerant to displays 
of deviant behavior by fellow ingroupers. One can imagine for example a group leader that 
may prime group members into being more morally disengaged, as to promote innovation 
within the group (in a positive perspective), or as to have room for himself (or others) to engage 
in less noble conduct (in a negative perspective). This can have implications in fields of 
knowledge that are adjacent to social psychology, such as political science or business 
management. 
Whatever the practical implications may be, this thesis also presents some limitations. 
For example, results on the evaluation of veteran and newbie ingroup targets (in Study 3) are 
somewhat inconclusive, which undermines further conclusions namely with respect to 
mediation analysis we conducted. That was probably due to a less efficient manipulation of 
target status. Moreover, the negative emotions to normative ingroup members (in Study 4) 
delivered unexpected, and hard to explain, results. Maybe pen-and-paper measuring techniques 
are insufficient to collect precise information about participants’ emotions. Future research 
could focus on more advanced measures of emotional reactions (such as physiological-
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assessing technologies). Finally, we are aware that the empirical content of this thesis could be 
extended with more studies, perhaps using larger and more diverse samples. For example, this 
thesis does not ascertain whether engaging in mechanisms of moral disengagement does result 
in the restauration of a positive social identity. Future research should address these limitations. 
Finally, although this thesis has probably raised more questions than the questions it 
has answered, we hope that the work we presented along these pages has contributed to deepen 
the understanding of how groups react to deviance within their ranks, and that our readers find 
our efforts were fruitful. 
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APPENDIX I – MATERIALS USED IN STUDY 1 
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 Note: Study 1 was conducted online, using Qualtrics. In this appendix, you will find a 
series of screenshots from the screens shown to participants. Because the height of some of the 
screens shown to participants surpassed that of the pages in this thesis, there are screens that 
may be split between two or more pages. For your reference, sometimes you will see a button 
labeled “PRÓXIMA PÁGINA” on the bottom right of the screenshot. This signals a page break 
in the actual questionnaire that was shown to participants. 
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APPENDIX II – MATERIALS USED IN STUDY 2 
[Example: Ingroup/Profitable condition] 
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Idade__________  
Sexo: Feminino  Masculino  
 
Este questionário tem como objectivo conhecer as atitudes dos portugueses relativamente a leis de 
vários países da união Europeia sobre a gestão de fundos públicos pelas Empresas Públicas. Por favor, 
dê-nos a sua opinião sincera. Este questionário será protegido, e utilizado apenas para fins da 
investigação que estamos a realizar.  
 
Pedimos-lhe que, enquanto cidadão(cidadã) Português(a), indique o seu grau de acordo com cada uma 
das seguintes afirmações (1 = Discordo; 7 = Concordo): 
 
Agora, gostaríamos de saber a sua opinião sobre as leis que legislam a gestão do financiamento dado 
pelo Estado Português às empresas públicas. No entanto, este tema tem sido alvo de muita polémica. 
Pedimos-lhe, por isso, que leia o seguinte texto, que resume os dados principais da polémica, e que 
responda às questões que se seguem. 
A função dos impostos é cobrir os gastos públicos do Estado, para que este possa garantir os 
direitos essenciais dos indivíduos. Os direitos mencionados na Constituição Portuguesa são: a 
Educação, a Saúde, o Trabalho, a Segurança, a Proteção à Maternidade e à Infância, a Assistência aos 
Desamparados, entre outros. É ainda previsto que a República Portuguesa constitua uma sociedade 
livre, justa e solidária, que garanta o desenvolvimento nacional, erradique a pobreza e a 
marginalidade, e reduza as desigualdades sociais. 
O país deve produzir a riqueza necessária para garantir os direitos acima referidos e outros. No 
entanto, tendo em conta os dados comparativos entre os PIB’s dos vários Países da União Europeia, 
Portugal é um dos que menos cresce, menos investe, menos poupa, mas que ainda assim tem uma 
grande despesa pública. 
 
Na página seguinte, pode ler a informação sobre um caso verídico passado numa empresa pública 
portuguesa. Por favor, leia com atenção e responda aos itens que se seguem, assinalando com uma cruz, 
o algarismo que melhor traduz a sua opinião. 
 
 
Estou empenhado(a) em contribuir positivamente para a sociedade Portuguesa. 
Discordo 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo 
 
Tenho orgulho em ser Português(a). 
Discordo 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo 
 
Sinto que sou parte importante da sociedade Portuguesa. 
Discordo 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo 
 
Ser Português(a) é importante para mim. 
Discordo 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo 
 
Muitas vezes penso em mim enquanto Português(a). 
Discordo 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo 
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…muito parecido com os outros portugueses. 
Discordo 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo 
 
…o “português típico”. 
Discordo 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Na minha opinião, de modo geral, Francisco Pinho é… 
  
Francisco Pinho (nome fictício) é um dos gestores de uma empresa pública portuguesa. Uma 
auditoria às contas desta empresa acusou a prática de utilização indevida de dinheiros públicos. 
Com efeito, Francisco Pinho não só não submeteu projectos de obras de construção civil de 
montante elevado a concurso público, como ainda adjudicou estas obras a “pessoas 
conhecidas”. Numa entrevista a um órgão de comunicação social local, Francisco Pinho afirmou 
que “por vezes, é impossível seguir os trâmites legais normais. A realização do concurso público 
exigiria mais dinheiro à empresa do que o que esta gastou, e eu tenho total confiança nas 
pessoas que a empresa contratou para a realização das obras.” A empresa pública da qual 
Francisco Pinho é gestor, apresentou um lucro de cerca de 4.000.000€ no ano de 2010. 
 
Fazer “batota” na gestão de empresas públicas é a única forma que os gestores têm para 
impedir que essas empresas se afundem, portanto é compreensível que eles o façam. 
Discordo 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo 
 
Quando comparado com algumas coisas que outras pessoas fazem, não ser completamente 
transparente na gestão de empresas públicas não é assim tão grave. 
Discordo 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo 
 
Uma gestão com recurso a “artimanhas” é apenas uma forma de os gestores públicos se 
desenrascarem. 
Discordo 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo 
 
Os gestores públicos têm de usar estratégias de gestão ilícitas simplesmente porque o 
contexto actual os obriga a isso. 
Discordo 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo 
 
Na generalidade, todos os gestores públicos utilizam estratagemas mais ou menos ilícitos, 
portanto isso não é assim tão preocupante. 
Discordo 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo 
 
Não há problema em fazer uma gestão menos transparente das empresas públicas, porque 
isso não prejudica assim tanto as pessoas. 
Discordo 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo 
 
A sociedade em geral é grande responsabilidade por haver gestores públicos que fazem 
“batota” nas empresas que gerem. 
Discordo 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo 
 
Normalmente, quem é prejudicado por gestores públicos com práticas pouco transparentes 
são pessoas que pouco importam, portanto, essas práticas não são assim tão graves. 
Discordo 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo 
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Má 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Boa 
 
Em que medida é que o caso que acabou de ler… 
 
No geral, a minha opinião sobre Francisco Pinho é… 
 
 
 
 
Acho que Francisco Pinho deve ser uma pessoa… 
 
 
Obrigado pela sua colaboração. 
  
o/a faz sentir bem/lhe provoca boas sensações. 
Discordo 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo 
 
o/a faz sentir curioso/a.  
Discordo 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo 
 
o/a faz sentir satisfeito/a. 
Discordo 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo 
 
o/a surpreende. 
Discordo 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo 
 
o/a deixa triste. 
Discordo 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo 
 
o/a enerva 
Discordo 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo 
 
o/a deixa indiferente. 
Discordo 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo 
 
o/a faz sentir algum receio. 
Discordo 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo 
 
o/a deixa envergonhado/a. 
Discordo 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo 
 
 
Gananciosa 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Generosa 
               
Insensata 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Sensata 
               
Desleal 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Leal 
               
Desrespeitadora 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Respeitadora 
               
Sem princípios 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Com princípios 
               
Incapaz 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Capaz 
               
Incompetente 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Competente 
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APPENDIX III – MATERIALS USED IN STUDY 3 
[Example: Socialist Party/Veteran condition] 
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 Note: Study 3 was conducted online, using Qualtrics. In this appendix, you will find a 
series of screenshots from the screens shown to participants. Because the height of some of the 
screens shown to participants surpassed that of the pages in this thesis, there are screens that 
may be split between two or more pages. For your reference, sometimes you will see a button 
labeled “PRÓXIMA PÁGINA” on the bottom right of the screenshot. This signals a page break 
in the actual questionnaire that was shown to participants. 
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APPENDIX IV – MATERIALS USED IN STUDY 4 
[Example: High Moral Disengagement/Ingroup condition] 
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 Note: Study 4 was conducted online, using Qualtrics. In this appendix, you will find a 
series of screenshots from the screens shown to participants. Because the height of some of the 
screens shown to participants surpassed that of the pages in this thesis, there are screens that 
may be split between two or more pages. For your reference, sometimes you will see a button 
labeled “PRÓXIMA PÁGINA” on the bottom right of the screenshot. This signals a page break 
in the actual questionnaire that was shown to participants. 
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This is an example of the paintings used in the bogus test. In total, six paintings similar to this were 
used. 
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The three images in this page correspond to one screen each. These screens were programmed to 
advance automatically, without the participant’s intervention. Hence the lack of the button labeled 
“PRÓXIMA PÁGINA”. 
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The three images in this page correspond to one screen each. These screens were programmed to 
advance automatically, without the participant’s intervention. Hence the lack of the button labeled 
“PRÓXIMA PÁGINA”. 
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